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Abstract 
Air transportation liberalization led to significant changes on aviation because of a 
substantial increase in air transportation demand. The airline industry has diversified its 
business models, adopting a hub-and-spoke network structure and creating low cost 
carriers. Consequently, airfares dropped and competition and flight frequency increased 
for the main markets. But it has also contributed for increasing congestion at airports 
and to the establishment of subsidy schemes to serve sparsely populated regions with 
implications for airlines and passengers. This thesis is concerned with the development 
of specific tools to deal with these two types of air transportation networks. The thesis 
extends the existing work in network design formulation to the situation of both 
congested and low demand networks.  
Aviation network design models determine the flight schedule and fleet assignment for 
a given network. Typically, they are developed by airlines as a core part of the airline 
planning process. In this thesis, these models are extended to encompass other 
perspectives. Three main perspectives are dealt with in this thesis: airline, aviation 
authority, and government. The optimization models proposed are linear and mixed-
integer with the objective of maximizing profits or minimizing costs. 
Networks operated under congestion are becoming more frequent as airport capacity is 
incapable to cope with the increasing demand for air transportation. This phenomenon is 
responsible for very large costs for airline and passengers. Therefore, it is necessary to 
Abstract 
xxiv 
mitigate delays without compromising airline profitability, passengers’ connectivity and 
service frequency. Three optimization models were developed in the thesis to study 
delay impacts in the perspective of governments, airlines, and aviation authorities. 
After liberalization, both the US and the EU launched subsidy schemes to prevent 
sparsely populated and remote regions from becoming underserved with respect to air 
transportation. In this case, schedule services without subsidies would not be viable. 
Governments set a minimum level of service to be satisfied by the operating airline and, 
at the same, give public subsidies for its operation. In this thesis, two decision 
approaches are developed to help governments setting the level of service required to be 
satisfied by the airlines.  These decision approaches are based on network design 
optimization models in which all relevant costs and revenues for the government 
analysis are involved, including airline and airport costs and revenues, and passenger 
time costs.  
Another objective of the thesis was to apply the models to case studies based on real 
world networks. Indeed, all models were applied to different networks, depending on 
their objectives, with significant improvements from the current networks. Formulations 
could cope with the size and complexity of real world networks, as all the applications 
reached optimal solutions. For congested networks were used the Portuguese air 
transportation system (Chapter 2), the main European network (Chapter 3), and the TAP 
network (Chapter 4). For subsidized networks were used the Azores network (Chapter 
5) and the Norwegian regional network (Chapter 6). Results show the usefulness of the 
optimization models as capable tools to help airlines, aviation authorities, and 
governments in their network design decisions. 
 xxv 
Resumo 
A liberalização do sistema de transporte aéreo, primeiro nos EUA e depois na Europa, 
transformou significativamente o sistema existente, com efeito direto no aumento da 
procura de viagens aéreas. Para este aumento contribuiu também a mudança no modelo 
de negócio das companhias aéreas, seja pelo aparecimento das companhias low-cost, 
seja pela mudança operacional para um sistema hub-and-spoke. Paralelamente, os 
preços diminuíram, a competição entre companhias aumentou e a frequência de voos 
cresceu substancialmente nas rotas mais lucrativas. A abertura do mercado teve também 
algumas consequências que podem ser consideradas negativas, entre as quais, o 
aumento dos atrasos e congestionamento nos maiores aeroportos e a necessidade de 
estabelecer esquemas de subsídio para manter as operações aéreas para locais remotos 
e/ou de fraca procura.  
Esta tese aprofunda o trabalho existente na formulação do desenho de redes de 
transporte aéreo para as situações específicas de redes de transporte aéreo operadas seja 
com congestionamento, seja com subsídios públicos.  
Os modelos de desenho de redes desenvolvidos determinam, para cada situação em 
análise, o horário e o tipo de avião para cada voo. Estes modelos foram concebidos para 
serem aplicados por companhias aéreas como parte central do seu planeamento 
operacional. Nesta tese, contudo, estes modelos são adaptados a outras situações e 
perspetivas, como sejam, governos e autoridades aeronáuticas. Os modelos de 
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otimização propostos são lineares e inteiros-mistos tendo como objetivo maximizar 
lucros ou minimizar custos de uma rede de transporte aéreo. 
O congestionamento nos maiores aeroportos mundiais tem vindo a crescer à medida que 
a procura desses aeroportos se aproxima da sua capacidade máxima. Esta situação 
origina custos muito significativos para as companhias aéreas, para os passageiros e 
para a economia. Desta forma, é necessário mitigar o efeito dos atrasos sem 
comprometer a viabilidade económica das companhias aéreas nem o nível de serviço e 
conectividade dos passageiros. Esta tese estuda os efeitos do congestionamento através 
de três modelos de otimização desenvolvidos para uma rede em que aeroportos e 
companhias aéreas são controlados publicamente, para uma rede de aeroportos e 
companhias que operam e competem num sistema congestionado e para uma companhia 
aérea que opera em competição.   
 Durante o processo de liberalização do transporte aéreo foi identificada a necessidade 
de salvaguardar as regiões (e populações) remotas para as quais a acessibilidade 
depende da existência de ligações aéreas. Neste caso, os governos podem subsidiar a 
operação destas rotas, estipulando, para tal, serviços mínimos a serem cumpridos pela 
companhia aérea. Nesta tese são desenvolvidas ferramentas para apoiar os governos em 
decisões sobre os requisitos a exigir às companhias aéreas. Estas ferramentas baseiam-
se em modelos de otimização do desenho de redes nos quais são tidos em conta os 
custos e receitas das companhias aéreas, os custos do tempo dos passageiros e os custos 
e receitas de operação dos aeroportos.    
Outro objetivo desta tese é a aplicação dos modelos desenvolvidos a estudos de caso 
baseados em problemas reais. Efetivamente, todos os modelos foram aplicados a redes 
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de transporte aéreo, dependendo do seu objetivo e contexto. As formulações são 
capazes de lidar com a dimensão e complexidade das redes existentes, tendo atingido o 
resultado ótimo em todas as situações. Para as redes com congestionamento as 
aplicações foram à rede portuguesa de transporte aéreo (Capítulo 2), ao conjunto dos 10 
maiores aeroportos e 9 maiores companhias aéreas na Europa (Capítulo 3) e à rede da 
TAP (Capítulo 4). Para as redes subsidiadas foi usada a rede do Arquipélago dos Açores 
(Capítulo 5) e a rede regional da Noruega (Capítulo 6). Os resultados obtidos 
demonstram as potencialidades dos modelos desenvolvidos e a sua utilidade prática para 
companhias aéreas, governos e autoridades aeronáuticas.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The liberalization of air transportation in developed economies, particularly North 
America and Europe, has shifted decisively the mobility of people and goods over the 
last 30 years. Indeed, the growth in air transportation demand after liberalization has 
been much higher than before: for the European Union (EU) the annual growth in the 
number of passengers was around 33 percent after the 1992 liberalization comparing to 
values in the 1980s of 4 to 6 percent (INTERVISTAS, 2006). Furthermore, as the world 
becomes more global and the need for transportation and communication increases, the 
impact of air transportation beyond the industry raises (GOETZ and GRAHAM, 2004). 
In 2006, the industry had an induced impact on world GDP and employment of over 
USD 1.1 trillion and 14.7 million, respectively (ATAG, 2008).  
For the future, it is expected that liberalization will extend to other parts of the World, 
especially developing countries. Indeed, according to IATA (2007) only 17 percent of 
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the international traffic is conducted in a deregulated environment and cabotage rights 
are forbidden for foreign airlines except within the European Union. Despite that, it is 
forecast that demand for air travel will continue to increase at a fast rate not only in 
developing regions but also in mature markets (IATA, 2011).  
As demand for air transportation, competition between airlines and airports, and airport 
usage is increasing, it becomes more important to improve the design of air 
transportation networks  in order to cope with the multiple challenges faced by the 
industry. The development of air transportation also led to diversified airline and airport 
business models and to changes in the government role.  
In a liberalized system, the competition between airlines led to changes in the airline 
operations: point-to-point to hub-and-spoke network configuration; concentration in the 
most profitable routes; and an overall yield reduction, although hub premiums may be 
charged by air carriers in their hubs (PELS, 2008). Another main change in the last 25 
years was the emergence of low-cost airlines. It has driven new passengers to the 
industry, through the launch of new routes, which has made regional/secondary airports 
appear as competitors for traditional airports. Airports have diversified their revenues, 
and commercial revenues currently accounting for almost half of total airport revenues 
(GRAHAM, 2009), while their market power has been reduced considerably as airlines 
can enter and exit airports much more easily (STARKIE, 2012) and competition from 
secondary airports has risen. Finally, governments are adopting a more regulatory rather 
than ownership role, with the privatization of many previously state-owned airlines 
especially in Europe (ALVES and BARBOT, 2008). The regulatory roles, where 
governments are a key stakeholder, focus on bilateral agreements for international 
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traffic and on airport ownership and slot allocation definition. All the previous changes 
combined have enhanced consumer welfare by increasing flight frequency and lowering 
prices (SCHIPPER et al., 2007).  
Despite all gains from liberalization, there are some consequences that might hamper 
some benefits in the future if not dealt with properly. On the one hand, demand for 
airport capacity has increased much more than supply leading to severe delays at the 
main airports that may compromise future growth of air transportation. On the other 
hand, sparsely populated regions had become underserved without subsidy schemes, as 
airlines shifted their operations towards more profitable routes.  
Congestion and airport delays are a direct, and probably inevitable, effect of the growth 
in air transportation, as many busy airports lack capacity to accommodate flight demand 
(NERA, 2004). Airport capacity is, indeed, a serious limitation to the growth in air 
transportation (DE NEUFVILLE and ODONI, 2003). A comprehensive study by 
NEXTOR (2010) estimates the cost of delays for the US economy in 2007 to be 32.9 
billion USD, of which more than 16 billion USD were direct costs for passengers and 8 
billion direct costs to airlines. The delay cost for the airlines can be compared with an 
overall profit of 5 billion USD for the US domestic carriers in 2007 (ATA, 2008). In 
Europe, average arrival delay in 2011 was 10.3 minutes comparing to 15 minutes in 
2010, which is equivalent to an average of, respectively, 28.6 and 34.7 minutes per 
delayed flight. Almost half of delay in Europe is reactionary delay that cannot be 
accommodated by airline schedules (CODA, 2011; CODA, 2012).  In the long-term, 
congestion can be coped with the expansion of existing airports or the construction of 
new ones. In the short-term, however, it must be handled through a better use of airport 
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capacity, with appropriate demand management measures, and through network design 
improvements.  
The need for subsidizing networks connecting remote or sparsely populated regions was 
identified during the liberalization process to mitigate the predictable effects of a shift 
of airline operations to the most profitable routes with an unacceptable reduction of 
service for low demand regions (SANTANA, 2009). Consequently, both the US and the 
EU have created similar programs, respectively called Essential Air Service, EAS, and 
Public Service Obligation, PSO (BRAATHEN, 2011). Within these programs, public 
authorities award subsidies to airlines for operating those routes as a monopoly while 
satisfying required levels of service (WILLIAMS, 2005). In Europe, usual PSO 
requirements are the minimum flight frequency or number of seats per leg, maximum 
airfares, connectivity requirements, or aircraft requisites. Public authorities in charge of 
PSO need on the one hand, to: enhance accessibility to remote regions providing them 
with adequate air services and, on the other hand, to prevent excessive subsidies to the 
airlines, balancing public and private expenditure for the use of the air transportation 
network. Thus, the decision approach for setting PSO requirements can be seen as a 
network design problem for which social welfare considerations need to be taken into 
account. 
1.2 Research objectives 
The goal of this thesis is to develop aviation network design models for the cases of 
airport congestion and low demand. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no 
literature available about optimization models developed and applied to these types of 
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air transport networks. I believe that the one-fits-all approach of the existing network 
design models may not be sufficient to fully cover particular problems and issues that 
arise on congested and low demand networks, such as, passenger disruptions or the 
definition of a minimum level of service.  
In this thesis, network design models are dealt with from the airlines, governments, and 
aviation authorities’ perspectives in their operational, political, and administrative 
decisions, respectively. One main and three specific objectives have been set for 
congested and low demand networks. 
For congested air transportation networks, addressed on Chapters 2 to 4, the main 
objective is to develop optimization models that include flight and passenger delay 
considerations to mitigate the impact of congestion in air transportation networks. The 
specific objectives are as follows: 
1. Analyze the impacts of delays for airlines and passengers, particularly for 
disrupted passengers.  
2. Include airline slot constraints in network design models focusing on 
governments, airlines, and aviation authorities. 
3. Analyze the effect of airline competition for airport and airline delays in 
liberalized air transportation networks.  
For low demand air transportation networks, addressed on Chapters 5 and 6, the main 
objective is to develop decision approaches to define the minimum level of service for 
subsidized air transportation networks, based on network design optimization models. 
The specific objectives are as follows: 
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1. Analyze the usefulness of the decision approach to help government setting 
efficient level of services to be met by the operating airlines. 
2. Estimate passenger demand functions for low demand and subsidized air 
transportation networks as function of maximum airfares, network 
configuration, and required level of service. 
3. Analyze trade-offs between government, airport, airline and passenger welfare 
or cost savings from different level of service requirements. 
An additional objective of this thesis is to apply the models to real-world networks. 
These networks were chosen taking into account the specific problem to be addressed, 
the type of network, and the availability of data. It should be noticed that, despite the 
effort made to have access to the largest set of real-world information to accurately 
replicate the existing networks, the applications are hypothetical case studies.   
1.3 Outline 
The thesis is divided in seven chapters, being Chapters 1 and 7, respectively, the thesis 
introduction and conclusion. The five main chapters, Chapters 2 to 6, are all written in 
the format of a scientific paper. Some have already been submitted or accepted for 
publication, and others are expected to be submitted in the next months. This means that 
all chapters have an introduction, problem definition, model formulation, and an 
application. Consequently, the reader can decide to read the thesis in succession or each 
chapter independently. Inevitably there are some repetitions throughout the document 
that could not be avoided.    
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Even though each chapter can be read independently this thesis forms a consistent 
document and not only a collection of papers. Indeed, all chapters address a different 
aviation network design problem. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are devoted to congested networks, that is, networks that in frequent 
circumstances operate with delays. Also, the focus is on networks operated using 
mainly slot-constrained airports. Airport delays that can be mitigated are due to lack or 
less than optimal usage of airport capacity, or due to airline scheduling options that 
cannot accommodate expected delays. Three optimization models were developed to 
address these issues with different perspectives and complexity. 
Chapter 2 introduces an optimization model to determine the best possible slot 
allocation decisions for a publicly-controlled aviation network. The model is aimed at 
determining the best decisions to be made by the public authority (government or 
aviation authority on its behalf) with regard to airport slotallocation for a given aviation 
network and also to the flight schedules of the publicly-controlled airlines. The leg-
based demand for flights and the capacity of the airports are assumed to be known. The 
objective is to minimize the total social costs of satisfying a given leg-based air travel 
demand. The costs to minimize include flight costs, airport costs, passenger time costs, 
congestion costs, and spilled passenger costs. The practical usefulness of the model is 
illustrated with an application to the main aviation network of Portugal. 
Chapter 3 presents an optimization model to analyze whether airport capacity and 
airline slot distribution are capable to accommodate the expected passenger demand 
with lower costs to the network, including airport delay costs. The approach is set to be 
use in a liberalized, busy, congested, and slot-constrained air transportation network. 
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The optimization model developed to cope with the objective, determines the minimum 
cost network configuration (flight frequency, flight time, seats per leg) taking into 
account the market power of each airline, passenger demand per flight-leg, and expected 
values of airport delays. The usefulness of this approach is shown with an application to 
a network comprising 10 of the largest and most congested airports in Europe.  
Chapter 4 introduces an integrated flight scheduling and fleet assignment optimization 
model that takes aircraft and passenger delay costs explicitly into account. The objective 
of the model is to maximize the expected profits of an airline that faces a given O/D-
based travel demand and operates in congested, slot-constrained airports. Both airline 
competition and airline cooperation are dealt with in the model, though in a simplified 
manner. The model was applied to a case study involving the main network of TAP 
Portugal, which comprises 31 airports and 100 daily flights legs.  
Chapters 5 and 6 deal with subsidized air transportation networks. These networks 
connect sparsely populated regions, which are very often remote regions whose 
accessibility relies on air transportation. In both chapters, the objective is to develop a 
decision approach to define Public Service Obligations (PSO) requirements based on 
network design optimization models. Such an approach may prove valuable to 
governments responsible for designing public support systems, whose objective is to 
increase accessibility to sparsely populated regions yet minimize public expenditure 
over the air transport network.  
Chapter 5 proposes a decision approach designed to assist governments (aviation 
authorities) in the definition of PSO requirements. The approach is based on an 
integrated flight scheduling and fleet assignment optimization model that minimizes the 
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total social costs of satisfying a given target origin/destination demand. With the outputs 
of the optimization model the maximum airfares per market as well as the amount of 
public subsidies necessary to finance the network are computed. The usefulness of the 
approach is illustrated with an application to the network of Azores, one of the main 
European networks fully-operated according to the PSO system. 
Chapter 6 presents an approach to evaluate the social welfare of an air transportation 
network run under public support systems. The approach is based on a welfare based 
integrated flight scheduling and fleet assignment optimization model (WFSFA) that 
extends the optimization model presented in Chapter 5 mainly by considering airport 
costs, improving the passenger level of service analysis, and relaxing the hypothesis of a 
given targeted demand. With the optimization model outputs, a social welfare analysis 
is done distinguishing between passenger, airline, airport, and government surplus. The 
usefulness of this approach is shown with an application to the regional Norwegian 
network, which is the largest in Europe.   
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the work done within the scope of this thesis as well as 
its main conclusions. 
1.4 Publications 
As mentioned before, this thesis is organized on the basis of scientific papers. It is 
therefore important to refer the publications that are expected to result from the research 
made during the four years of the doctoral program. 
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Some of the papers have been submitted to international journals and have been 
accepted for publication or  are under review, and others will be submitted soon.The 
paper about the research made on integrated flight scheduling and fleet assignment 
under congestion with the application to the TAP network (Chapter 4) has been 
accepted for publication in Transportation Science. The paper about publicly-owned air 
transportation networks with the application to the Portuguese network (Chapter 2) has 
been submitted to the Journal of Air Transportation Management. The paper that 
analyzes whether airport capacity and airline slot distribution are capable to 
accommodate the expected passenger demand with lower costs to the network, 
including airport delay costs with an application to the ten airports and 8 largest airlines 
in Europe (Chapter 3) has not been submitted yet. The papers resulting from the 
research made about subsidized networks with an application to the Azores network 
was recently submitted to Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 
(Chapter 5) and the one with an application to the Norwegian regional network will be 
submitted very shortly to Transportation Research Part B: Methodological (Chapter 6). 
Beside the publications, the dissemination of the research developed in the doctoral 
program has been made in several international and national conferences between 2009 
and 2012. Indeed, all papers have been presented and discussed previously in one or 
more conferences. The full list of conferences is the following: 
 13th Air Transport Research Society Conference (13th ATRS), June 27-30, 
2009, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates – Chapter 2;  
 23rd European Conference on Operational Research (XXIII EURO), July 5-8, 
2009, Bonn, Germany  – Chapter 2;  
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 International Workshop on Advances in Airport, Air Traffic, and Airline 
Network Design, April 27, 2010, Lisbon, Portugal  – Chapter 4;  
 7th Triennial Symposium on Transportation Analysis (TRISTAN VII), June 20-
25, 2010, Tromso, Norway  – Chapter 4; 
 14th Air Transport Research Society Conference (14th ATRS), July 6-9, 2010, 
Porto, Portugal  – Chapter 4;  
 12
th
 World Conference on Transportation Research (XII WCTR), July 11-15, 
2010, Lisbon, Portugal  – Chapter 4;  
 8º Encontro do Grupo de Estudos em Transportes (8º GET), January 6-7, 2011, 
Esmoriz, Portugal – Chapters 3 and 4; 
 15º Congresso da Associação Portuguesa de Investigação Operacional (IO 
2011), April 18-20, 2011, Coimbra, Portugal – Chapters 2, 3 and 4; 
 1
st
 Annual INFORMS Transportation Science and Logistics Society Workshop: 
Congestion Management of Transportation Systems on the Ground and in the 
Air (), June 26-29, 2011, Pacific Grove, USA  – Chapter 3; 
 25º Congresso da Associação Nacional de Pesquisa e Ensino em Transportes 
(XXV ANPET), November 7-11, 2011, Belo Horizonte, Brazil  – Chapter 5;  
 9º Encontro do Grupo de Estudos em Transportes (9º GET), January, 5-6, 
Tomar, Portugal – Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5; 
 The Israeli Operations Research Society Conference 2012 (ORSIS 2012), June 
3-4, 2012, Jerusalem, Israel  – Chapter 6;  
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 13º Workshop da Associação Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento Regional: 
Policy Analysis of Complex Transport Systems, June 9, 2012, Ponta Delgada, 
Portugal  – Chapter 5; 
 E3 Forum: Education, Employment and Entrepreneurship (), June 28, 2012, 
Lisbon, Portugal – Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
  
Chapter 2  
Optimal Slot Allocation in Publicly-
Controlled Aviation Network: an 
application to Portugal 
2.1 Introduction 
Airport congestion is one of the main problems faced today by the air transportation 
industry. In the long-term, this problem may be coped with through the expansion of 
existing airports (runways and/or terminal buildings) and the construction of new ones, 
as well as through the improvement of air traffic control systems. However, in the short-
term, it is necessary to enhance the utilization of the existing airport capacity – in 
particular, by allocating airport slots to flights in a more efficient way. Indeed, the 
outcomes that slot allocation processes are currently leading to appear to be far from 
optimal from the social point of view (BRUECKNER and ZHANG, 2001; MADAS and 
ZOGRAFOS, 2006; MARQUES and BROCHADO, 2008).  
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In this chapter, is presented an optimization model to determine the best possible slot 
allocation decisions for a publicly-controlled aviation network and, more generally, the 
best possible design for that type of aviation network. The objective is to minimize the 
total social costs of satisfying a given leg-based air travel demand with a given aircraft 
fleet (the fleet of the airlines operating in the network). The costs to minimize include 
flight costs, airport costs, time costs, congestion costs, and spill costs. The model is 
intended as a tool for assisting aviation authorities in their decisions regarding slot 
allocation processes. 
Airport slot allocation and, in general, airport capacity utilization have been studied for 
the last 50 years. NEWELL (1979) analyzed how airport capacity depends of various 
factors – aircraft mix, departure and arrival flight times, and runway geometry – 
computing the “airport capacity curve” for an uneven mix of flight departures and 
arrivals. In the 1990s, this concept has been used in optimization models to define 
runway (ground) capacity (GILBO, 1993) and runway and near-terminal airspace 
capacity (GILBO, 1997) for individual airports. In recent years, these models have been 
extended to multi-airport networks by DELL’OLMO and LULLI (2003) and 
ANDREATTA et al. (2011), respectively for a deterministic and a stochastic context (to 
take into account e.g. uncertainty in weather conditions). The objectives considered in 
these models are the minimization of arrival and departures queues and the 
minimization of delays. 
The previous (single and multi-airport) optimization models determine airport capacity 
assuming the number of flight arrival and departures to be known. In our model, 
however, airport capacity is an input parameter. Indeed, we aim to design the aviation 
Optimal Slot Allocation in Publicly-Controlled Aviation Network 
17 
network that minimizes the total social costs of satisfying a given passenger demand, 
and, more specifically, how the slots of the airports included in the network should be 
allocated to flights. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, are presented 
and discussed the main ingredients of airport slot allocation problems. Afterward, is 
described the optimization model formulated to deal with such problems in a publicly-
controlled aviation network. The practical usefulness of the model in then illustrated 
with an application to the main aviation network of Portugal. In the final part of the 
Chapter, are made some concluding remarks and indicated the direction for future work 
in this area. 
2.2 Problem Ingredients 
Over the last three decades, air transportation went through a deregulation process that 
will most probably continue in the next decades (BELOBABA et al., 2009). Within this 
process, the role of governments (or aviation authorities on their behalf) has changed 
considerably, especially in the US and in Europe (GOETZ and GRAHAM, 2004, 
ALVES and BARBOT, 2008). Despite this, air transportation is still controlled very 
strictly in a vast majority of the world. Indeed, according to IATA (2007), only 17% of 
the international traffic takes place in a deregulated environment. Moreover, cabotage 
rights, which are the rights for an airline to transport passengers on the domestic routes 
of foreign countries, exist only in the European aviation space. This signifies that, at 
present, governments still occupy a key position in air transportation worldwide and 
even more so with respect to domestic networks.  
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The level of control exerted by a government over an aviation network varies 
considerably from country to country. Sometimes, the government (or some public 
entity) owns the airports included in the network and also the airline(s) that operate 
there, thus having full control over the network – in the sense that it can define flight 
schedules and airport slots (that is, airport capacity utilization). In other cases, the 
airports are owned by the government but at least some airline operating in the network 
is not. The level of control in these circumstances is lower, as the government can only 
define the airport slots and try to influence flight schedules (by way of its regulatory 
powers and in the framework of bilateral agreements with other governments within 
which the flight frequencies of the airlines are defined). Finally, if the government does 
not own airlines and airports, it will not be able to define airport slots, and its level of 
control over the aviation network will be much smaller. 
The focus of this chapter is on the problem faced by aviation authorities willing to 
allocate airport slots in the aviation network under their control (or influence) with the 
objective of minimizing the total social costs associated with the operation of the 
network, while satisfying a given air travel demand and taking into account the aircraft 
fleet assigned to the flights that take place within the network (regardless of the number 
of airlines involved). 
Slot allocation processes are the processes through which the declared capacity of 
airports is distributed among the airlines that use the airports. They are promoted by 
IATA (except in the US) to define the departure and arrival times for the flights of both 
incumbent airlines and new airlines willing to use the airports. The declared capacity of 
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an airport is “the number of aircraft movements per hour that an airport can 
accommodate at a reasonable level of service” (DE NEUFVILLE and ODONI, 2003). It 
depends on the capacity of runways, passenger terminals, and apron areas, as well as on 
possible environmental constraints and on the intended level of service. 
Air travel demand can be given (or estimated) by flight leg (leg-based demand) or by 
itinerary (itinerary- or O/D-based demand). Itinerary-based demand certainly is more 
relevant for analyses conducted by airlines, but for network-wide analyses the 
consideration of leg-based demand should be accurate enough and facilitates the 
collection of data (statistics on itinerary-based demand are not freely available). The 
distribution of demand varies considerably over the day. It typically refers to relatively 
large periods – e.g. early morning, late afternoon, etc. If some fraction of the demand 
for some period cannot be satisfied, it is expected that part of that demand is recaptured 
on later periods and the other part is lost, that is, passengers are spilled (BARNHART et 
al., 2002; RATLIFF et al., 2008; GALLEGO et al., 2010). The fraction of lost demand 
is typically larger for short-distance flights, that is, travel time elasticity is lower for 
short-distance flights (see e.g. JORGE-CALDERÓN, 1997). 
The total social costs involved in an aviation network consist of five components: flight 
costs, airport costs, time costs, congestion costs, and spill costs. Flight costs comprise 
fuel costs and crew costs, as well as vehicle maintenance and depreciation costs. These 
costs are leg-specific and aircraft-specific (and also airline-specific, since some 
competitive advantages are expected from one airline over the others). Airport costs 
include capital and manpower, being different between domestic and international 
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flights. Time costs are the costs associated with the scheduled travel times incurred by 
the passengers, which mainly depend on the value of time (VOT) and on travel distance. 
The VOT is higher for business trips than for leisure trips, and increases with 
passengers’ income (BRONS et al., 2002). Congestion costs are the costs for 
passengers, airlines, and airports related with high levels of airport utilization. Indeed, 
airport congestion can be neglected for low utilization rates but it tends to increase fast 
for utilization rates above 80-85% (DE NEUFVILLE and ODONI, 2003).  Spill costs 
represent the loss in revenue (and of good will) that occurs when the existing demand 
cannot be fully satisfied, either because of lack of seat capacity in the flights or because 
of mismatches between scheduled travel times and passengers’ desired travel times. 
2.3 Optimization Model 
The model developed to determine the optimal allocation of slots in a publicly-
controlled aviation network is presented in this section. There are a few models where 
aviation network design is dealt with from the perspective of aviation authorities (e.g., 
JANIC, 2003, and LE et al., 2008), but they do not focus on slot allocation issues. In 
contrast, there is a vast literature where the subject is coped with from the perspective of 
airlines. Within this literature, two main problems are considered: flight scheduling and 
fleet assignment. These problems are often tackled separately – see e.g. ERDMANN et 
al. (2001), AGBOKOU (2004), and YAN and CHEN (2007) for the flight scheduling 
problem, and ABARA (1989), HANE et al. (1995) and BARNHART et al. (2002) for 
the fleet assignment problem. But there are a number of articles where they are dealt 
with simultaneously through integrated models – see e.g. DESAULNIERS et al. (1997), 
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REXING et al. (2000), and LOHATEPANONT and BARNHART (2004). Our model 
has a number of features in common with these models but it focus on the optimal 
utilization of airport capacity rather than on the optimal planning of airline operations. 
For formulating the model, consider the following notation: 
Sets 
 A = {1, …, A}: set of airports  
 P = {1, …, P}: set of travel demand periods 
 T = {1, …, T}: set of slot time windows (of, say, 15 minutes) 
 F = {1, …, F}: set of aircraft types 
Parameters 
 sAjt : capacity of airport j in slot time window t 
 nf : number of aircraft of type f  
 sf : capacity of an aircraft of type f (passengers or seats) 
 djk: scheduled travel time between airports j and k (measured in slot time 
windows) 
 qjkp: demand for flights on leg jk (between airports j and k) in period p 
(passengers) 
 αjk : recapture rate (fraction of demand transferred to the next demand period 
because of lack of aircraft or airport capacity) 
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 cFjkf : flight cost for an aircraft of type f on flight leg jk (EUR per flight) 
 cAjf : airport cost for an aircraft of type f in airport j  (EUR per flight) 
 cTjk : time cost for flight leg jk (EUR per passenger) 
 rjt: utilization rate at airport j in slot time window t 
 βj : airport congestion utilization rate at airport j (that is the utilization rate 
of the airport above which congestion delays start to occur) 
 cCj: congestion cost at airport j when the utilization rate is 100% (EUR per 
slot time window) 
 cSjk : spill cost for flight leg jk (EUR per passenger) 
Decision variables 
 xjkft: number of flights by aircraft type f on leg jk that take off in slot time 
window t 
 yjft: number of aircraft of type f that are ready to take off from airport j in 
slot time window t 
 ujt: difference between the utilization rate of airport j in time window t and 
airport congestion utilization rate (βj) 
 vjt: binary variable that is equal to 1 if airport j is congested in time window 
t, and is equal to zero otherwise 
 wjkp: spare seats on flight leg jk in demand period p 
 zjkp, spilled passengers on flight leg jk in demand period p 
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Given this notation, the optimization model can be formulated as follows: 
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The objective-function (2.1) of this mixed-integer optimization model expresses the 
minimization of the total social costs involved in the operation of the aviation network, 
considering the five types of costs identified above (i.e., flight costs, airport costs, time 
costs, congestion costs, and spill costs). Flights costs are given by the multiplication of 
the number of flights by their cost per leg and aircraft type. Airport costs are given by 
the multiplication of the number of flights by a unit cost per flight (arrival or departure), 
for each airport and aircraft type. Time costs are obtained through the multiplication of 
the number of passengers in the legs by the respective flight time cost. Congestion costs 
for each airport j and slot time window t, are given as a linear function of the airport 
utilization rate. Below a given limit (βj), it is assumed that congestion is not relevant, ujt 
is negative, and the binary variable vft can take the value of zero (and will take it 
because, otherwise, costs would be higher). Above that limit ujt is positive and vjt will be 
equal to one and congestion costs are taken into account. For better accuracy, 
congestion costs could be represented with a piecewise linear function. This would, at 
the same time, keep the model linear and allow for congestion costs to increase more 
than proportionally with the airport utilization rate. Finally, spill costs are set equal to 
the number of spilled passengers multiplied by a unit spill cost. The number of spilled 
passengers is the difference between the number of passengers that could not travel in 
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the demand period where they would have liked to do it and the number of these 
passengers that traveled in subsequent demand periods.  
The model includes twelve sets of constraints. Capacity constraints (2.2) ensure that 
movements do not exceed airport capacity (available slots per slot time window). 
Availability constraints (2.3) describe the use of the existing fleet – for each type of 
aircraft, the total fleet is equal to the number of airborne aircraft plus the aircraft 
scheduled to take off plus the parked aircraft. Continuity constraints (2.4) and (2.5) 
ensure that the number of aircraft of each type available to fly in each time window 
from each airport is equal to the number of landings minus the number of take-offs in 
that time window plus the aircraft that were parked in that airport in the previous time 
window. The demand equation (2.6) states that the total demand for each flight leg and 
period is either satisfied or spilled. The total demand consists of the passengers that 
want to travel in that period plus the passengers that were recaptured from the previous 
period. The satisfied demand is given by the available seats less the spare seats. 
Utilization constraints (2.7) and (2.8) specify the utilization rate of each airport in each 
time window and the corresponding level of congestion costs. Finally, statements (2.9) 
to (2.12) define the domain for the decision variables. 
2.4 Case study 
The model described in the previous section was used in a case study involving the 
Portuguese main network of airports. This network consists of five airports: Lisbon 
(LIS), Oporto (OPO), Faro (FAO), located in mainland Portugal; Funchal (FNC), 
located in the island of Madeira; and Ponta Delgada (PDL), located in the island of São 
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Miguel (Azores). All these airports are operated by ANA, a company owned by the 
Portuguese government. Up to October 2008, only two publicly-owned airlines were 
operating in the domestic network: TAP and SATA. TAP is owned by the Portuguese 
government and SATA is owned by the Azorean regional government. In the last few 
years, EasyJet and Ryanair started operating domestic routes, respectively, Lisbon-
Funchal and Oporto-Faro. 
The case study consisted in determining the optimal allocation of airport slots (and 
underlying aviation network design) for the domestic network in the year 2008, a time 
when it was still fully controlled by public entities, and comparing it with the actual 
allocation of slots in that year. In addition to this, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to 
assess the effects of changes in some key parameters on the final results. The case study 
was carried out to demonstrate, with a simple case, the potential usefulness of the 
proposed optimization model. 
Below, in consecutive subsections, we provide detailed information on the data set used 
in the case study, on the results obtained through the application of the optimization 
model (optimal network) and for the sensitivity analysis, and on model solving issues. 
2.4.1 Data Set 
The data set used in the case study consisted of: capacity of airports; type and number 
of aircraft; air travel demand and recapture rate; flight duration; costs; and actual 
network. This data was essentially taken from the official aviation statistics (ANA, 
2009) and from the websites of the airports and of the airlines. 
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The hourly capacity of the airports, shown in Table 2.1, was assumed to be the declared 
capacity of the airports (the capacity for the 15-minute slot time windows was assumed 
to be 25% of the hourly capacity). The percentage of airport capacity that could be used 
for domestic flights was set equal to the percentage of domestic movements in the total 
movements of each airport during the year 2008.  
Table 2.1 - Capacity of airports 
Total International Domestic
LIS 36 28 8
OPO 20 16 4
FAO 22 18 4
FNC 14 10 4
PDL 14 10 4
Airport
Capacity (movements per hour)
 
There were three types of aircraft making domestic flights in Portugal in 2008: Embraer 
ER4, Fokker F100, and Airbus A319. The number of available aircraft and the number 
of seats per aircraft type, as well as the landing fees levied by each airport per aircraft 
type are presented in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 - Fleet and landing fees 
LIS OPO FAO FNC PDL
ER 4 6 49 170 110 110 225 77
F 100 4 99 214 214 214 445 152
A 319 4 132 315 315 315 653 223
Aircraft 
type
Number 
of aircraft
Seats
Landing fees (EUR)
 
The daily travel demand for each flight leg is given in Table 2.3. This demand was 
taken to be the number of passengers transported in March 2008 (the busiest winter 
month in that year) increased by 5%. The number of passengers in that month was 10% 
of the annual total. The daily demand was divided into four periods – 6 to 10 am, 10 am 
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to 2 pm, 2 to 6 pm, and 6 pm to midnight. Due to lack of data, it was assumed that the 
daily demand is evenly distributed across those demand periods. The recapture rate 
between demand periods was considered to be 50% (JA et al., 2001).  
Table 2.3 - Leg-based demand 
LIS OPO FAO FNC PDL
LIS 0 960 410 1790 720
OPO 980 0 0 510 180
FAO 420 0 0 0 0
FNC 2110 524 0 0 74
PDL 860 210 0 61 0
Leg-based demand (passengers per day)
DestinationOrigin
 
The duration of each flight leg is given in Table 2.4. It comprises the time the aircraft is 
expected to be airborne plus a turn time of 30 minutes (2 slot time windows). After the 
turn time, it is assumed that the aircraft is ready for take-off or is parked.  
Table 2.4 - Flight duration 
LIS OPO FAO FNC PDL
LIS - 6 5 9 12
OPO 6 - 7 10 12
FAO 5 7 - 9 12
FNC 9 10 9 - 10
PDL 12 12 12 10 -
Origin
Flight duration (15-min slot time windows)
Destination
 
The flights costs per leg and aircraft type are shown in Table 2.5 (they were taken from 
JANIC, 2003). The time costs were calculated considering the value of time to be 15 
EUR per hour for all flights – this was approximately the value used in the cost-benefit 
evaluation of high-speed rail projects in Portugal (TIS.pt, 2007; SDG, 2009).  
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Table 2.5 - Flight costs 
LIS OPO FAO FNC PDL
LIS - 23 22 63 94
OPO 23 - 41 75 96
FAO 22 41 - 58 97
FNC 63 75 58 - 74
PDL 94 96 97 74 -
Origin
Flight costs (EUR per passenger)
Destination
 
The congestion costs were assumed to be zero for airport utilization rates below 85%, 
and to grow linearly between 85 and 100% until 1,500 EUR per slot time window (in 
accordance with the indications given in DE NEUFVILLE and ODONI, 2003). The cost 
of a spilled passenger was assumed to be very large in relation to the other costs, so that 
the maximum possible demand is met. 
The actual network operated by TAP and SATA before October 2008 (assuming the 
best possible fleet assignment) is represented in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Actual network 
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The total number of daily flights is 68, thus the number of slots used is 136 slots. The 
number of passengers transported in the network is 7,982, which signifies 1,827 spilled 
passengers. The total cost of this network is 1.55106 EUR per day. Congestion affects 
all airports resulting in a cost of 63,045 EUR. 
2.4.2 Optimal Network  
The network obtained through the application of the optimization model is described in 
Figure 2.2 and Table 2.6. In this table, is provided a comparison between the optimal 
network and the actual network operated by TAP and SATA before October 2008. 
 
Figure 2.2 - Optimal network 
The analysis of the networks reveals that the overall airport utilization is larger in the 
optimal network, as the slots increase from 138 in the actual network to 158. This is a 
consequence of the increase in flights from 68 to 79 (+16.2%). The number of 
passengers transported in the network increases by 6.8% and the number of spilled 
passengers decreases by 29.7%. 
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Table 2.6 - Results for the actual and the optimal network 
Actual Optimal
Value 68 79
Var. % - 16.2
Value 7982 8524
Var. % - 6.8
Value 1827 1285
Var. % - -29.7
Value 1553.2 1533.6
Var. % - -1.3
Value 1278.2 1286.9
Var. % - 0.7
Value 15.9 18.4
Var. % - 15.8
Value 196.0 217.5
Var. % - 10.9
Value 63.0 10.8
Var. % - -82.9
Flight costs
(K EUR)
Airport 
costs
(K EUR)
Time costs
(K EUR)
Congestion 
costs
(K EUR)
     * Net of spill costs
Parameters
Network
Number of
flights
Number of
passengers
Number of 
spilled 
passengers
Total costs*
(K EUR)
 
 
Figure 2.3 - Airport slot utilization for the optimal network 
 
LIS 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2
OPO 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
FAO 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
FNC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
PDL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
LIS 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
OPO 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
FAO 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
FNC 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
PDL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
LIS 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
OPO 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
FAO 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FNC 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
PDL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
6 pm to 12 am
6 am to 12 pm
12 pm to 6 pm
Utilization Increase Utilization Decrease
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The number of flights augments mainly in the legs connecting Lisbon with the other 
airports (Figure 2.4). The largest increase occurs in the Lisbon-Faro connection with 6 
daily flights each way instead of 4. Also, there are two additional Lisbon-Funchal 
flights (13 instead of 11). All flight legs except Funchal-Ponta Delgada experiment a 
reduction with respect to number of spilled passengers, being Lisbon-Faro the leg with 
the largest reduction (-34.6%). 
 
Figure 2.4 - Flight frequencies for the actual network and the optimal network 
The 20 aircraft available needed to operate the actual network are also necessary in the 
optimal network. There are, however, some differences in aircraft utilization, with an 
increase in the use of medium aircraft and a reduction in the use of large and small 
aircraft. Indeed, the 99-seater Fokker is the most used aircraft in the optimal network, 
totaling 39 flights, that is 49% of the total number of flights (against 38% in the actual 
network). The smallest aircraft (ER 4 with 49 seats) are used in the flights to/from Faro 
and in 3 flights between Lisbon and Oporto, which represent 18% of the flights instead 
of 25% in the actual network. The large aircraft are mainly used in the legs connecting 
mainland Portugal with Azores and Madeira.  
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Finally, despite the increase in the number of flights and passengers, the optimal 
network involves a total social cost of 1.53×10
6
 EUR (per day), 1.07% lower than the 
cost of the actual network. Congestion effects are only felt in one airport (Oporto), and 
their costs drop by 82.9% to 10,800 EUR. Landing fees increase 15.8% as a result of the 
increase in the number of flights. 
2.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to assess the variability of results, a sensitivity analysis was performed with 
respect to the following parameters: recapture rate; airport congestion utilization rate; 
value of time; and spill costs. Table 2.7 provides the results of the sensitivity analysis 
and comparisons with the results obtained for the actual network and the optimal 
network. 
 2.4.3.1. Recapture rate 
Four different values of α were tested to evaluate the influence of the recapture rate on 
the results obtained for the optimal network: 0; 25; 75; and 100%. Large values of α 
mean that a relatively large number of passengers still want to travel after their 
preferred travel period. If α is small, then passengers are more time sensitive and less 
willing to change their travel period. 
The conclusion was that the number of slots increases with the value of α, varying 
between 150 (α = 100%) and 160 (α = 0%), which corresponds to a number of flights 
between 75 and 80, respectively. In contrast, the number of passengers increases and the 
number of spilled passengers decreases significantly – for α = 100% the number of 
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spilled passengers is 997, that is, -22.4% than in the optimal network. The total cost of 
the network ranges between 1.70×10
6
 EUR for α = 0 (+10.6% than in the optimal 
network) and 1.51×10
6
 EUR for α = 100% (-1.6%). The largest differences with respect 
to the optimal network occur for the congestion costs, which vary between +24.3% for α 
= 0 and -26.1% for α = 100%. 
 2.4.3.2. Airport congestion utilization rate 
The analysis of how changes in airport congestion utilization rate (that is, the airport 
utilization rate above which congestion effects are felt) affect results was made 
considering the following β values: 0, 20, 40, 60, and 100%. If β is smaller the 
congestion effects will be higher and thus the total cost of the network is expected to 
increase.  
It was found that the number of flights varies between 76 and 81 flights, corresponding 
to 152 and 162 slots, respectively for β = 0 and β = 100%. The total number of 
passengers is only very slightly affected by changes in β, ranging between 8,520 (when 
no congestion effects are not felt, that is β = 100%) and 8,540 passengers. The main 
impact of changes in β relates, naturally, with congestion costs. These costs increase 11 
times with respect to the optimal network when β = 0. However, because congestion 
costs are small in the network under analysis, total costs vary only between 1.61×10
6
 
EUR (+4.8%) for β = 0 and 1.53×106 EUR (-0.4%) for β = 100%. 
 2.4.3.3. Value of time 
The evaluation of the influence of changes in the value of time (VOT) on the results 
was assessed considering the following alternatives: -20%, -10%, +10%, and +20% of 
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the VOT values used in the calculation of the actual and optimal networks (15 EUR per 
hour). 
The outcome was that the number of slots only varies between 156 (VOT = -10 or -
20%) and 158 (VOT = -10 or -20%), which corresponds to 78 or 79 flights. The time 
costs accompany the variation of the VOT, but this has no implications on the number 
of passengers (due to the large value of spill costs). The total costs range between 
1.51×10
6
 EUR (VOT = -20%) and 1.58×10
6
 EUR (VOT = +20%), that is, respectively, 
-1.4% and +2.8% than the cost for the optimal network. 
 2.4.3.4. Spill costs 
The optimal network was calculated assuming a very large cost per spilled passenger, so 
that the maximum possible demand is satisfied. This assumption is now relaxed, as two 
unit spill costs are considered: the average airfare per leg; and the double of this 
average. 
The implications of these changes is that the number of slots decreases to 142 (-10.1%) 
and 146 (-7.6%), respectively for the average airfare and for the double of the average 
airfare, the number of flights decreases by the same percentages, and the number of 
passengers drops by 6.3 and 5.5%. Although these values are lower than for the optimal 
network they are still higher than for the actual network. The decrease in flights and 
passengers is reflected on flight and time costs. Flight costs decrease 14.3 and 11.6% 
while time costs drop 10.7 and 8.3%. The total costs (net of spill costs) are 1.32×10
6
 
EUR for the average airfare and 1.36×10
6
 EUR for the double of the average airfare, 
that is, 13.7 and 11.1% lower than the total costs for the optimal network. 
  
Table 2.7 - Results for the sensitivity analysis 
Value Var.
% Value Var.
% Value Var.
% Value Var.
% Value Var.
% Value Var.
% Value Var.
% Value Var.
%
68 - 7982 - 1827 - 1553.2 - 1278.2 - 15.9 - 196.0 - 63.0 -
79 16.2 8524 6.8 1285 -29.7 1533.6 -1.3 1286.9 0.7 18.4 15.8 217.5 10.9 10.8 -82.9
0 80 1.3 8104 -4.9 1705 32.7 1695.6 10.6 1423.9 10.6 19.4 5.3 238.9 9.9 13.4 24.3
25 79 0.0 8256 -3.2 1553 20.9 1647.4 7.4 1383.9 7.5 19.3 4.9 232.6 7.0 11.5 6.0
75 78 -1.3 8783 3.0 1026 -20.1 1526.3 -0.5 1280.9 -0.5 18.0 -2.2 217.5 0.0 9.9 -8.3
100 75 -5.1 8813 3.4 996 -22.5 1508.8 -1.6 1266.9 -1.6 16.4 -10.8 217.5 0.0 8.0 -26.1
0 76 -3.8 8520 0.0 1289 0.3 1607.0 4.8 1252.8 -2.7 16.7 -9.3 207.7 -4.5 129.8 1102
20 77 -2.5 8525 0.0 1285 0.0 1564.7 2.0 1223.2 -4.9 17.2 -6.5 208.5 -4.1 115.7 972
40 77 -2.5 8515 -0.1 1294 0.7 1565.7 2.1 1279.1 -0.6 18.6 1.1 209.9 -3.5 58.0 437
60 78 -1.3 8525 0.0 1284 -0.1 1540.3 0.4 1271.0 -1.2 18.0 -2.6 209.7 -3.6 41.6 285
100 81 2.5 8540 0.2 1269 -1.3 1527.5 -0.4 1303.3 1.3 19.0 3.2 205.1 -5.7 0.0 -100
-20 78 -1.3 8524 0.0 1285 0.0 1511.7 -1.4 1311.6 1.9 18.5 0.3 170.8 -21.5 10.8 0.0
-10 78 -1.3 8523 0.0 1286 0.1 1535.4 0.1 1311.6 1.9 18.5 0.3 194.4 -10.6 10.8 0.0
+10 79 0.0 8522 0.0 1287 0.2 1551.0 1.1 1286.9 0.0 18.4 0.0 234.9 8.0 10.8 0.0
+20 79 0.0 8524 0.0 1285 0.0 1577.1 2.8 1286.9 0.0 18.4 0.0 261.0 20.0 10.8 0.0
Avg. fare 71 -10.1 7991 -6.3 1818 41.5 1324.2 -13.7 1102.9 -14.3 17.0 -7.7 193.5 -11.0 10.8 0.0
2 x Avg. fare 73 -7.6 8053 -5.5 1756 36.7 1363.9 -11.1 1137.6 -11.6 17.5 -5.2 198.0 -8.9 10.8 0.0
Airport 
congestion 
utilization 
rate
(%)
Time costs
(%)
Spill costs
     * Net of spill costs
Airport costs
(K EUR)
Time costs
(K EUR)
Congestion costs
(K EUR)
Actual
Optimal
Recapture 
rates
(%)
Network
Number of
flights
Number of
passengers
Number of spilled 
passengers
Total costs*
(K EUR)
Flight costs
(K EUR)
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2.4.4 Model Solving 
The optimization model was solved on a Dual Core processor with 1GB of RAM using 
the Xpress software (FICO, 2009). The optimal network was computed in 356.2 
seconds – the LP relaxation took 0.8 seconds, the first feasible integer solution was 
obtained after 6.4 seconds, and the 1% optimality gap was reached in 15.5 seconds. For 
all instances solved, the computation time varied between 89.0 seconds and 1,879.4 
seconds with an average of 619.2 seconds and standard deviation of 449.9 seconds. The 
larger computation times occurred when  = 0, that is, when airports experience 
congestion even for very low utilization rates (Figure 2.5). Apart from this, there seems 
to be no pattern relating model instances with computation time. The LP relaxation took 
between 0.6 and 1.9 seconds with an average of 1.2 seconds and a standard deviation of 
0.4 seconds. On average, the first integer variable was found after 8.0 seconds (standard 
deviation of 3.0 seconds) and the 1% optimality gap was reached after 34.7 seconds 
(standard deviation of 24.7 seconds). For most instances, the 1% optimality-gap 
solution was the same as the optimal solution. 
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Figure 2.5 - Computation time 
The large computation time necessary to solve small instances, like the one raised by 
the main aviation network of Portugal, clearly indicates that the model will be very hard 
to solve to exact optimality for large and even mid-size networks. For such networks, if 
1% optimality-gap solutions are not accurate enough (even knowing that they quite 
probably are the optimal solutions), then more efficient formulations and/or methods 
would have to be developed for tackling the model. 
2.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we presented an optimization model for assisting governments (aviation 
authorities) in their decisions regarding the allocation of airport slots and, more 
generally, the design of aviation networks. The results obtained through the model can 
be fully applied in practice by governments who exert complete control over the 
aviation network of the respective countries (and, despite the deregulation of air 
transportation, this is still the case in many parts of the world). If control is only partial, 
then governments can use the results provided by the model to influence the choices of 
the other agents involved (airports and/or airlines). The optimization model has a 
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number of features in common with the integrated flight scheduling and fleet 
assignment models used by airlines for operational planning purposes, but also has 
some specific features, e.g., airport slots are a decision variable, the objective is to 
minimize total social costs (including passenger time costs), and congestion costs 
depend on the decisions made. The practical usefulness of the model was demonstrated 
through an application to the main aviation network of Portugal in 2008 (the last year it 
was fully controlled by the government). Indeed, the results obtained for this application 
show that a different airport slot allocation would have allowed serving a much larger 
number of passengers while decreasing slightly the total social costs of the network (or, 
alternatively, serving a slightly larger number of passengers with much lower costs). 
With respect to this area of work, our main goal is to improve the model so as to make it 
more suitable for application to aviation networks that are not fully controlled by 
governments. This will in particular require taking into account the competition among 
the airlines and/or airports involved in the networks. Even if competition issues are 
dealt with in a simplified way, the model would have to be considerably modified in 
order to properly capture them, posing a research challenge that we plan to address in 
the near future. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 3  
Optimization-based analysis of Slot 
Allocation in the main European 
Airports  
3.1 Introduction 
Aviation authorities in Europe (EUROCONTROL) and in the United States (FAA) are 
working on very ambitious programs to increase the capacity of the air transportation 
system, in order to reduce the current levels of airport delays. These programs focus on 
air traffic control systems (SESAR and NextGen) and on innovative demand 
management measures. Such initiatives are necessary to cope with the expected increase 
in demand for air transportation – “intra-European routes have a forecast growth of 
passenger demand of 4.0 percent per year until 2031” (BOEING, 2011) – and to 
diminish the current levels of delays – which represented in 2007 over 32 billion USD 
just in the US (NEXTOR, 2010). At the European level, the CODA report reveals that 
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in 2010, 44.8 percent of the flights in Europe were delayed at arrival and the average 
delay time of those flights was 33 minutes (EUROCONTROL, 2011). 
To cope with the future demand for air transportation it is necessary to increase system 
capacity and to regulate the supply-demand relationship (flights and passengers) using 
administrative or market-based measures. Building new airports, expanding the existing 
airport capacity – runways and terminals –, and enhancing the air traffic control system 
are examples of measures to increase system capacity. In the supply-demand 
relationship side, an administrative slot allocation process is established in the main 
airports outside the US. Market-based mechanisms are, among others, congestion 
pricing, airport slot trading, and airport slot auctions, as well as the adoption of a more 
market-driven landing fee scheme. However, in the short and medium term the air 
transportation system relies on the improvements that can be achieved by better 
allocating the existing airport capacity (air traffic control and slot control).  
The main objective of the research described in this chapter is to analyze whether 
airport capacity and slot distribution are capable to accommodate the expected 
passenger demand with lower costs, including airport delay costs. The approach used 
for the analysis applies to a liberalized, congested, and slot-constrained air 
transportation network, being based on an optimization model that determines the 
minimum total cost for the network (flight frequencies, flight times, seats per leg) taking 
into account the passenger demand per flight leg, the market power of airlines, and the 
expected values of airport delays. The fundamental research question to be answered 
can be formulated as follows: 
“Is it possible to satisfy a given passenger demand with less air transportation system 
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costs (including aircraft and passenger delay costs) without compromising airline 
competition?”  
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some background 
on the subject of liberalized, congested and slot-constrained air transportation networks. 
After that, the main European air transportation network (involving 34 airports) is 
characterized with respect to airport market concentration, capacity utilization, and 
flight delays. Then, we present the optimization model upon which the approach is 
based. The usage of the optimization model is illustrated next with a case study 
involving the ten largest European airports. In the final section, the strengths and 
limitations of the approach and underlying model are assessed, and the conclusions 
drawn from the case study are summarized. 
3.2 Background Information 
Liberalized, mature air transportation networks – especially, Europe and North America 
– have features and problems that are, to some extent, different from other networks.  In 
particular, these networks involve open markets in which: (1) airlines compete intensely 
for market power by increasing frequency and lowering fares; (2) airports compete for 
attracting connecting passengers and to become airline bases and hubs, thus increasing 
their commercial attractiveness; (3) passenger demand for air transportation has grown 
significantly more than airport capacity; (4) airport delays are getting higher as airport 
utilization is getting close to maximum. Thus, today airport capacity is a scarce resource 
that needs to be used in the best possible way, as delays increase more than 
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proportionally with the increase in airport utilization (DE NEUFVILLE and ODONI, 
2003). 
Reducing congestion and airport delays is extremely important for the air transportation 
system because they have a significant impact for passengers that arrive later than 
expected to their destinations and, particularly, for those that miss their connections, 
because of the costs for airlines of disrupted schedules and passengers, and also because 
of the indirect implications for the economy. Not all delays are possible or even 
desirable to eliminate, as they are derived from a great number of interdependent factors 
such as air traffic control limitations, lack of airport capacity, airline network 
configurations, bad weather conditions, security measures, and environmental 
constraints. Despite this, it seems that airline competition has a strong impact on the 
existing levels of delays, as carriers compete aggressively for passengers, increasing 
competition and reducing aircraft seat capacity (especially in the short and medium haul 
flights).  
To cope with the shortage of airport capacity, airlines, airports, slot coordinators, and 
public authorities under IATA guidance have established a slot allocation system that 
regulates the use of airport capacity – for details see MADAS and ZOGRAFOS (2008) 
and IATA (2012). This system limits the usage of airports to a specified number of 
movements for a given time period. The airport capacity in terms of slots is set 
administratively taking into account the number of runways, capacity of the terminals, 
air traffic control capacity, and intended level of service. The core principles of the slot 
allocation system are the so-called “grandfather rights” and “use-it-or-lose-it” rule. 
According to them, airlines that have the right to use a slot in a season can keep it in the 
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next if they have used it beyond a given threshold (usually, 85 percent).  With these 
principles, some factors arise that might compromise an efficient use of the airport 
capacity: 
1. In slot constrained airports airlines tend to use all slots they have the right to use 
in order to keep them for the next season and preventing the entry of 
competitors.  
2. Because of that, airlines with historical market power at an airport tend to keep 
their advantageous position restricting competition (Figure 3.1) – which is even 
truer at peak periods (BARBOT, 2004). 
 
Figure 3.1 - Airline slots at Heathrow Airport (Start of 2009 summer season) 
3. When their market power is high, airlines can charge a fare premium 
(STARKIE, 1998), and tend to increase flight frequency rather than increasing 
aircraft capacity – “tendency exists that aircraft size is kept below optimal 
levels” (GIVONI and RIETVELD, 2009).  
4. Finally, this contributes for a less-than-total use of airport capacity because 
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airlines drop slots that are assigned in a period of time different from the 
requested as the assigned slots are not viable (or profitable) under their network 
restrictions. This is especially true in airports where demand exceeds capacity 
only at peak periods (AACHEN UNIVERSITY, 2007). 
The air transportation system is thus being operated with a fierce competition between 
airlines for passengers and revenues and, at the same time, a lack of competition at the 
airport level. This situation might promote a less than optimal use of airport capacity 
with consequences in terms of delays and passengers’ level of service. These 
circumstances have been be the basis for a discussion (especially at the European level) 
of more market-based mechanisms to allocate airport capacity, and the European 
Commission has produced regulations that go in line with “the needs of the European 
airports” (CEC, 2011). 
There are several measures that can be classified as “market-based mechanisms”, such 
as slot trading, slot auctions, congestion pricing, and landing fees non-proportional to 
maximum takeoff weight (MTOW), which have been discussed in the literature (PELS 
and VERHOEF, 2004; JANIC, 2005; DANIEL and HARBACK, 2009). The strengths 
and limitations of the current slot allocation system and possible impacts on the air 
transportation system of a shift to market-based mechanisms have been studied in the 
literature – STARKIE (1998), FAN (2004), BARBOT (2004), and MADAS and 
ZOGRAFOS (2010) – and in reports centered on the European and US markets – 
NERA (2004), DOTECON (2006), and NEXTOR (2010).  
Due to their importance to the air transportation system, airport delays have been 
addressed extensively in the literature. The consequences and design of congestion 
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pricing strategies have been dealt with, among others, by BRUECKNER (2002, 2005), 
SCHANK (2005), and SANTOS and ROBIN (2010). According to SANTOS and 
ROBIN (2010) “a congestion charge should be set equal to the congestion externality 
not already internalized by the airlines”, which goes in line with the findings from 
BRUECKNER (2002). The relationship between airport utilization and airport delays 
has been studied by JOHNSON and SAVAGE (2006), LE (2008), and VAZE and 
BARNHART (2012), among others. According to VAZE and BARNHART (2012), a 
reduction in the number of slots at LaGuardia would increase the profits for all the 
airlines and decrease substantially delay costs. Finally, some studies have focused on 
the effects of congestion for the passengers, e.g., BRATU (2003), SHERRY et al. 
(2007), AHMADBEYGI et al. (2008), and BARNHART et al. (2010). Those papers 
conclude that travel disruptions (cancelled flights and missed connections) are the main 
cause for passenger delays. According to BARNHART et al. (2010), travel disruptions 
account for almost half of passenger delay time in 2007. 
3.3 Airport Characterization 
The characterization of airport market concentration, capacity utilization, and flight 
delays for the 34 largest European airports (corresponding to the airports analyzed by 
the CODA reports) was made using data from a week of July 2009 (OAG data). 
Relevant statistical results are described in the next paragraphs. The analysis was made 
to support assumptions and hypothesis tested with the optimization model. 
The European air transportation network is a liberalized and congested network where 
European-based airlines have cabotage rights, that is, they are free to provide domestic 
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and international services in any country in Europe. Despite this, legacy carriers still 
hold a dominant position in the airports of their countries, where they have set their 
main hubs. This dominance is a factor which is kept by the current slot allocation 
system based on historical rights – “grandfather rights” – and the “use-ir-or-lose-it” 
rule.  
Airport market concentration was assessed using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
(HHI). Results show that 20 out of the 34 airports can be considered as market-
concentrated (Figure 3.2), and that concentration is related with the market power of the 
largest airline in each airport and not with the airport size or the average number of 
seats per flight.  
 
Figure 3.2 - Herfindahl Index (flights and seats) for the 34 biggest airports in Europe (July 2009) 
Airport primary delays were estimated using the stochastic and dynamic queuing model 
DELAYS© (KIVESTU, 1976; MALONE, 1995). To do so, we first calculated the 
airport utilization rate per 15-min and hour period. Airport utilization rate was defined 
as the total number of assigned slots divided by the airport declared capacity per period 
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of time. For the 34 airports, the average peak-hour utilization rate is 81.0 percent and 
the average daily utilization rate is 54.9 percent (Figure 3.3). As can be seen in the 
figure, only two airports are characterized with an average daily utilization above 80 
percent – Frankfurt and London Heathrow – meaning that there is still airport capacity 
to be used.  
 
Figure 3.3 - Airport utilization rate per day and busiest hour for the 34 biggest airports in Europe 
(July 2009) 
Airport delays are clearly related with airport utilization (Figure 3.4). The case of 
London Heathrow shows that when utilization increases the expected primary delay also 
increases. Taking into account that typically only 40 percent of flights are delayed, the 
average value per delayed flight is approximately 11 minutes without considering 
propagation effects in the network. Using the “1+1” average value for propagation 
effect (COOK and TANNER, 2011)  – i.e., one minute of primary delay generates, on 
average, one minute of reactionary delay –  each delayed flight is responsible for over 
20 minutes of delay or, in terms of cost, for more than 1,600 EUR.  
From the characterization made above, some conclusions can be drawn about the 
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European network with implications for our analysis: first, most of the airports are 
market concentrated and dominated by a country-based airline; second, the average 
number of seats per flight seems to be related with the type of airport but not with 
airport competition; third, airport delays are relevant especially when airport utilization 
rate is near capacity; fourth, there is still available airport capacity outside peak hours in 
all airports. 
 
Figure 3.4 - London Heathrow Airport average primary delay and airport utilization rate (July 
2009) 
3.4 Optimization Model 
In this section, we describe the optimization model developed to answer the research 
question. The objective of the model is to minimize the total cost of an air transportation 
network. The costs considered in the model are the direct costs to transport passengers 
from one airport to the others, namely flight costs, airport costs, delay costs, spill costs, 
and schedule delay costs. Airline competition is taken into account by reallocating slots 
across airlines in a balanced manner, thus ensuring that changes in airlines’ market 
power will be small. 
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The model applies to a given planning period – e.g., one day – divided in demand 
periods within which passenger demand is assumed to be given – e.g., 3-hour periods – 
and further divided in slot time windows – e.g., 15 minutes. Airport declared capacity 
(number of available slots) and utilization rate (number of slots assigned to airlines) are 
known and defined per slot time window. A given number of airlines operate in the 
system. For each airline, the number and time windows of available slots per airport, as 
well as the flight frequency and number of passenger per flight leg, are known. 
Connectivity issues are not addressed in the model.  
Using the notation provided in Table 1, the model can be formulated as follows: 
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 (3.1) 
The objective function (3.1) expresses the minimization of the costs of an air 
transportation network. The costs considered are, in order of appearance: flight costs 
and airport costs; aircraft delay costs; passenger delay costs; spill costs; and schedule 
delay costs. Flight costs are computed as a function of leg distance and average number 
of seats per flight, leg and airline. Airport costs are calculated as a function of the 
average number of seats per flight. Aircraft delay costs are calculated by multiplying the  
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Table 3.1 - Notation for the optimization model 
Sets 
N = {1, …, N} - set of airports 
A = {1, …, A} - set of airlines 
P = {1, …, P} - set of demand periods  
T = {1, …, T} - set of slot time windows  
TP = {1, …, TP} - set of slot time windows belonging to demand period p 
S = {1, …, S} - set of aircraft average sizes (in number of seats) 
F = {1, …, F} - set of flight frequencies 
Parameters 
njat - number of slots of airline a at airport j in slot time window t 
tjk - travel time between airports j and k (in slot time windows) 
qjkap - demand of airline c for leg jk in demand period p 
cFjks - unit flight cost for aircraft of average size s on leg jk (EUR per seat) 
cAjs - unit airport cost per aircraft of average size s at airport j  (EUR per seat) 
cDjs - unit delay cost per aircraft of average size s at airport j  (EUR per seat per minute) 
cSjk - unit schedule delay cost for leg jk  (EUR per passenger per minute) 
cTjk - unit time cost for leg jk (EUR per passenger per minute) 
djkt - expected delay for leg jk in slot time window t (minutes) 
αjk - maximum percentage of passenger demand for leg jk that can be lost/gained by each airline 
βjk - maximum percentage of passenger demand for leg jk that can be spilled 
pjk - average fare for leg jk (EUR per passenger) 
tPjka - schedule padding for airline a on leg jk (minutes) 
tDf - schedule delay for flight frequency f (minutes) 
Decision Variables 
xjkast - number of flights on leg jk made by airline a with aircraft of average size s that take off in slot time window t 
ujkat - number of passengers on leg jk traveling in flights of airline a that take off in slot time window t 
vjkafp - number of passengers on leg jk traveling in flights of airline a with a frequency of f that take off in demand 
period p 
yjkasp  = 1 if aircraft of average size s are used by airline a on flight leg jk and demand period p (otherwise yjkasp  = 0) 
zjkafp = 1 if airline a flies with frequency f on leg jk and demand period p (otherwise zjkafp = 0) 
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average cost per minute of delay by the number of flights and by the expected delay 
time. Passenger delay costs are calculated by multiplying the average cost per minute of 
delay of a passenger by the expected delay time minus the average schedule padding 
and by the number of passengers. Spill costs are the loss in revenue for airlines of not 
being able to satisfy all passenger demand. They are obtained by multiplying the 
difference between the passenger demand and the total number of passengers in a leg by 
the average fare in the leg. Schedule delay costs are calculated by multiplying the 
average unit passenger waiting time cost by the number of total passengers per leg and 
demand period and by the average waiting time per leg and demand period.  
Ten sets of constraints are included in the model. 
Capacity constraints (3.2) restrict the use of an airport for departures and arrivals to the 
slots available per airline and slot time window.  Demand constraints (3.3) specify that 
the sum of passengers carried by the airlines needs to be at most equal to the passenger 
demand for that leg. The maximum level of passenger spill is given by constraints (3.4). 
If βjk is zero then all passenger demand on leg jk needs to be satisfied. The maximum 
amount of passenger demand that each airline can gain or lose with respect to the actual 
situation is defined by constraints (3.5) and (3.6). These constraints are necessary if 
passenger transfers between airlines are to be kept within given limits. This is relevant 
to guarantee that changes with respect to the actual situation are small, thus not 
changing airlines’ market power significantly.   
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The definition of an average number of seats per flight is needed to determine flight and 
airport costs as a linear function of the aircraft size. For each flight leg, demand period 
and airline, an average number of seats per flight is determined through constraints 
(3.7). Constraints (3.8) specify that the number of passengers in each flight leg, demand 
period and airline cannot exceed the available number of seats. Constraints (3.9) 
determine the aircraft seat configuration (available number of seats) to be used in each 
flight leg, demand period, and airline.  
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The average schedule delay in each flight leg and demand period is defined assuming 
that passenger demand is given in each demand period. Constraints (3.10) define the 
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flight frequency in each flight leg and demand period as the sum of the flights flown on 
that demand period by all airlines. The total number of passengers in each demand 
period is defined in constraints (3.11) as the sum of all passengers that fly in flights 
departing in the slot time windows belonging to the demand period.   
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3.5 Case study 
The optimization model presented in the previous section was applied to the ten largest 
European airports in terms of international non-European passengers (excluding the 
airports dominated by low-cost carriers) and eight major European airlines, using flight 
and passenger data from July 2009. The airports considered in the application were 
Amsterdam - Schiphol (AMS), Barcelona - El Prat (BCN), Paris - Charles de Gaulle 
(CDG), Rome - Fiumicino (FCO), Frankfurt - Main (FRA), London - Gatwick (LGW), 
London - Heathrow (LHR), Madrid - Barajas (MAD), Munich International (MUC), 
and Milan - Malpensa (MXP). The airlines dealt with in the application were Air France 
(AF), British Airways (BA), Iberia (IB), KLM (KL), Lufthansa (LH), SWISS (LX), 
Austrian Airlines (OS), and EasyJet (U2). A dummy airline was included to account for 
the rest of the traffic between the airports considered in the application.  
Low-cost carriers were not dealt with in the case study despite the fact that some of 
them are among the largest in Europe in terms of passengers. Three main reasons 
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explain this: they are not dominant players in the busiest and congested airports; they 
tend to serve a different kind of passenger demand; and they operate flight legs that use 
airports that were considered secondary just a few years ago – these airports were also 
not considered in the study. 
The study determined the minimum cost, including expected delay costs, to transport a 
given number of passengers. First, we have calculated the cost of the actual network, 
which was used to compare with the optimal network. The optimal network was 
obtained setting α=5% and β=0%, that is, limiting passenger transfers between airlines 
to 5% and guaranteeing that all passengers were transported.  
After obtaining the optimal network, three model alternatives were run to analyze 
specific aspects: 
– Passenger transfer limit effects - the optimization model was run with 
different values of α to evaluate the impact of this parameter for airline and 
overall network costs. Six values of α were considered: 0% (no transfer), 
5%, 10%, 20%, 50%, and 100% (unlimited transfers).  
– Delay cost effects - the optimization model was run without considering 
delay costs, and these costs were computed afterwards. This permits to 
assess the impact of delay costs on the airline and network costs and on 
flight frequencies. 
– Flight frequency effects - the optimization model was run fixing the flight 
frequencies per leg to the actual value. This alternative gives insights about 
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the improvements that can be achieved in the network even without changing 
flight frequencies.  
– Passenger spill effects - the optimization model was run allowing for 
passenger spill. This permits to evaluate the impact of the passenger spill 
parameter (β) on airline and network costs and on the passenger level of 
service. Three values of β were considered: 5%, 10%, and 20%. 
The indicators used to compare the actual network with the optimal network were as 
follows: total costs, flight costs, delay costs (aircraft and passengers), flight frequency, 
flights per airport, and average number of passengers per flight. The comparison is 
done, when suitable, per airline and airport.  
The data used in the case study is presented in the next sub-section. Then, we describe 
the results, beginning with the actual network, and continuing with the optimal network 
and the networks corresponding to each model alternative. 
3.5.1 Study Data 
To carry out the case study, the following data are needed: airline flight schedules, 
airport schedules, airport declared capacity, expected delay times per airport, airport 
landing fees, number of passengers per leg, delay costs for flights and passengers, and 
average fares per leg. These data were collected from OAG schedule database, 
EUROCONTROL, and EUROSTAT.   
Airline schedules were obtained using OAG database for a week of July 2009, from 
which we took the busiest day for the case study – Friday. A total of 1,025 flights were 
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considered between the ten airports analyzed. The slot distribution per airline in each 
airport and slot time window and the average number of seats per leg and airline were 
also obtained from that database. An overview can be seen on Table 3.2. The flight 
frequencies and flight times per leg given in Table 3.3 are also for Friday. The flight 
time per leg was assumed to be the lowest value in the schedule for the leg. The 
schedule padding of each flight is assumed to be the difference between the scheduled 
flight time and the minimum flight time.  
Table 3.2 - Daily airline slots per airport 
AMS BCN CDG FCO FRA LHR MAD MUC VIE ZRH
AF 14 16 126 12 16 14 20 14 8 12 252
BA 12 10 16 10 12 104 10 14 8 12 208
IB 8 84 0 10 8 22 138 8 4 6 288
KL 104 12 14 10 8 16 12 12 8 12 208
LH 28 22 36 24 132 36 16 120 20 22 456
LX 8 6 12 8 10 12 6 8 8 78 156
OS 8 4 6 4 8 8 0 8 54 8 108
U2 0 4 8 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 16
Other 31 80 22 67 20 17 65 11 38 7 358
Total 213 238 240 145 214 229 271 195 148 157 2050
Number of Slots
Airline
Airport
Total
 
Airport declared capacity was taken from EUROCONTROL reports in movements per 
hour and then divided in 15-minute periods (Table 3.4). The expected primary flight 
delay time for each airport and slot time window was obtained using this data through 
the DELAYS© model (Table 3.4).  
Airports costs were assumed to be equal to the landing fees levied by the airports to the 
airlines. The landing fees were estimated for each airport according to IATA (2009) as a 
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linear function of aircraft seat capacity. An example for Brussels Airport is shown in 
Figure 3.5.   
Table 3.3 - Flight frequency per leg 
AMS BCN CDG FCO FRA LHR MAD MUC VIE ZRH
AMS 0 12 14 8 11 18 11 13 10 10
BCN 12 0 10 9 6 8 63 7 4 3
CDG 14 10 0 15 18 15 13 15 9 12
FCO 8 9 13 0 7 9 11 7 4 4
FRA 11 6 18 7 0 16 12 12 14 11
LHR 18 8 15 9 16 0 13 15 8 13
MAD 10 57 13 11 12 13 0 8 2 6
MUC 13 7 15 6 12 15 8 0 12 9
VIE 10 4 9 4 14 8 2 12 0 11
ZRH 10 3 12 4 11 12 6 9 11 0
Airport
Airport
Daily flight frequency
 
Table 3.4 - Number of passengers, declared capacity, and average delay per airport 
AMS BCN CDG FCO FRA LHR MAD MUC VIE ZRH
15168 15878 16747 12511 12551 17670 16940 9670 8239 9401
14149 15560 15259 13327 13226 18018 18111 10294 8296 9143
106 60 112 88 80 88 90 90 66 68
Number of departures (pax/day)
Indicator
Number of arrivals (pax/day)
Declared capacity (mov/h)
Airport
 
 
Figure 3.5 - Brussels airport landing fees as linear function of aircraft seat capacity 
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Passenger data per leg was collected for July 2009 using the EUROSTAT website. A 
daily average was calculated from the values available there and taken as the daily 
number of passengers per leg (Table 3.5).  
Table 3.5 – Number of passengers per flight leg (July 2009) 
AMS BCN CDG FCO FRA LHR MAD MUC VIE ZRH
AMS 0 1599 1624 813 987 1836 1315 888 748 786
BCN 1474 0 1251 1007 754 1017 4375 675 387 415
CDG 1638 1326 0 2140 1608 1678 1261 1229 1045 1154
FCO 786 1005 1458 0 774 1248 1325 520 394 432
FRA 776 721 1261 793 0 1944 1453 1364 1219 772
LHR 1682 981 1605 1301 1978 0 1582 1398 800 1494
MAD 1141 3909 1491 1261 1388 1569 0 726 205 707
MUC 809 611 1089 459 1334 1360 707 0 662 437
VIE 717 400 983 408 1217 818 222 711 0 946
ZRH 896 429 1060 495 861 1207 647 512 991 0
Origin
Destination
Daily passenger demand
 
Delay costs have two components: aircraft delay and passenger delay. For the aircraft 
delay costs we used the values presented in COOK and TANNER (2011) for short 
delays (15 minutes) and long delays (65 minutes).The average aircraft delay cost per 
minute is a function of aircraft seat capacity. The passenger delay cost has two parts: 
cost to airlines (e.g., re-bookings, compensations) and cost to passengers (time losses).  
The value per minute of delay was assumed to be, respectively, 0.018 EUR/pax/min and 
0.75 EUR/pax/minute. Those values were obtained also from COOK and TANNER 
(2011), assuming a value of time of 45 EUR/hour (EUROCONTROL, 2009). Flight-leg 
fares were collect in a short period of time from available non-stop return fares for July 
2011 without taxes and fees. 
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3.5.2 Study Results 
The results obtained with respect to total cost, flight costs, delay costs (aircraft and 
passengers), flight frequencies, flights per airport, and average number of seats per leg 
for the optimal network and the actual network are displayed in Table 3.6. These results 
were obtained through the optimization model, in the case of the actual network running 
the model with the existing flights per airline and without considering delay costs, and 
calculating the delay costs afterwards to obtain the total cost. 
Table 3.6 - Costs, number of flights, and passengers per flight for actual and optimal networks 
Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var %
43.7 - 36.7 - 2.5 - 1.6 - 1.1 - 1025 - 97.0 -
39.1 -10.4 33.1 -9.7 2.1 -16.3 0.6 -62.8 0.6 -47.2 971 -5.3 102.4 5.6Optimal
Number of 
flights
Number of 
passengers 
per flightNetwork
Total cost
(M €)
Flight costs
(M €)
Airport costs
(M €)
Aircraft delay 
costs (M €)
Pax delay
costs (M €)
Actual
 
The actual network involves a total cost of 43.7 MEUR, of which 84.1 percent (36.7 
MEUR) are flight costs, 5.8 percent (2.5 MEUR) are airport costs, 3.7 percent (1.6 
MEUR) are aircraft delay costs, 2.6 percent (1.1 MEUR) are passenger delay, and 4.0 
percent (1.7 MEUR) are schedule delay costs. The number of flights is 1,025 and the 
average number of passengers per flight is 97.0.  
The total cost for the optimal network is 39.1 MEUR, that is, 10.4 percent smaller than 
for the actual network. This result is achieved with a very significant reduction of delay 
costs: aircraft delay costs drop by 62.8 percent and passenger delay costs by 47.2 
percent. Flight and airport costs also drop, by 9.7 and 16.3 percent, to 33.1 and 2.1 
MEUR, respectively. Schedule delay costs increase 54.6 percent to 2.7 MEUR. The 
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number of flights falls to 971 (-5.3 percent), while the average number of passengers 
per flight increases to 102.4 (+5.6 percent).  
Comparing the results per airline, it can be seen that the airlines with larger reductions 
in total cost are the ones with larger reductions in delay costs and number of flights: IB 
and LH (Table 3.7). This situation results from a substantial cut in the flight frequency 
of MAD-BCN (120 to 100 flights) and in the total number of flights to/from FRA and 
MUC, respectively. All airlines reduce their flight costs between 6.9 and 14.3 percent. 
The average number of passengers per flight increases between 0.7 (BA) and 8.4 
percent (LH), being the smallest average number of passengers per flight 86.3 (OS) and 
the largest 117.4 (U2). Finally, passenger transfer between airlines is much smaller than 
the 5 percent limit. Indeed, only for the smallest airline considered in the case study 
(U2) the transfer exceeds 0.5 percent. 
For the ten airports considered in the application, the total cost involved in flights and 
passengers departing or arriving at the airport decreases between 6.8 and 15.4 percent, 
and the number of flights taking-off and landing at the airport decreases between 0.5 
and 9.2 percent (Table 3.8). The airport costs decrease as a result of reductions in the 
number of flights between 2.6 and 21.4 percent. Aircraft delay costs at the airports 
decrease between 58.3 percent (AMS) and 69.1 percent (MUC), and passenger delay 
costs decrease between 42.2 percent (AMS) and 57.7 percent (MUC). Overall, 
decreases in costs and number of flights are higher at FRA, MUC, BCN, and MAD, 
which is a direct consequence of the reduction in the number of flights for the airlines 
dominant in these airports (LH and IB).  
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Table 3.7 - Costs, number of flights, passengers, and passengers per flight per airline for actual and 
optimal networks 
Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var %
AF 4.4 -10.8 3.9 -9.4 294.5 -16.3 81.8 -58.3 80.8 -52.1 120 -4.8 13146 0.1 109.5 5.1
BA 4.2 -7.8 3.7 -6.3 269.1 -6.6 106.4 -58.0 106.5 -51.4 103 -1.0 11340 -0.2 110.1 0.7
IB 5.7 -14.0 5.1 -12.4 412.5 -21.3 56.8 -65.0 50.0 -59.8 130 -9.7 13248 -0.3 101.9 10.4
KL 3.3 -7.9 3.1 -7.0 133.0 -15.2 33.5 -59.8 39.5 -51.0 103 -1.0 8978 0.3 87.2 1.3
LH 6.9 -14.3 6.4 -11.9 274.0 -18.1 143.0 -67.8 143.2 -61.5 210 -7.9 20529 -0.1 97.8 8.4
LX 2.7 -10.9 2.4 -8.2 186.8 -13.2 66.2 -64.8 65.0 -58.7 75 -3.8 8372 -0.1 111.6 3.9
OS 1.9 -9.3 1.7 -8.1 102.8 -13.6 31.3 -56.5 27.8 -50.3 52 -3.7 4485 -0.2 86.3 3.6
U2 0.3 -6.9 0.3 -5.7 26.9 -13.1 2.4 -59.3 2.5 -52.6 8 0.0 939 1.1 117.4 1.1
OTHER 7.0 -11.1 6.4 -9.8 406.1 -17.9 71.8 -62.1 73.3 -55.3 170 -5.0 18408 0.3 108.3 5.6
Airlines
Total cost
(M €) Aircraft Passenger 
Flight costs
(M €)
Delay costs (K €)Airport
costs (K €)
Number of 
flights
Number of 
passengers
Number of 
passengers 
per flight
 
Table 3.8 - Costs, number of flights, and passengers per flight per airport for actual and optimal 
networks 
Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var %
AMS 3.5 -6.8 3.3 -6.0 111.6 -17.3 43.2 -25.8 106.0 -0.5 96.7 0.5
BCN 4.3 -13.4 3.9 -12.1 362.9 -21.4 38.9 -43.9 108.0 -9.2 103.4 10.2
CDG 4.2 -12.3 3.7 -10.4 319.6 -18.3 209.4 -30.0 111.5 -7.1 111.6 7.6
FCO 3.0 -8.4 2.9 -7.7 52.1 -15.0 40.9 -33.7 71.0 -2.1 117.0 2.1
FRA 3.3 -15.4 3.0 -12.7 91.4 -10.2 215.0 -41.9 99.0 -7.5 107.1 8.1
LHR 4.8 -9.3 4.1 -7.5 357.4 -2.6 345.3 -30.2 111.5 -2.6 114.3 2.7
MAD 5.4 -12.9 4.9 -11.7 443.9 -20.4 53.9 -41.7 124.5 -8.1 101.5 8.8
MUC 2.7 -15.2 2.6 -13.3 41.8 -20.3 84.6 -48.8 91.0 -6.7 85.1 7.1
VIE 2.7 -7.9 2.4 -6.7 179.3 -13.0 41.9 -37.6 72.5 -2.0 88.7 2.1
ZRH 2.5 -9.7 2.2 -6.2 145.7 -19.5 108.7 -44.0 76.0 -3.2 93.6 3.3
Airport
Total cost
(M €)
Flight costs
(M €)
Airport costs
(K €)
Total delay 
costs (K €)
Number of 
flights
Number of 
passengers per 
flight
 
 3.5.3.1. Airline passenger transfer effects 
The results described above for the optimal network were obtained for α=5%, thus 
ensuring that passenger transfer between airlines and airline market power would be 
small. To assess the impact of this parameter in the network, the optimization model 
was run using five different values of α: 0 (no passenger transfer between airlines), 10, 
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20, 50, and 100% (unlimited transfers). However, the results obtained for 20, 50, and 
100% were the same, thus only the values for α=20% are presented. This means that 
allowing for a passenger variation of more than 20% does not improve the network. The 
main results are summarized on Table 3.9.  
Table 3.9 - Costs, and number of flights for actual and optimal networks for different model 
alternatives 
Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Number Var %
43.7 - 36.7 - 2.5 - 2.7 - 1025 -
39.1 -10.4 33.1 -9.7 2.1 -16.3 1.2 -56.5 971 -5.3
39.6 -9.4 33.1 -9.7 2.1 -16.3 2.5 -9.2 971 -5.3
40.6 -7.1 34.5 -5.9 2.2 -11.6 1.2 -53.9 1025 0.0
0 39.2 -10.1 33.3 -9.4 2.1 -16.1 1.2 -56.1 975 -4.9
10 39.0 -10.6 33.1 -9.9 2.1 -16.5 1.2 -56.7 968 -5.6
20 38.6 -11.6 32.6 -11.1 2.1 -17.2 1.2 -57.3 951 -7.2
5 38.9 -11.0 33.0 -10.2 2.1 -16.8 1.1 -57.7 964 -6.0
10 38.5 -11.9 32.6 -11.1 2.1 -17.5 1.1 -59.1 953 -7.0
20 36.7 -16.0 30.8 -16.1 2.0 -21.3 1.0 -63.8 892 -13.0
Aircraft delay 
costs (M €)
Number of 
flights
Actual
Total cost
(M €)
Flight costs
(M €)
Airport costs
(M €)
Optimal
Network
Optimal without delay
Optimal with fixed frequency
Optimal with 
airline passenger 
transfer
(%)
Optimal with 
passenger spill
(%)
 
Total cost drops with respect to the actual network by 1.2, 10.4, 10.6, and 11.6 percent 
for values of α of 0, 5, 10, and 20%, respectively. It can be seen that as the passenger 
transfers limit increases the cost savings increase but at a smaller rate. The total number 
of flights decreases between 4.9 percent for α=0% and 7.2 percent with α=20%. Finally, 
the delay costs drop 50.8 percent for α=0% and 57.3 percent for α=20%. For the number 
of flights and for the delay costs the rate of decrease becomes smaller with the increase 
in α. 
The passenger transfers between airlines are always less than 2.0 percent, except for U2, 
even when the limit is 20 percent (Figure 3.6). For U2 the gains are: 1.1 (α=5%), 4.7 
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(α=10%), and 9.2 percent (α=20%). This result might be explained by the fact that U2 is 
the smallest of the airlines considered, and small absolute variations in the number of 
passengers represent high relative changes. 
 
Figure 3.6 - Airline passenger variation for different airline passenger transfer limits 
 3.5.3.2. Delay cost effects  
An important aspect of the research described in this chapter is the inclusion of aircraft 
and passenger delay costs in the total cost of the air transportation network. To test their 
influence on the final results, the model was run without considering the aircraft and 
passenger delay costs, and these costs were calculated afterwards to determine the total 
cost of the network. 
The value we obtained for this cost was 39.6 MEUR, which signifies a 1.1 percent 
increase in relation to the optimal network (optimized with delay costs), but a 9.4 
percent decrease in relation to the actual network (Table 9). The drop in costs from the 
actual network is due to a 9.7 percent decrease on flight costs and a 15.9 percent 
reduction on aircraft delay costs. In contrast, the passenger delay costs increase by 0.4 
percent. The total costs increase from the optimal network is mainly due to the aircraft 
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
AF BA IB KL LH LX OS U2 OTHER
P
as
se
n
ge
r 
tr
an
sf
e
rs
 (
%
)
Airline
α=0% α=5% α=10% α=20%
Chapter 3 
66 
(+126.0 percent) and passengers (+90.0 percent) delay costs. The number of flights and 
the average number of passengers per flight are the same as in the optimal network. 
These results indicate that flight frequency might be above the optimal in some legs as 
the number of flights is the same with and without delay effects, and that both aircraft 
and passenger delays have a significant effect in flight costs.  
The results at airline and airport level are quite similar to the ones obtained for the 
optimal network. In relation to the actual network, the costs for airlines decrease 
between -7.5 and -12.2 percent, and the costs for airports decrease between -6.6 and -
13.9 percent. When the comparison is made with the optimal network, as expected, all 
airlines and airports increase their total costs: between 0.3 and 3.2 percent for the 
airlines and between 0.2 and 2.9 percent for the airports.  
The largest difference with respect to the optimal is in the passenger transfers between 
airlines (Figure 3.7).  When delay costs are not taken into account, passenger transfers 
increase, exceeding 0.5 percent for five airlines, although continuing to be clearly less 
than the (5%) limit. 
 
Figure 3.7 - Airline passenger variation for the optimal networks with and without delay costs 
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 3.5.3.3. Flight frequency effect 
A critical aspect for airline competition is the flight frequency per leg. As was seen 
before, the optimal network (obtained without fixing the flight frequency) reduces the 
number of flights in 5.3 percent to 971 flights, which leads to an increase in the average 
number of passengers per flight. Fixing the flight frequency to its actual value (1,025 
flights), the total cost drops 7.1 percent in relation to the total cost of the actual network, 
mainly due to a 53.9 percent drop in the total delay costs (Table 9). Flight costs and 
airport costs also decrease 5.9 and 11.6 percent, respectively. When the comparison is 
made with the optimal network, total cost increases by 3.7 percent as a consequence of a 
generalized increase in costs, well distributed between flight, airport and delay costs.  
 
Figure 3.8 - Total cost reduction per airport for the optimal networks with variable and fixed flight 
frequency 
At the airport level, the reduction in total costs with respect to the actual network is 
more evenly distributed (across airports) than the one observed for the optimal network 
(Figure 3.8). Largest cost decreases are mostly achieved by reducing the number of 
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seen for the airlines: gains are smaller and better distributed than in the optimal 
network, though all airlines decrease its costs from the actual network. 
 3.5.3.4. Passenger spill effect 
In the previous model alternatives, the passenger demand per leg was always fully 
satisfied – passengers could change airline but no passengers were spilled. Here, this 
assumption is relaxed by allowing passenger spill (β) up to 5%, 10%, and 20% of the 
actual demand per leg. In relation to the actual network, the total cost decreases between 
11.0 percent (β=5%) and 16.0 percent (β=20%) which is, respectively, 0.6 percent and 
4.4 percent more than in the optimal network (without passenger spill). In terms of 
delay costs, the drop ranges between 57.7 percent (β=5%) and 63.8 percent (β=20%), 
which is, respectively, 1.3 and 6.5 percent more than in the optimal network. These 
results seem to indicate that the cost savings are small with a passenger spill limit of 5% 
but tend to increase more than proportionally with the increase in the spill limit. 
Total passenger spill is 3.0 (β=5%), 6.1 (β=10%), and 13.0 percent (β=20%) in relation 
to the actual network, corresponding to a total flight reduction of 6.0, 7.0, and 13.0 
percent, respectively. In relation to the actual network, the average number of passenger 
per flight increases 4.0, 1.0, and 0.03 percent, respectively, for β equal to 5%, 10%, and 
20%. The results at the airline and airport level are coherent with what have been seen 
in the previous alternatives. Passenger spill per airline is presented in Figure 3.9. 
Airlines (except U2) decrease the number of passengers for all values of β. The largest 
reductions are 3.8 percent for β=5% (BA), 8.3 percent for β=10% (AF), and 17.2 
percent for β=20% (AF). At the airport level the largest decreases in terms of flights are 
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the same as in optimal network (BCN, FRA, MUC, and MAD) plus CGD and FCO 
(Figure 3.10).  
 
Figure 3.9 - Airline passenger variation for the optimal networks with different demand spill limits 
 
Figure 3.10 - Flight reduction per airport for the optimal networks for different demand spill limits 
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minutes and the linear relaxation took 1.1 seconds to solve. The computation time 
seems to be related with the value of α: intermediate values of α led to more time to 
reach optimality. Indeed, the computation time increased to 84.5 minutes when α=10% 
and 62.0 minutes when α=20%, and decreased to 5.5 minutes when α=0%. For α=100% 
the result was the same as for α=20% but the computation time was just 45.3 minutes. 
The 10-percent optimality gap was achieved for all α within 1 minute of computation 
time.  
When the delay costs are not considered in the optimization model, the computation 
time is quite similar to when they are considered, and also depend on the value of α 
(varying between 3.3 and 53.8 minutes). But when the flight frequency is fixed, the 
optimality was reached within only one minute for all values of α (0.6 to 1.0 minutes), 
and when we allowed for passenger spilling the computation time varied between 1.4 
(α=20%) and 6.6 (α=5%) minutes. 
The computation times mentioned above are very acceptable given the type of 
application the model is intended to – assisting aviation authorities in their decisions 
regarding airport capacity usage. Moreover, the airport network considered in the 
application is a very dense one. This seems to indicate that the optimization model 
could be tractable even if the air transportation network was much larger. 
3.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we presented an approach to analyze whether, in an air transportation 
network, the expected passenger demand can be satisfied with the existing airport 
Optimization-based analysis of Slot Allocation in the main European Airports 
71 
capacity at a lower total cost, including aircraft and passenger delay costs. The results 
obtained through its application can provide aviation authorities with valuable insights 
on how to improve the performance of a liberalized, congested, and slot-constrained air 
transportation network. The main contribution of this chapter is the optimization model 
underlying the approach. This model incorporates aircraft and passenger delay costs in 
the total costs, which is essential to understand the implications of network changes to 
passengers, airlines, and airports.  
Analyzing the results for the case study, the first main conclusion is that costs can be 
significantly reduced (10.4 percent) with only minor changes in airline competition and 
passenger level of service. This reduction is mainly achieved by cutting by half the 
expected delay costs for aircraft and passenger and without demand spilling. The share 
of delay costs in the total costs of the system drops from around 6.5 percent to about 3 
percent, even without considering delay propagation effects. The distribution of these 
cost savings is distributed across airlines rather evenly. Although all airports in the 
network reduce their costs, four of them – BCN, FRA, MAD, and MUC – gain clearly 
more than the others. The second conclusion is that cost reductions are obtained with a 
relatively small reduction in the number of flights (of around 5 percent). The flight 
reduction is higher for the high-frequency leg of MAD-BCN (with typically low load 
factors) and for flights to/from FRA and MUC, airports where LH is the clearly 
dominant airline. To balance this flight reduction the average number of passengers per 
flight should increase also around 5 percent to 6 percent. The third conclusion is that 
these changes can occur without significant changes in the market power of the airlines 
operating the network. Indeed, the results show that passenger transfer between airlines 
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is always below 1 percent (except for the smallest airline considered in the case study). 
The largest airlines have higher drops in their delay costs and, therefore, in their total 
costs. This situation is due to the fact that these airlines have more slots to play with, 
being therefore capable of changing flight times to reduce their expected delays. 
Finally, from the airports perspective, a small change in the network design can lead to 
smaller costs while maintaining a good level of service for the passengers. As expected, 
gains are higher for the airports where delays are higher.    
According to these conclusions, it seems possible to affirm that: 
1. Airport capacity is sufficient to accommodate the existing demand (or even an 
increase in demand) if airports and airlines agree to small changes in the actual 
network design. 
2. Airline profitability is not compromised by a reduction of flight frequencies, as 
delay costs drop more than proportionally with the decrease in these frequencies. 
3. Airlines can reduce delay costs if they change their flights in order to avoid 
flying between peak periods at the departure and arrival airports, or at least 
avoiding the peak period at one of the airports.  
4. Passengers will not see a deterioration of their level of service because flight 
frequency reduction is small, they can still travel close to their desired travel 
time, and their expected delay time is significantly reduced. 
The conclusions stated above were drawn relying on a number of simplifications. In 
particular, they involve origin-destination demand (and leg-interdependence) effects and 
delay propagation effects. Also, airline market share was dealt with in a simplified way, 
assuming that an airline will have a demand share per leg and time period proportional 
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to their seat share. Despite these simplifications, we believe that the insights provided 
through the optimization model can be very useful for aviation authorities, airlines and 
airports in their discussions regarding a better usage of airport capacity.  
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Chapter 4  
Integrated Flight Scheduling and 
Flight Assignment under Airport 
Congestion 
4.1 Introduction 
The liberalization of air transport markets and its consequences, such as the increase in 
traffic, have led airlines to a large number of functional changes. One of the most 
important is the adoption by airlines of hub-and-spoke networks. Other changes are the 
reduction of the average price per available seat-kilometer, the rise in flight frequencies, 
and the establishment of partnerships between airlines (BELOBABA et al., 2009). A 
negative consequence of the growth in air traffic for airlines and passengers is the 
increase in airport congestion and flight delays. This signifies huge costs to the airlines 
and the economy – according to a recent report, the total delay costs for the US 
economy in 2007 were USD 32.9 billion, including USD 16.7 billion of direct costs to 
passengers and USD 8.3 billion of direct costs to airlines (NEXTOR, 2010). 
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Airlines can address the challenges they face in this context in a multiplicity of ways. In 
particular, it is crucial that they make an optimal choice of the timetable for the flights 
they offer in each market – flight scheduling – and of the aircraft they use for each flight 
– fleet assignment. 
Flight scheduling and fleet assignment are fundamental stages of the airline planning 
process. Models that deal with both issues simultaneously led to significant 
improvements in airlines that operate in competitive markets (REXING et al., 2000; 
LOHATEPANONT and BARNHART, 2004). These models assume that the schedule 
will be met as planned (AHMADBEYGI et al., 2008), something that does not happen 
in many occasions. Therefore, they disregard important costs currently faced by airlines. 
In this chapter, is presented a mixed-integer linear optimization model for integrated 
flight scheduling and fleet assignment where the costs for an airline associated with 
aircraft and passenger delays are explicitly taken into account. The objective of the 
model is to maximize the expected profits of the airline for a given O/D-based (or 
itinerary-based) travel demand. The model is designed for application to networks that 
include some congested, slot-constrained airports, considering in a simplified manner 
both airline competition and airline cooperation (alliances, partnerships). The usefulness 
of the model is demonstrated through a case study involving the main network of TAP 
Portugal. 
Flight delays and their implications have been extensively debated in the literature, from 
a wide variety of standpoints – including flight scheduling. In this context, basically two 
types of model have been proposed: schedule recovery models, which are applied 
during operations to return a disrupted schedule to the plan (BRATU and BARNHART, 
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2006); and robust scheduling models, which are used to create new flight schedules by 
re-timing and re-fleeting existing schedules to reduce expected operating costs and 
increase schedule robustness (LAN et al., 2006). The model proposed here can be 
classified in the latter type, but differs from the existing models in several respects – 
and particularly because delay costs are dealt with in an O/D-based flight scheduling 
and fleet assignment framework. 
The chapter is organized as follows. After this introduction, is presented an overview of 
the flight scheduling and fleet assignment literature. Next, is provided a detailed 
explanation of the ingredients of integrated flight scheduling and fleet assignment 
problems, where the implications of airport congestion, airline competition, and airline 
cooperation are examined. Then, is formulated the mixed-integer linear optimization 
model, specify the assumptions upon which the model is based, and describe its 
application to the TAP network. In the final section is appraised the strengths and 
limitations of the model, and identify directions for future research. 
4.2 Literature Overview 
Flight scheduling and fleet assignment are two very important (and difficult) stages of 
the airline planning process, and have motivated a great deal of attention in the air 
transport literature (BARNHART et al., 2003; CLARK and SMITH, 2004). In general, 
these stages have been dealt with separately until the 1990s due to computational 
limitations, but, since then, there have been significant efforts to partially or fully 
integrate them.  
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Flight scheduling is the process through which airlines decide the timetable of their 
flights with the typical objective of maximizing profits. The first flight scheduling 
models date back to the 1960s and 1970s. Work carried out in this period is thoroughly 
reviewed in ETSCHMAIER and MATHAISEL (1985). In the last two decades, great 
progress has been made by re-timing, changing, adding, or removing flight legs from an 
existing schedule – see e.g. BERGE and HOPPERSTAD (1993) and 
LOHATEPANONT and BANHART (2004) – or by building schedules from scratch to 
charter airlines – see e.g. ERDMANN et al. (2001) and BARNHART and KIM (2005). 
All these models deal with a single airline. Recently, YAN and CHEN (2007) presented 
a flight scheduling model for airline alliances, claiming that it was successfully applied 
to two Taiwan airlines. 
Fleet assignment is the process through which airlines assign aircraft to flights with the 
typical objective of minimizing costs. Fleet assignment problems (FAP) were first 
tackled in FERGUSON and DANTZIG (1955), that is, even before flight scheduling 
problems started to be addressed from an optimization perspective. The literature on 
these problems has been recently reviewed by SHERALI et al. (2006). The two core 
models are the ones presented in ABARA (1989) and HANE et al. (1995). The former 
set the usual constraints of a FAP model – cover, balance, aircraft availability, and 
schedule balance constraints – and uses all feasible connecting arcs between flights as 
decision variables. RUSHMEIER and KONTOGIORGIS (1997) increased the 
efficiency of ABARA’s formulation by explicitly considering the possible connections, 
and developed a heuristic algorithm to solve the model. In HANE et al. (1995) the fleet 
type to fly each flight leg is used as a decision variable of the model, thus reducing the 
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number of variables. Also, it introduced other widely-used techniques – node 
consolidation and island construction – to further reduce the size of the model. The 
previous models use leg-based information, therefore they do not take connecting 
passengers and hub-and-spoke network effects into account. O/D-based FAP models 
were proposed by JACOBS et al. (1999) and BARNHART et al. (2002). In these 
models, demand, recapture, and fares are all considered at the origin-destination market 
level and not per leg, which leads to more meaningful results. It has been shown that 
their application can result in significant additional profits to airlines.   
Solving flight scheduling and fleet assignment models sequentially may lead to sub-
optimal results. To avoid this, the two airline planning stages must be dealt with in an 
integrated manner. In this case, airlines decide simultaneously the timetable of their 
flights and the aircraft to assign to each flight. LEVIN (1971) was the first to propose a 
(very simple) integrated model, considering a single aircraft type and discrete flight 
time windows. The same approach was adopted in models proposed by 
DESAULNIERS et al. (1997) and REXING et al. (2000). Both define a set of possible 
re-timing arcs for each flight leg and allow for a heterogeneous fleet. The models pick 
the re-timing arcs that optimize airline profits. It is assumed that the flight legs are 
known, which means that a base-schedule has to exist (or be built) previously. 
LOHATEPANONT and BARNHART (2004) relaxed the assumption of fixed and 
known flight legs. They start by dividing the flights in two sets: mandatory and 
optional. The optimization process then chooses the optional flights that maximize 
airline profits while taking into account the impact of flight frequency on travel 
demand. Airline competition is considered in the demand function through a quality of 
Chapter 4 
80 
service index. This work was recently extended to stochastic travel demand conditions 
by YAN et al. (2008). 
None of the integrated models referred to above address flight delay issues. But these 
issues are dealt with in two types of optimization models: schedule recovery models and 
robust scheduling models. In schedule recovery models (ROSENBERGER et al., 2001a; 
BRATU and BARNHART, 2006) the objective is to optimize the aircraft and/or 
passenger routing after the occurrence of an unexpected event. These are reactive 
models because they are applicable only after the disruption has taken place. In robust 
scheduling models (ROSENBERGER et al., 2001b; LAN et al., 2006; GAO et al. 
2009), the objective is to minimize the cost of delays (or a surrogate variable) by 
introducing slackness, or other attributes providing flexibility to recover, in the airline 
schedule. 
The model presented in this chapter is of the latter type. However, unlike the models 
currently available, it is not based on a pre-defined schedule – the schedule is 
established as a function of the expected aircraft and passenger delays in an integrated 
O/D-based flight scheduling and fleet assignment framework, considering both airline 
competition and airline cooperation issues. Taken together, these features make our 
model a significant contribution to the airline planning literature. 
4.3 Problem Ingredients 
The problems faced by airlines when they make their flight scheduling and fleet 
assignment decisions are highly complex, particularly when the airlines operate in 
congested, slot-constrained airports. .Below, we detail a number of ingredients that 
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should be contemplated in a model developed for assisting airlines at making those 
decisions. 
In many airports, particularly in Europe, airlines are limited in the number of slots they 
can use because the declared capacity of airports is insufficient to accommodate peak 
period demand, constraining the choices of airlines in terms of time and frequency of 
flights (ACL, 2009). The allocation of airport slots to airlines is decided during the 
IATA scheduling conferences (IATA, 2008a). These conferences are held every six 
months to provide a forum for the allocation of slots and for the reaching of consensus 
on the schedule adjustments necessary to conform to airport capacity limitations. A 
significant part of the slots is assigned through the mechanism of grandfather rights, 
being kept by the same airlines from season to season (BARBOT, 2004). The remaining 
slots are assigned taken into account the scheduling needs of airlines. Thus, on the one 
hand, schedules are set given the available slots and, on the other hand, slots are 
requested to meet scheduling needs.  
The requests for slots, as well as the average number of seats per flight, are related to 
the competition between airlines. In liberalized markets there is a higher frequency of 
flights and a lower number of seats per flight (GIVONI and RIETVELD, 2009). 
Airlines tend to increase their frequencies both by adding new non-stop flights and by 
offering connecting itineraries. Airlines do that to gain market share, since there is a 
positive (empirical) relationship between the number of passengers that an airline can 
expect to serve and the frequency of flights they offer in a market. The relationship is 
often considered to have the shape of an S-curve, particularly in short and medium-haul 
markets (SIMPSON, 1970; BELOBABA et al., 2009). 
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The passenger demand per market is forecast through specialized models (WEI and 
HANSEN, 2005). In each market, there are passengers desiring distinct kinds of service: 
some want to travel non-stop while others are more price-sensitive and prefer to take a 
connecting itinerary with reduced price. The relative portion of passengers willing to fly 
non-stop is a function of the type of market (business or leisure), distance, flight 
frequency, and competition (VASIGH, et al., 2008). With appropriate quality share 
indexes (QSI), airlines can estimate the percentage of passengers that will pay for non-
stop premium service, and then select itineraries and frequencies to match that demand. 
The price-sensitive passengers may accept to fly in connecting itineraries, particularly if 
they involve only one stop (COLDREN et al., 2003). Each connecting itinerary offered 
by an airline uses one or more of its hubs as connecting points. But airlines can also use 
the flights of partner airlines to increase the number of connecting itineraries they make 
available to passengers (ABEYRATNE, 2000; FAN et al., 2001). In BRUECKNER 
(2003) it is shown that both code-sharing and anti-trust immunities reduce the fares for 
passengers on international flights by around 10%. This allows airlines to increase the 
market share on the flight legs they offer provided that a good level of schedule 
coordination among airlines is assured (WAN et al., 2009).  In particular, it is necessary 
to guarantee that the connecting time is properly sized. Otherwise, if the connecting 
time is too long the attractiveness of the itinerary will decrease, and if it is too short it 
can lead to misconnections with significant flight delays and large costs to airlines. 
Data from the US domestic network in 2007 show that disrupted passengers experience 
“an average delay of 456 minutes accounting for 50% of all passenger delay minutes, 
but are only 3.4% of the delayed passengers” (NEXTOR, 2010). This means that each 
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passenger that misses a connection has a much higher cost for an airline than a 
passenger that is delayed but still manages to get her/his flight. Thus, reducing the 
probability of passenger disruption will have a strong impact on delay costs. It should 
be underlined here that aircraft delays can be substantially different from passenger 
delays when passengers are traveling in connecting itineraries (LAN et al., 2006). 
Occurrence of delays is especially likely to happen in airports characterized with a 
utilization rate of 85% or more (above that rate delays increase sharply, see DE 
NEUFVILLE and ODONI, 2003). 
Airlines must make their flight scheduling and fleet assignment decisions taking all 
these aspects into account, as well as the costs and revenues they can make in each 
market. Revenues are essentially made from selling tickets, with the fares applied to 
non-stop trips being typically higher than those applied to connecting trips (which are 
made by the most price-sensitive passengers). Costs can be divided into four categories: 
vehicle costs, airport costs, spill costs, and passenger delay costs. Vehicle costs consist 
mainly of fuel, crew, maintenance, leasing, and aircraft depreciation costs, as well as 
navigation taxes. Airport costs are the landing fees and other airport charges paid by 
airlines to airport authorities. Together, vehicle and airport costs signify more than 60 
percent of the total costs of an airline (SWAN and ADLER, 2006). Part of these costs is 
attributable to aircraft delays. Spill costs are the losses in airline revenues resulting from 
insufficient seating capacity to satisfy demand. Finally, passenger delay costs are the 
costs to the airline of passengers that miss their connection due to delays in a previous 
flight leg. These costs include re-accommodation costs and costs associated with a loss 
of good will. 
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4.4 Optimization Model 
In this section is described the formulation of the optimization model designed to 
represent the integrated flight scheduling and fleet assignment problem faced by an 
airline that operates mainly in slot-constrained airports, as well as the assumptions upon 
which the model is based. The objective of the airline is to maximize (expected) profits 
while satisfying the demand for its flights, taking into account airport congestion 
(arrival delays), airline competition, and airline collaboration issues. The model applies 
to a given network of non-stop and one-stop flights, and a given planning period (e.g. 
one day or one week), being each day divided into demand periods (e.g. early morning, 
late morning, early afternoon, etc.), and each demand period further divided into slot 
time windows (of, say, 15 minutes). 
4.4.1 Model Assumptions 
The optimization model relies on the following assumptions: 
(1) The markets served by the airline, the network structure (hubs), the available fleet, 
the unit revenues for non-stop and (one-stop) connecting flights, the unit vehicle, 
airport, spill, and delay costs, and the arrival delays distribution at the airports are 
known (or can be anticipated with reasonable accuracy). 
These assumptions reflect the fact that flight scheduling decisions have a short-term 
nature – they are made approximately one year in advance of the season to which 
they apply. 
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(2) The flight frequencies of airline’s competitors are known (or can be anticipated with 
reasonable accuracy). 
This assumption is plausible if decisions are being made during the IATA 
scheduling conferences, as information about slot requests becomes available. Even 
before the conferences, it is also plausible in situations where, like in Europe, 
airports are slot-constrained. In this case, flight frequencies are quite difficult to 
change, as airlines need to find vacant, compatible slots both in the departing and 
the arrival airport. 
(3) The market share of the airline can be expressed as a piecewise linear function of 
flight frequency. 
The market share of an airline in a given market is the ratio between its flight frequency 
in that market and the total flight frequency in the market. For each demand period, it 
can be expressed as follows: 
jkp
jkp
bjkp
b
Fr
M
Fr





B
 (4.1) 
where B = {1, …, B} - set of airlines that operate in the market; Mjkp - share of the 
airline in market jk in demand period p; Frjkp - frequency of the airline in market jk in 
demand period p; μ - parameter greater than 1 representing the impact of flight 
frequency on market share (for larger μ the impact is larger); Frbjkp - frequency of airline 
b in market jk in demand period p. 
If the flight frequencies of the other airlines in the market are known, which is in line 
with assumption (2), the relationship between market share and flight frequency 
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represented with expression (4.1) can be plotted as an S-curve (Figure 4.1). Such curve 
can be approximated by a piecewise linear function with as much accuracy as the 
number of pieces of the function. 
 
Figure 4.1- Piecewise linear approximation of the S-curve 
(4) The effect of slight changes in passenger connecting time upon the demand faced by 
the airline is negligible. 
Travel costs, which include ticket fares and time costs, are an essential determinant 
of travel demand. Time costs include in-flight time and connecting time costs. If the 
increase in connecting times is small as compared to total travel time, the decrease 
in travel demand would be minor. Moreover, such decrease would be at least partly 
compensated with the increase in travel demand that would in principle arise from 
the decrease of the probability of passengers being disrupted. Hence, travel demand 
should remain almost unchanged as a consequence of slight changes in connecting 
times.  
(5) The recapture rate of the airline for a given market is a function of travel time and 
current market share. 
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The recapture rate of an airline is the fraction of demand spilled in a given period 
that is regained by the airline in later periods. Estimation of recapture rates is a 
complex task, mostly dealt with in the revenue management field (COLDREN and 
KOPPELMAN, 2005; RATLIFF et al., 2008; GALLEGO et al., 2010). To our best 
knowledge, the only airline operational planning models where passenger recapture 
is taken into account are the ones presented in BARNHART et al. (2002) and 
LOHATEPANONT and BARNHART (2004). In these articles a quality share index 
(QSI) is used to estimate recapture rates. The QSI measures the attractiveness of an 
itinerary, and is related with the airline’s market share.  
The expression that will be used in the computation of recapture rates is as follows: 
0 1max 0 ;  1 , , ,jkp jkp
jk
M j k p
t

  
       
  
A P  (4.2) 
where αjkp - recapture rate for market jk in demand period p; M
0
jkp is the current 
airline market share in demand period; and tjk - travel time without delay between 
airports j and k. 
Expression (4.2) makes the recapture rate of the airline for a given market dependent 
on travel time (if this time is smaller than one hour then no passengers are 
recaptured) and (current) market share; that is, it captures two important aspects 
influencing the attractiveness of an itinerary – and the QSI.  Indeed, it is expected 
that long-haul markets are less sensitive to departure/arrival time than short-haul 
markets (JORGE-CALDERÓN, 1997). Also, if an airline has a large market share, it 
should be able to recapture a large fraction of demand. 
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In the previous expression, current market share is used as an indicator of actual 
market share. This certainly is a simplification, but its consequences should be 
acceptable if the airline flight frequencies (and market shares) do not change 
substantially, which is likely to be the case if the current flight schedules fit well the 
demand faced by the airline. The simplification is important because it allows to 
keep the optimization model linear while taking recapture rates into account (as 
shown in BARNHART et al., 2002, “the benefit of incorporating recapture into the 
fleeting decision process outweighs any errors that might result from inaccurate 
recapture rates”). 
(6) The airline can assign passengers to partner flights in one of the legs of a connecting 
itinerary. 
This assumption reflects one of the main facets of airline collaboration. By 
assigning passengers to partner flights in one of the legs of a connecting itinerary, 
airlines provide service in markets that otherwise they would not be able to serve. 
The revenues are then split across the airlines involved, typically in proportion with 
the length of the legs. 
4.4.2 Model Formulation 
For formulating the model, consider the following additional notation: 
Sets: A = {1, …, A} - set of airports; A0 = {1, …, A0} - set of hub airports;  
P = {1, …, P} - set of demand periods; T = {1, …, T} - set of slot time windows; TP = 
{1, …, TP} - set of slot time windows belonging to each demand period p; F = {1, …, 
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F} - set of aircraft types. 
Parameters: r
N
jk  - revenue for non-stop flights in market jk (USD per passenger); r
C
jk - 
revenue for connecting flights in market jk (USD per passenger); cVjkf  - vehicle cost for 
an aircraft of type f on leg jk if the flight is not delayed (USD per flight); cAjf  - airport 
cost for an aircraft of type f at airport j if the flight is not delayed (USD per flight); αNjkp 
- recapture rate in market jk for demand period p on non-stop flights for the current 
market share; αCjkp - recapture rate in market jk for demand period p on connecting 
flights for the current market share; cDf  - delay cost for an aircraft of type f (USD per 
slot time window); pjt,t’-t - probability of a flight set to arrive at airport j in slot time 
window t being delayed more than (t’-t) slot time windows; cT
MIN
j  - minimum 
connecting time for passengers at airport j (measured in slot time windows); cPjk - 
average cost per slot time window for a disrupted passenger travelling on market jk 
(USD per passenger and slot time window); sjt - available slots at airport j in slot time 
window t; nf  - number of aircraft of type f; d
N
jkp - passenger demand for non-stop flights 
in market jk and demand period p; d
C
jkp - passenger demand for connecting flights in 
market jk and demand period p; ajkp - slope of the piecewise linear approximation of the 
S-curve corresponding to market jk in demand period p; β - parameter smaller than 1 
representing the relative loss of utility of a connecting flight (Simpson, 1970; Belobaba 
et al., 2009); bjkp - intercept of the piecewise linear approximation of the S-curve 
corresponding to market jk in demand period p; sVf  - capacity of an aircraft of type f. 
Decision Variables: q
N
jkt - number of passengers that fly non-stop between airports j and 
k taking off in slot time window t; q
C1
jhkt - number of passengers on itinerary j-h-k that 
fly from airport j to hub h taking off from j in slot time window t; q
C2
jhkt - number of 
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passengers on itinerary j-h-k that fly from hub h to airport k taking off from h in slot 
time window t; xjkft - number of flights by aircraft type f on leg jk that take off in slot 
time window t; z
N
jkp - number of passengers spilled from non-stop flights in market jk in 
demand period p; z
C
jkp - number of passengers spilled from connecting flights in market 
jk in demand period p; wjhktt’ - number of connecting passengers that are waiting at 
airport h on itinerary j-h-k that are set to arrive at airport h in slot time period t and 
depart from airport h in slot time window t’; yjft - number of aircraft of type f that are 
available to take off from airport j in slot time window t. 
Using this notation, the objective-function of the model can be formulated as follows:  
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 (4.3) 
Function (4.3) expresses the maximization of the (expected) profits of the airline. The 
first two terms represent revenues associated with non-stop and connecting itineraries, 
respectively. The next term represents vehicle costs and airport costs. The fourth and 
fifth terms capture spill costs for non-stop and connecting passengers, respectively. The 
spill costs are calculated assuming that a fraction of the demand that cannot be met in a 
given period will be transferred to a different demand period, according to a given 
recapture rate. The aircraft delay costs (sixth term of the objective function) are 
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calculated by multiplying the unit cost of a delayed aircraft with the expected flight 
delay. The passenger delay costs, last term of objective function, are calculated by 
multiplying the number of passengers affected by the delay and the unit cost per slot 
time window of a disrupted passenger by the probability of a passenger being delayed 
and left with insufficient time to make the connecting flight. 
The objective-function is to be optimized considering the following constraints: 
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The role of these constraints is as follows. Capacity constraints (4.4) restrict the use of 
an airport for departures and arrivals to the slots available. Balance constraints (4.5) 
ensure that during the planning period the number of take-offs is equal to the number of 
landings per aircraft type and airport. Availability constraints (4.6) limit the use of 
aircraft to the existing fleet. Continuity constraints (4.7) and (4.8) guarantee aircraft 
continuity in each airport, for each time period and aircraft type. Demand equations for 
non-stop passengers (4.9) specify whether the demand for each market is either satisfied 
or spilled. The non-stop demand in a given demand period is the number of passengers 
willing to travel in the period multiplied by the airline market share plus the passengers 
that are recaptured from the previous period. Constraints (4.10) play a similar role for 
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connecting passengers, while taking into account whether both legs are flown by the 
airline or one of them is flown by a partner airline. Constraints (4.11) express the 
market share of the airline as a piecewise linear function of flight frequency. Constraints 
(4.12) ensure that, in connecting itineraries with both legs flown by the airline, the 
passengers in the first leg also make the second leg. Constraints (4.13) guarantee that 
the number of seats in each flight must be higher than the number of passengers 
assigned to the flight. Constraints (4.14) and (4.15) define the waiting passengers in 
each itinerary j-h-k and their connecting time. Constraints (4.14) force that the sum of 
the waiting passengers in a market j-h-k that arrive at airport h on time window t’ and 
depart on time window t is equal to the passengers in itinerary j-h-k that depart from 
airport h on time window t. Analogous constraints (4.15) are included for passengers on 
the first leg of a connecting itinerary. Finally, expressions (4.16) to (4.18) define the 
domain of the decision variables. 
4.5 Case study 
The optimization model presented in the previous section was applied to a case study 
involving the main network of TAP Portugal, the Portuguese legacy carrier. This airline 
operates mainly in Europe, in Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa (particularly, 
Angola and Mozambique), and in Brazil. TAP main network consists of the 31 airports 
served non-stop with a minimum of 7 flights per week in the 2009 IATA summer 
season, 100 daily flight legs and more than 300 O/D markets (Figure 4.2). TAP’s 
network is based on a major hub in Lisbon (LIS) and a minor hub in Porto (OPO).  
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The study consisted in determining the optimal flight schedule and fleet assignment 
solutions for TAP’s main network, and comparing them with the current situation. The 
solutions were obtained considering the following modeling alternatives: 
– Market shares do not change with flight frequencies vs. market shares vary 
with flight frequencies according to the piecewise linear approximation of 
the S-curve. The former alternative is designated as “fixed market shares” 
and the latter as “variable market shares”.  
– Slots currently used by the airline must remain the same vs. slots can change 
freely within an interval of one hour centered in the initial slots. The former 
alternative is designated as “fixed slots” and the latter as “variable slots”. 
– Delay costs are taken into account in the optimization model vs. delay costs 
are not taken into account (they are calculated after solving the model). 
The comparison of solutions was made considering the following indicators: airline 
profits, total number of flights, delay costs, average passenger connecting time, and 
average number of feasible connections per flight.   
Below, we start by providing information on the data used in the study and on model 
solving issues. Then, we present the results we have obtained for a week of operations, 
for the busiest day of the week, and an analysis of the sensitivity of results to changes in 
some key parameters. 
It should be underlined here that this is an academic study, where a real-world network 
is used to exemplify the kind of results that are possible to obtain with the optimization 
model. 
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Figure 4.2 - Main network of TAP Portugal in the IATA Summer Season 2009 
4.5.1 Study Data 
The data used in the application was: number of slots used by TAP in the 2009 IATA 
summer season, number of weekly flights per leg, set of partner flights and their 
schedules, set of competitor flights and their schedules, arrival delays distribution for 
each airport, demand per market and type of service (non-stop vs. connecting), 
operating costs per leg and aircraft type, and average fares per market and type of flight. 
These data were provided by TAP or taken from EUROCONTROL reports. 
The number of slots used by TAP varies with the day of the week, with the weekly total 
being 3,236 slots. The busiest day of the week is Friday, with a total of 480 slots. 
Lisbon is the airport with the largest number of slots – around 200 per day. A sample of 
the TAP schedule (from which we took the slots available per airport) is shown in Table 
4.1. 
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Table 4.1 - TAP flights in the IATA Summer Season 2009 (sample) 
MO TU WE TH FR SA SU
EWR- OPO 00:05 07:15 X X X
GIG- LIS 01:50 11:25 X X X X X
LIS- GIG 08:35 18:50 X X X X X X X
OPO- GRU 09:15 20:05 X X X
OPO- EWR 10:25 18:30 X X X
LIS- EWR 10:35 19:05 X X X X X X X
GRU- OPO 21:35 07:45 X X X
EWR- LIS 22:15 05:30 X X X X X X X
Route Departure Arrival
Day
 
The number of weekly flights in TAP’s main network is 1,618 (50% of the total number 
of slots). The daily distribution of the flights and the minimum fleet necessary to fly 
them are displayed in Table 4.2. The minimum fleet was calculated taking into account 
the average turn time values of 45 minutes for narrow-body aircraft and 90 minutes for 
wide-body aircraft. 
Table 4.2- Number of TAP daily flights and minimum fleet per week day 
MO TU WE TH FR SA SU
229 230 229 234 240 227 229
ER4 7 6 6 6 7 6 7
F 100 4 4 3 5 4 5 4
A -  319 14 13 14 13 13 14 12
A -  320 8 9 10 9 9 6 9
A -  321 3 2 3 2 3 1 3
WIDE 5 5 5 6 6 5 5
Aircraft
type
Day
Number of flights
 
The set of partner flights consists mainly of flights offered by the airlines of Star 
Alliance (of which TAP is a member) but also includes flights involving specific 
bilateral agreements (e.g. some Iberia flights to/from Brazil). The schedule of those 
flights was assumed to be fixed and operated without delays. Passengers can be 
assigned to these flights if the scheduled arrival and departure allow at least the 
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minimum connecting time of 30 minutes. An example of the available partner flights to 
Munich is shown in Table 4.3. The set of competitor flights consists of all flights 
offered by airlines other than TAP for the markets considered. 
Table 4.3 - Available flights to Munich from partner airlines 
Departure 
airport
Departure 
time
BCN 12:05
MAD 12:30
BRU 12:40
FRA 13:05
MXP 13:10
ZRH 13:30
MAD 15:30
LUX 17:10
BCN 18:05
ZRH 19:05
ZRH 20:45
FRA 21:25
Partner flight to Munich 
 
With the schedules of TAP and competitors, the share in each market was obtained 
using expressions (4.1) and (4.11). The values used for parameters µ and β, taken from 
BELOBABA et al. (2009), were 1.2 and 0.3, respectively. Given the market share, we 
assigned each market to one of the three pieces of the piecewise linear function we have 
drawn to represent the relationship between flight frequency and market share (the R-
square for points of frequency spaced 0.01 in the S-curve and in the piecewise linear 
function is, for the three pieces, 0.99, 0.98, and 0.95). The recapture rate between 
demand periods was calculated using expression (4.2), though without considering 
market share variations throughout the day (because of lack of data for competitors). 
Examples of market shares and recapture rates are provided in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. 
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Although the values of recapture rates were considered plausible by TAP officials and 
are, for most of the markets, in line with the values obtained by JA et al. (2001) – 
recapture rates between 15% and 55% – further work is necessary to confirm their 
validity. 
Table 4.4 - TAP market share in O/D markets (sample) 
LIS OPO FAO FNC PDL
AMS 61 83 23 11 46
BRU 66 72 13 84 31
CGD 43 81 22 100 36
EWR 50 83 35 61 100
FRA 74 41 25 61 40
GRU 82 35 100 100 100
LAD 74 89 50 67 100
LHR 62 45 4 82 44
MAD 22 26 5 92 33
MXP 55 64 64 65 19
Origin
Market share (%)
Destination
 
Table 4.5 - Recapture rate of TAP for flights departing from Lisbon (sample) 
Destination AMS BRU CDG EWR FRA GRU LAD LHR MAD MXP
Recapture 
rate (%)
33 33 19 42 41 73 63 29 0 26
 
The information about arrival delays was obtained from EUROCONTROL (for 2007). 
With this information we determined the “percentage of flights that arrived delayed 
more than x minutes” in each hour of operation for each airport, and the corresponding 
cumulative distribution curves. The curve for Lisbon is shown in Figure 4.3. As can be 
seen there, the majority of flights arrive within 15 minutes of the expected arrival time. 
Between 8% and 25% of the flights are delayed by more than 15 minutes. Similar 
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curves were obtained for all airports. In the case study we worked with 15-minute slot 
time windows, therefore the relevant probability values are the ones for 0, 15, 30, 45, 
60, 75, 90, 105, and 120 minutes of delay.   
 
Figure 4.3 - Cumulative arrival delays distribution for Lisbon airport in 2007 
The demand for each market considered in the application was supplied by TAP. For 
markets where TAP offers a non-stop flight, the demand was divided into non-stop and 
connecting according to the passengers transported by TAP in previous seasons (Table 
4.6). In the other markets, passengers were split between non-stop and connecting in the 
same way as for TAP flights in similar markets (e.g. long-haul Europe/South America, 
medium-haul Europe/Europe).  
The vehicle and aircraft costs per market and aircraft type and the average revenues per 
market and type of service were also supplied by TAP. Delay costs were taken from the 
literature. Two different costs were considered – passenger costs and aircraft costs. As 
noted earlier, passenger delay costs are the direct costs to the airline of disrupted 
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passengers. Though these costs certainly depend on market characteristics (as stated in 
the model), the available data refer only to average values. These data are provided in a 
study of passenger delay costs in the US made by BRATU and BARNHART (2006) 
and in a comprehensive study of passenger and aircraft delay costs in Europe 
commissioned by the Performance Review Commission of EUROCONTROL to COOK 
et al. (2004). Both studies report an average minute cost of 0.40 USD per disrupted 
passenger – which we adopted for all TAP markets. For the aircraft delay costs we used 
the values in Table 4.7, calculated from the ones presented in the COOK et al. study for 
short delays (15 minutes) and long delays (65 minutes). 
4.5.2 Model Solving 
The optimization model was solved on a Quad Core processor with 4GB of RAM using 
the commercial software Xpress with the optimizer version 20.00.11 (FICO 2009). The 
model involved over 550,000 integer variables before a set of preprocessing methods 
were applied to reduce that number to around 50,000. As expected, the computation 
time varied considerably depending on whether slots were fixed or variable (within one 
hour). In the first case, the time needed to solve the model was 35.0 seconds when the 
market share was fixed and 63.5 seconds when the market share was variable. In the 
second case, the equivalent figures were 342.3 and 642.0 seconds, respectively. This 
suggests that, when slots are fixed, the model runs fast enough to allow its real-time 
utilization by a mid-size airline in IATA scheduling conferences. Indeed, the 
implications of using new slots or changing slots can be estimated in only about one 
minute, even if market share effects are taken into account. Also, the model can be used  
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Table 4.6 - Percentage of non-stop and connecting passengers departing from Lisbon (sample) 
Destination Non-stop Connecting
AMS 58 42
BRU 74 26
CDG/ORY 83 17
EWR 52 48
FAO 100 0
FNC 76 24
FRA 73 27
GRU 69 31
LAD 88 12
LHR/LGW 78 22
MAD 89 11
MXP 71 29
OPO 100 0
PDL 83 17
Passengers departing from Lisbon (%)
 
Table 4.7 - Delay costs per aircraft type (USD) 
15 30 60 90 120 150 180
ER4 5 54 154 254 354 454 554
F 100 18 116 312 507 703 898 1094
A – 319 28 157 416 674 933 1192 1450
A – 320 34 185 488 791 1093 1396 1699
A – 321 38 204 535 867 1198 1529 1861
WIDE 63 315 819 1322 1826 2329 2832
Aircraft type
Delay cost (USD)
Minutes of delay
 
for identifying the best possible slots within one hour of existing (or pre-defined) slots, 
but in this case real-time utilization is less obvious as results take over ten minutes to 
obtain. 
The main reason for the fast computation times we have observed (as compared with 
the times reported for other integrated schedule design and fleet assignment models, 
such as the one presented in LOHATEPANONT and BARNHART, 2004) seems to be 
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because we are dealing with slot-constrained airports to/from which airlines can only fly 
if they have a slot assigned. Indeed, when slots are allowed to vary within one hour (4 
time periods), the time to solve the model increases around 10 times with respect to 
when slots are fixed. We have performed a test for fixed market share allowing slots to 
change within three hours (12 time periods), and the computation time was 1349.6 
seconds, which is almost 40 times more than when slots are fixed and 4 times more than 
when they can change within one hour. Other reasons that certainly contribute to 
explain the good performance of the model are the relatively small size of the airline 
network both in terms of fleet and number of flights, and the fact that the airline has 
only two hubs, which limits the number of feasible itineraries. 
4.5.3 Main Results 
The main results of the application of the optimization model – airline profits, total 
number of flights, delay costs, average passenger connecting time, and average number 
of feasible connections per flight – are summarized in Table 4.8. The results shown in 
this table for the “current schedule with variable market share” situation were obtained 
fixing the flight schedule but allowing changes in fleet assignment. 
Airline profits increase from 23,845 USD/week in the current schedule to 25,092 (+5.2 
percent) in the optimum schedule when market shares are variable with flight 
frequencies and slots are fixed, and to 32,055 (+34.4 percent) when slots are variable 
(within one hour of the existing slots). If market share effects were ignored, airline 
profits would also increase, but the magnitude of the increase would be much smaller 
(from 15,435 to 15,810 or 17,628 USD/week, depending on whether slots are fixed or 
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variable). This underlines the importance of considering market share effects in the 
flight scheduling (and fleet assignment) process. It is worth noting here that, if delay 
costs were not taken into account in the optimization model, airline profits would 
almost vanish (3,241 USD/week instead of 25,092 USD/week if slots were fixed, and 
3,721 USD/week instead of 32,055 USD/week if slots were variable) due to a major 
increase in passenger delay costs. This clearly suggests that neglecting these costs leads 
to decisions that might seriously endanger the viability of an airline. 
The total number of flights, which is 1,618 per week for the current schedule, 
diminishes to 1,583 (-2.2 percent) in the optimum schedule when market share effects 
are taken into account if slots are fixed and to 1,592 (-1.6 percent) if slots are variable. 
The reduction in the number of flights would be much stronger if these effects were 
ignored (those percentages would be -14.2 and -11.9, respectively). This is consistent 
with the widespread idea that airline competition is responsible for a considerable 
increase in flight frequencies.   
The total delay costs depend on the number of flights. Hence we compare the 
percentage of delay costs relative to total costs rather than their absolute values. For the 
current schedule that percentage is 9.8 for variable market shares and 9.7 for fixed 
market shares. In the optimum schedule, the first figure shrinks to 8.4 (-14.3 percent) if 
slots are fixed and to 7.4 percent (-24.5 percent) if slots are variable. The reduction in 
delay costs would be even greater if market share effects were not considered (-24.5 
percent and -26.5 percent). As can be seen in Table 4.8, the reduction of these costs is 
essentially due to a major decrease in passenger delay costs.  
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Passenger delay costs are inversely related with the average passenger connecting time, 
therefore connecting time increases when the schedule is optimized. For the current 
schedule, the average passenger connecting time is 86.3 minutes when market share 
effects are considered and 83.5 minutes when these effects are ignored. In the optimum 
schedule, if slots are fixed, the equivalent figures are 93.2 minutes (+8.0 percent) and 
96.1 minutes (+15.1 percent), and, if slots are variable, they are 108.5 minutes (+25.7 
percent) and 112.6 (+34.9 percent). Although these connecting time changes are 
noticeable, their contribution to total travel time is rather small. Indeed, for the 
intercontinental markets, the average travel time increases 1.3 or 0.9 percent when slots 
are fixed depending on whether the market share is fixed or variable, and 3.5 or 3.0 
percent when slots are variable. Since time costs are only a fraction of total travel costs, 
the implications for demand should be minor (as it was assumed they would be). For the 
European markets, the equivalent percentages are 3.8 and 2.7 percent when slots are 
fixed, and 10.1 and 8.5 percent when they are variable, meaning that, at least in the 
latter case, demand effects might deserve further consideration. Finally, the average 
number of feasible connections, which is 5.98 in the current situation, increases between 
4.3 percent and 9.2 percent (the maximum increase occurs when the slots are fixed and 
the market share is variable). The flights with more feasible connections are the ones 
from/to Brazil (with more than 20 feasible connections), because the maximum 
connecting time is high (as the flight time is large), and those to the Azores. 
In Table 4.9 are presented the results obtained for Friday, the busiest day of the week, 
considering that slots are fixed and that market shares are fixed or variable.
  
 
Table 4.8 - Summary of results for a week of operations 
Aircraft Pax Total
USD Minutes
Fixed Fixed Fixed 15435 1618 4.9 4.9 9.7 83.5 5.98
Fixed Variable Variable 23845 1618 5.5 4.2 9.8 86.3 5.98
Fixed Fixed Variable 15810 1388 5.3 2.1 7.4 96.1 6.27
Fixed Variable Variable 25092 1583 5.3 3.1 8.4 93.2 6.53
Variable Fixed Variable 17628 1425 5.3 1.9 7.2 112.6 6.36
Variable Variable Variable 32055 1592 5.2 2.2 7.4 108.5 6.24
Current
Optimal
Fleet 
Assignment
Airline profits Total flights
Model features Indicators
Schedule Slots Market share
Delay cost Waiting time 
(avg.)
Average 
feasible 
connections
% of total costs
 
 
Table 4.9 - Summary of results for Friday (busiest day of the week) 
Aircraft Pax Total
USD Minutes
Fixed Fixed Fixed 4376 240 5.2 4.8 10.1 87.6 6.18
Fixed Variable Variable 4376 240 5.2 4.8 10.1 87.6 6.18
Fixed Fixed Variable 5787 212 5.6 2.5 8.1 90.7 6.48
Fixed Variable Variable 6481 234 5.2 2.7 7.9 94.4 6.53
Market share
Delay cost Waiting time 
(avg.)
Average 
feasible 
connections
% of total costs
Model features
Current
Optimal
Indicators
Fleet 
Assignment
Airline profits Total flights
Schedule Slots
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When the market share is fixed, airline profits for the optimum schedule increase 31.9 
percent (from 4,376 to 5,787 USD/day) in relation to the current situation. The number 
of flights is reduced from 240 to 212 (-11.7 percent). The connections where reductions 
occur correspond to medium-haul markets where TAP faces strong competition (Figure 
4.4). The only connection where a new flight is added is LIS-OPO (where TAP has no 
competitors). The weight of delay costs decreases 19.5 percent (to 8.1 percent), the 
average connecting time increases 5.5 percent (to 90.7 minutes), and the average 
number of feasible connections per flight increases 4.9 percent (to 6.48). The decrease 
in delay costs is only due to the reduction of the weight of passenger delay costs (-48.0 
percent), because the weight of aircraft delay costs increases (+5.5 percent). 
 
Figure 4.4 - Changes in daily flight frequencies with fixed market shares – Fridays 
When the market share is variable, airline profits increase 19.2 percent (from 5,438 to 
6,481 USD/day) in relation to the current schedule, though not as much as when market 
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share is fixed. The number of flights decreases, but only to 234 (-2.5 percent). In total, 
Lisbon loses 2 flights and Oporto loses 4 flights (Figure 4.5). There is a transfer of 
flights from OPO to LIS in the connections with MAD, LHR and ORY. These changes 
reflect the higher competition among legacy carriers that exists in the Lisbon airport. 
The weight of delay costs decreases 24.3 percent (to 7.9 percent), the average 
connecting time increases 7.8 percent (to 94.4 minutes), and the average number of 
feasible connections per flight increases 5.7 percent (to 6.53).  
 
Figure 4.5 - Changes in daily flight frequencies with variable market shares – Fridays 
4.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to assess the implications of the assumptions upon which the case study and 
underlying model are based, a sensitivity analysis was performed with respect to five 
model parameters – average revenues per market, vehicle costs, aircraft delay costs, 
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passenger delay costs, and recapture rate per market. For each parameter four values 
were tested: -20, -10, +10, and +20 percent in relation to the base values (i.e. the values 
considered in the previous subsection). The results were calculated for Friday 
considering fixed slots and variable market shares, and were compared with respect to 
airline profits, number of flights, and average passenger connecting time (Table 4.10). 
Changes in average revenues per market (r) have a major influence on airline profits – 
when ∆r=-20% profit decreases to 5,295 USD/day (-18.3%), and when ∆r =+20% profit 
increases to 7,615 USD/day (+17.5%). Comparatively, the number of flights changes 
slightly, going down from 234 to 230 (∆r=-20%) or up to 238 (∆r =+20%). The average 
passenger connecting time varies between 91.0 minutes (∆r=-10%) and 95.2 minutes 
(∆r =+20%), which is a –3.1% and +0.8% variation from the base value (94.4 minutes). 
The variation of vehicle costs (cV) also has a significant impact on airline profits, but 
clearly smaller than the variation of average revenues per market – they rise from 5,821 
USD/day (-10.2%) when ∆cV =+20% to 7,229 USD/day (+11.5%) when ∆cV =-20%. In 
contrast, the changes in number of flights are much larger, being as few as 215 (-8.1%) 
when ∆cV =+20% and as much as 240 when ∆cV =-20%. The average passenger 
connecting time also varies considerably, ranging between 83.5 minutes (-11.5%) when 
∆cV =-20% and 106.5 minutes (+12.8%) when ∆cV =+20%.  
Changes in aircraft delay costs (cD) lead to variations in airline profit that oscillate 
between -2.8 percent (∆cD =+20%) and +3.6 percent (∆cD =-20%). However, they have 
almost the same impact on the number of flights as the average revenues per flight – for 
∆cD=+20% the number of flights is 231, and for ∆cD=-20% is 236. The average 
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passenger connecting time varies from 89.6 minutes (-5.1%) to 98.1 minutes (+3.9%) 
when ∆cD =-20% and ∆cD =+20%, respectively. 
Table 4.10 - Summary of sensitivity analysis results 
-20 5295 -18.3 230 -1.7 91.5 -3.1
-10 5885 -9.2 233 -0.4 91 -3.6
10 7142 10.2 235 0.4 93.4 -1.1
20 7615 17.5 238 1.7 95.2 0.8
-20 7229 11.5 240 2.6 83.5 -11.5
-10 6769 4.4 238 1.7 89.3 -5.4
10 6093 -6 225 -3.8 98.7 4.6
20 5821 -10.2 215 -8.1 106.5 12.8
-20 6714 3.6 236 0.9 89.6 -5.1
-10 6575 1.5 234 0 93.6 -0.9
10 6427 -0.8 232 -0.9 96.1 1.8
20 6300 -2.8 231 -1.3 98.1 3.9
-20 6598 1.8 235 0.4 87.6 -7.2
-10 6500 0.3 234 0 92.6 -1.9
10 6455 -0.4 234 0 96.6 2.3
20 6390 -1.4 232 -0.9 98.6 4.5
-20 6183 -4.6 237 1.3 93.6 -0.8
-10 6381 -1.6 235 0.4 95.8 1.5
10 6630 2.3 234 0 94.9 0.5
20 6824 5.3 231 -1.3 91.4 -3.2
Variation (%)
Variation (%)
Indicators
Airline profits Total flights Waiting time (avg.)
USD Total MinutesVariation (%) Variation (%)
Vehicle costs
Recapture 
rate
Average 
revenues per 
market
Aircraft delay 
costs
Passenger 
delay costs
Parameter
 
The variation in passenger delay costs (cP) influences airline profits less than aircraft 
delay costs, since changes range from -1.4% (∆cP =+20%) and +1.8% (∆cP =-20%). The 
same occurs with the number of flights, which go down to 232 (∆cP =+20%) or up to 
235 (∆cP =-20%). But, with respect to the average passenger connecting time, the 
opposite happens – when ∆cP =-20% this time decreases to 87.6 minutes (-7.2%), and 
when ∆cP =+20% it increases to 98.6 minutes (+4.5%). 
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Changes in recapture rates (α) the airline profits vary from 6,183 USD/day (-4.6%) 
when ∆α=-20% to 6,824 USD/day (+5.3%) when ∆α=+20%, that is, their effect on 
profit is stronger than the effects of changes in delay costs. The number of flights 
diminishes from 234 to 231 (∆α=+20%) or augments to 237 (∆α=-20%), approximately 
the same changes as when delay costs change. The implications upon the average 
passenger connecting time are rather small (and irregular), ranging between 95.8 
minutes (+1.5%) when ∆α=-10% and 91.4 minutes (+3.2%) for ∆α=+20%.  
Overall, it can be said that variations in average revenues per market, vehicle costs, and 
recapture rates have a stronger impact on airline profits than aircraft and passenger 
delay costs. This seems to happen in part because the number of flights and average 
passenger connecting times change with delay costs approximately as much as they 
change in response to the variation of average revenues per market. Thus, it looks like 
that the consideration of delay costs in the optimization model leads to flight schedules 
(and fleet assignments) that contribute in a significant manner to the stabilization of 
airline profits. This is, we believe, an important point favoring the utilization of the 
model in practice. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The model presented in this chapter addresses integrated flight scheduling and fleet 
assignment problems from a robust scheduling perspective. Its main contribution lies in 
the fact that the aircraft and passenger delay costs involved in these problems are 
explicitly taken into account. Other contributions include the consideration of slot-
constrained airports, O/D-based travel demand, airline competition and airline 
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cooperation. Taken together, these contributions give answer to some of the main 
features of the problems dealt with in this chapter.  
The practical usefulness of the model was tested on a case study involving the main 
network of TAP Portugal. Even though the results we have obtained rely on some 
simplifications, they provide useful insights into how the Portuguese legacy carrier 
might improve their flight schedule and fleet assignment. The improvement could lead 
to an increase in TAP’s expected profits, while diminishing the total number of flights 
and increasing slightly the average passenger connecting time. The increase is estimated 
at about 5 percent even if the slots operated by TAP in all airports of their main network 
do not change. But, if the slots could change freely within one hour of the current slots, 
the increase could be substantially higher. The fact that the model has run in only about 
one minute when slots were fixed is extremely important, because this allows the real-
time utilization of the model in scheduling conferences. These findings clearly indicate 
that the model is a valuable addition to the airline planning toolbox. 
Despite the strengths of the model, we recognize that it has two main limitations. First, 
the demand captured by airlines is taken as given, instead of depending on fares and 
other passenger costs (including time costs); second, the reaction of rival airlines is 
assumed to be known. The former limitation seems relatively easy to cope with, but the 
latter could only be overcome through a much more complex model – so more complex 
that we doubt it could be of practical interest. Moreover, in slot-constrained airport 
networks (as the ones outside the US) the changes in airline slots in consecutive seasons 
are typically small. 
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In the future, part of our activity in this area of research will be devoted to improving 
the model with respect to the first limitation identified above. The other part will be 
dedicated to testing the applicability of the model to networks of larger airlines. It may 
well be that, for such airlines, the model becomes impossible to solve within acceptable 
computation effort when commercial software is used. If this is the case, efficient 
specialized methods, exact or heuristic, would then have to be developed. 
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Chapter 5  
Setting Public Service Obligations in 
Low-Demand Air Transportation 
Networks: Application to the Azores 
5.1 Introduction 
In response to deregulation of air transportation, commercial airlines were expected to 
concentrate their networks on profitable routes and to reduce services and/or increase 
fares in thinner markets. Also, they were expected to change the configuration of their 
networks to adopt a hub-and-spoke structure, thus decreasing both demand variability 
per leg and fares (in thicker markets) but increasing travel times (REYNOLDS-
FEIGHAN, 1995a). Both types of reaction go against the interests of regions without 
sufficient passenger demand to have profitable legs – regions where air transportation 
often plays a crucial role with respect to the mobility of people and goods, as well as to 
the development of tourism. Because of this, governments have decided to accompany 
the air transportation deregulation process with the adoption of subsidy schemes aimed 
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at mitigating the consequences that could be anticipated with respect to low-demand 
regions (SANTANA, 2009). Currently, there are two major subsidy schemes: the 
Essential Air Services (EAS) program, launched in the USA in 1978; and the Public 
Service Obligation (PSO) system, launched in Europe in 1992. Detailed information 
about both schemes and their differences can be found in REYNOLDS-FEIGHAN 
(1995b) and BRAATHEN (2011). 
The PSO system was put forward as a core part of the legislation pertaining to the 
deregulation of air transportation in Europe (CEC, 1992a; CEC, 1992b; CEC, 1992c; 
CEC, 2008). The system can be briefly described as follows (Figure 5.1): (1) A 
government (aviation authority) feels the need to open new PSO routes, domestic or 
international, to/from low-demand regions. (2) The government defines the level of 
service for those routes and opens a call for bidders – all airlines with a permit to 
operate in Europe can bid. (3) Airlines bid for the routes without subsidies, and the 
government assigns the routes to the best proposal; otherwise, if no airlines are willing 
to operate those routes, the government launches a new bidding process in which 
subsidies are granted to the airlines. (4) Airlines bid again for the routes, this time 
knowing the subsidies. (5) The government decides which airline will have the right to 
fly each route. (6) The process is repeated every three years. For more information 
about the PSO system, readers are referred to WILLIAMS (2005). 
The items included in the PSO requirements vary significantly from country to country. 
The minimum flight frequency between airports and the minimum number of seats 
available per flight leg are among the most frequent items imposed by governments. 
With respect to flight schedules, earliest departure times and latest arrival times are 
Setting Public Service Obligations in Low-Demand Air Transportation Networks 
115 
sometimes included in the PSO requirements to guarantee daily round trips. In order to 
ensure good connectivity, governments can set the maximum number of stops between 
airports or the maximum waiting time between flights. Governments can also specify 
aircraft features such as the minimum number of seats or even the aircraft type (jets vs. 
turbo-props). Finally, discounts for students, residents, and/or retired people can be 
explicitly contained in the PSO requirements. 
 
Figure 5.1 - Scheme of the PSO system 
The number of routes operated in Europe – within a country or between European 
countries – under PSO contracts has been growing consistently throughout time: they 
were 67 in 1997, 168 in 2001, 230 in 2003 (MINSHALL, 2004), and, according to CEC 
(2010), at least 260 routes in 2010 (the expression “at least” is used because the number 
of routes changes during the year). Currently, eight EU countries plus Norway and 
Iceland offer PSO services, awarding financial compensation to airlines operating 
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regular services to/from low-demand regions. Norway and France are the countries with 
the most PSO routes – respectively, 61 and 41 routes in 2010 (CEC, 2010). The country 
where the domestic network is most dependent on this kind of subsidies is Portugal – in 
2001, 40 percent of the domestic passengers in Portugal traveled on PSO routes 
compared to around 10 percent in France, Norway, and Scotland (WILLIAMS and 
PAGLIARI, 2004). The level of subsidies varies widely across countries, being around 
120 EUR per passenger in Germany and only slightly above 20 EUR per passenger in 
France and Portugal (BRAATHEN, 2011). 
In this chapter, is proposed a decision approach designed to assist governments 
(aviation authorities) in the definition of PSO requirements. The approach is based on 
an integrated flight scheduling and fleet assignment (IFSFA) model to determine the air 
transportation network that minimizes the total social costs of satisfying a given 
origin/destination (O/D) demand, as well as the amount of public subsidies necessary to 
finance it. The IFSFA model differs from traditional models, which are sought for 
airlines and aim at maximizing profits (LOHATEPANONT and BARNHART, 2004; 
SHERALI et al., 2010). To the best of our knowledge, the literature about the 
subsidization of air transportation has never dealt with these kind of operational issues 
before, focusing instead on the analysis and comparison of subsidy schemes 
(REYNOLDS-FEIGHAN, 1995a; GRAHAM, 1998; SANTANA, 2009; METRASS-
MENDES and DE NEUFVILLE, 2010; LIAN, 2010; BRAATHEN, 2011). 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Next, in consecutive sections, is 
described the proposed decision approach and the underlying IFSFA model. The usage 
of the approach is then illustrated for one of the main networks fully operated according 
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to a PSO system – the network of the Azores (Portugal). In the last section, we assess 
the main strengths and weaknesses of the decision approach and indicate some 
guidelines for future research. 
5.2 Decision Approach 
The problem faced by a government when setting PSO requirements for the air 
transportation network of a low-demand region is quite complex. The decision approach 
proposed below is designed to cope with this complexity. The objective of the 
government is assumed to be the minimization of the total social costs of the network. 
This objective has to be pursued while balancing the demand to satisfy and the level of 
service to offer with the amount of public subsidies the government can afford to pay to 
the airlines that operate the network. The demand depends on the costs incurred by 
passengers, which consist of airfares and time costs, and particularly of the costs 
corresponding to the waiting time of connecting passengers, which in turn depend on 
the flight schedules, thus on the level of service offered to passengers. 
The proposed decision approach comprises five stages (Stages 1 to 5), to be repeated 
sequentially until the amount of public subsidies the government needs to pay complies 
with the budget available to finance the network (Figure 5.2). 
In Stage 1, the government sets, for all markets m (O/D pairs between airports j and k), 
the target number of passengers (or demand targets) qm to be transported by the air 
transportation network, taking into account historical information and socioeconomic 
objectives related, for example, with access to public facilities such as secondary and 
higher education schools, hospitals, or tribunals. These targets are expected to reflect 
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the views of the government on the mobility needs of the region under consideration. 
The public subsidies involved in the air transportation network will naturally depend on 
the demand targets adopted, and may be excessive in the face of budgetary constraints. 
If this is the case, these targets will have to be revised in a later stage of the approach. 
 
Figure 5.2 - Scheme of the decision approach 
In Stage 2, the flight schedule (and fleet assignment) that minimizes the total social 
costs incurred to satisfy the demand targets defined in Stage 1 is determined using the 
IFSFA model described in the next section. The total social costs consist of airline costs 
(c
A
) and passenger time costs (c
P
). Airline costs consist of ground and system operating 
costs and direct operating costs (BELOBABA et al., 2009, Chapter 5). Passenger time 
costs consist of on-board time costs (c
B
) and waiting time costs (c
W
). The IFSFA model 
can reflect typical PSO requirements such as the minimum flight frequency between 
airports and the minimum number of seats available per flight. 
In Stage 3, airfares for all markets, pm, are calculated using a demand function relating 
the number of passengers with: (1) passenger costs (airfares plus the time costs 
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determined in Stage 2); (2) socioeconomic variables reflecting the size of the markets 
(e.g., population and income); and (3) service variables reflecting, for example, 
intermodal competition. That is, airfares are obtained through the following expression: 
 , , ,B Wm m m m mq f p c c v m   M  (5.1) 
where M is the set of markets and mv  is the vector of socioeconomic and service 
variables for market m. 
In Stage 4, the amount of public subsidies, g, is calculated as the difference between the 
airline costs determined in Stage 2 and the revenues made by the airline from the 
airfares determined in Stage 3. That is:   
A m m
m
g c p q

 
M
 (5.2) 
Finally, in Stage 5, the amount of public subsidies is compared with the budget 
available to finance the air transportation network of the region. If the budget is 
exceeded (or cannot be increased), the demand targets should be updated and the 
process needs to be repeated starting from Stage 1. Otherwise, if the budget is satisfied, 
the government can set the PSO requirements according to the results of the approach.  
To conclude this section it is worth noting that the decision approach described above is 
general and may need adaptions to specific situations. This is, for instance, the case 
when discounts for students, residents, and/or retired people are to be applied, would 
require the segmentation of demand targets and consideration of different airfares for 
the same market. 
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5.3 Optimization Model 
The integrated flight scheduling and fleet assignment model underlying the decision 
approach described in the previous section is designed for application to a given 
planning period (e.g., one week or one day) divided in small time windows (e.g. 10, 15, 
or 30 minutes). The objective of the model is minimization of the total social costs of 
the air transportation network. This is a different objective from typical IFSFA models, 
that reflect the focus of airlines on maximization of profit. 
Due to the importance to airlines, extensive literature is available about flight 
scheduling  – e.g., BERGE and HOPPERSTAD (1993), ERDMANN et al. (2001), and 
BARNHART and KIM (2005) – and fleet assignment problems – e.g., ABARA (1989), 
HANE et al. (1995), BARNHART et al. (2002), and DUMAS et al. (2009). More 
recently, these problems are being addressed in an integrated way (see, e.g., 
LOHATEPANONT and BARNHART, 2004, and SHERALI et al., 2010). However, as 
far as we know, there are no IFSFA models available for air transportation networks 
operated under PSO requirements. 
For formulating the model, consider the following notation: 
Sets:  
A - set of airports indexed by j or k; R - set of aircraft types indexed by r; M - set of 
markets indexed by m; N - set of nodes indexed by n (a node consists of an airport and a 
time window, see Figure 5.3); I - set of itineraries indexed by i (an itinerary consists of 
a departure node, an arrival node, and possible connecting nodes); G - set of ground arcs 
indexed by g (ground arcs represent consecutive time windows for the same airport);  
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G
O
n - set of outbound ground arcs from node n (that is, ground arcs that start at node n); 
G
I
n - set of inbound ground arcs to node n (that is, ground arcs that end at node n); G
C
 - 
set of ground arcs that pass the count time; F - set of flight arcs indexed by f (a flight 
arc consists of a departure node and an arrival node); F
O
n - set of outbound flight arcs 
from node n; F
I
n - set of inbound flight arcs to node n; F
C
 - set of flight arcs that pass 
the count time; Fjk - set of flight arcs for leg jk (departing from airport j and arriving at 
airport k). 
 
Figure 5.3 - Representation of nodes, flight arcs, and ground arcs 
Parameters: dm - number of passengers for market m; c
F
fr  - flight costs for an aircraft of 
type r to fly arc f (EUR per flight); c
S
gr  - stoppage costs of having an aircraft of type r 
on ground arc g (EUR per aircraft); c
B
i  - on-board time cost for a passenger on itinerary 
i  (EUR per passenger); c
W
i - waiting time cost for a passenger on itinerary i  (EUR per 
passenger); sr  - capacity of an aircraft of type r; lf - maximum load factor for flight arc 
f;  δfi - parameter equal to 1 if flight arc f belongs to itinerary i, and 0 otherwise; δ
m
i - 
parameter equal to 1 if itinerary i serves market m, and 0 otherwise; xminjk - minimum 
number of flights to be offered on leg jk; sminjk - minimum number of seats to be offered 
on leg jk. 
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Decision Variables: ui - number of passengers assigned to itinerary i; xfr - number of 
flights by aircraft type r on arc f; ygr - number of aircraft of type r on ground arc g; zr  - 
number of aircraft of type r. 
Using this notation, the objective function of the optimization model can be formulated 
as follows: 
min F S B Wfr fr gr gr i i i i
f r g r i i
C c x c y c u c u
     
      
F R G R I I
 (5.3) 
The objective function (5.3) represents the minimization of the total social costs of the 
air transportation network (except for airline ground and system operating costs, which 
are taken as fixed). The costs considered encompass airline operating costs and 
passenger time costs. The airline operating costs are divided in two components: the 
costs of flying the arcs (flight costs), which consist of vehicle, fuel, and crew costs; and 
the costs of having aircraft stopped at an airport (these costs will normally be larger 
when aircraft are outside airlines’ bases). The passenger time costs are divided in on-
board time costs and waiting time costs. 
The model includes the following sets of constraints: 
, gr fr r
g f
y x z r
 
    
C CG F
R
 
(5.4) 
Constraints (5.4) limit the use of aircraft to the available fleet. For each aircraft type r 
the number of aircraft on the ground plus the number of aircraft in the air equal the total 
number of aircraft available. 
, ,fr gr fr gr
f g f g
x y x y n r
   
        
I I O O
n n n nF G F G
N R  (5.5) 
Setting Public Service Obligations in Low-Demand Air Transportation Networks 
123 
Constraints (5.5) guarantee aircraft continuity per node and aircraft type. For each 
aircraft type r at each node n, the sum of inbound flight and ground arcs equals the sum 
of outbound flight and ground arcs (that is, the number of aircraft that arrive or were 
parked on a given airport in a given time window is equal to the number of aircraft that 
take-off or stay parked). 
, ff r fr i i
r i
l s x u f
 
   
R I
F  (5.6) 
Constraints (5.6) limit the number of passengers assigned to each flight to the number of 
available seats. This number is equal to the number of seats of aircraft type r flying arc f 
multiplied by the maximum allowed load factor per arc. Passengers on itineraries i can 
be assigned to flight arc f  if that flight arc belongs to these itineraries (in this case, δfi is 
equal to 1). To account for demand uncertainty, the load factor can have an upper limit 
below one, which is especially important in low-demand markets where demand 
uncertainty tends to be high (SWAN, 2002).  
m
m i i
i
q u , m

  
I
M  (5.7) 
Constraints (5.7) guarantee that the demand per market is satisfied, that is, all 
passengers in market m are assigned to an itinerary i serving market m.  
min , ,jkfr
f r
x x j k
 
   
jkF R
A  (5.8) 
min , ,jkr fr
f r
s x s j k
 
   
jkF R
A  (5.9) 
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Constraints (5.8) and (5.9) exemplify typical PSO requirements. They set a lower bound 
for the number of flights and the number of seats per leg during the planning period. 
Expressions (5.10) and (5.11) specify the type and domain of the decision variables, and 
complete the formulation of the model. 
,  non-negative integers,fr grx y  f ,r ,g   F R G  (5.10) 
0,iu i   I  (5.11) 
5.4 Case study 
The decision approach (and underlying optimization model) proposed before was 
applied to a case study involving the air transportation network of the Azores 
(Portugal). The archipelago of the Azores comprises nine islands located in the Atlantic 
Ocean about 1,500 km west of Lisbon with a total population of around 245,000. The 
domestic air transportation network is subsidized by the Azorean government, and 
permission to operate the network has been granted to SATA for three years. The 
network comprises nine airports, one in each island (Figure 5.4). The main airport is 
located in Ponta Delgada, the capital city of Azores. SATA has two operation bases, 
established at the airports of Ponta Delgada (PDL) and Terceira (TER). The connections 
of the archipelago with mainland Portugal, Europe, and North America are made 
essentially through these two airports. The fleet used by SATA to run the network 
consists of six Bombardier Dash 8 aircraft – two DHC-8-200 (DH2) with 37 seats and 
four DHC-8-400 (DH4) with 80 seats. The PSO requirements set by the government 
cover, among others, the following items: minimum number of weekly flights and seats 
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per leg; days of operation for the non-daily flights; and airfares for residents and 
students. The minimum number of weekly flights per leg for the various months of the 
year is shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.4 - Current air transportation network of the Azores  
Table 5.1 - Minimum number of weekly flights under PSO requirements 
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
22 22 22 22 22 22 26 26 22 22 22 22
6 6 6 11 11 11 17 17 11 11 6 6
9 9 9 10 10 10 14 14 10 10 9 9
3 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 7 7 7 9 9 7 7 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2
11 11 11 11 11 11 14 14 11 11 11 11
8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 8 8 8 8
7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 7 7 7 7
2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2
7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 7 7 7 7
3 3
4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
TER -  GRW
Flight leg
PDL -  TER
PDL -  HOR
PDL -  SMA
PDL -  SJZ
PDL -  PIX
PDL -  FLW
TER -  HOR
TER -  SJZ
TER -  PIX
TER -  FLW
TER -  CVU
HOR -  FLW
HOR -  CVU
FLW -  CVU
 
The case study compares the current air transportation network of the Azores 
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(corresponding to the current PSO requirements) with the optimum networks obtained 
through the decision approach proposed in Section 5.2. The comparison was initially 
made at the network level, and then for the different airports/islands of the archipelago. 
The optimum networks were established for a maximum load factor per leg of 90 
percent, considering both no limit on the maximum waiting timing faced by connecting 
passengers and a limit of 3 hours (for each stop). The variability of results with changes 
in some important parameters was assessed through a sensitivity analysis.  
The results obtained for the case study indicate that, for the current number of 
passengers per market, the air transportation network of the Azores could be clearly 
better for all parties involved – the passengers who use it (including those who use it in 
connecting itineraries), the airline who operates it, and the government who subsidizes 
it. Indeed, the total social costs of the network could decrease by 7.1 percent, as a result 
of reductions of 14.9 and 1.3 percent airline operating costs and passenger time costs, 
respectively. The amount of public subsidies could drop by 6.7 percent and the airfares 
could drop by 8.3 percent. The gains would naturally be smaller if more attention were 
paid to the waiting times of connecting passengers, but would still be noteworthy. It 
should be noted that, if this decrease in the amount of public subsidies was considered 
by the government to be unsatisfactory, then, according to the decision approach 
proposed in Section 5.2, the target number of passengers would have to be lowered.  
In the remainder of this section, is provided detailed information on the data used in the 
case study, on the results obtained at the network level and at the airport/island level, 
and on the computational effort required to solve the optimization model underlying the 
decision approach. 
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5.4.1 Study Data 
The following data was used in the case study: demand targets for each market; flight 
time per leg; flight costs per leg and aircraft type, stoppage costs, and airline ground and 
system operating costs; value of time; minimum number of weekly flights and seats per 
leg and maximum airfares per market (both set as PSO requirements), and current 
number of flights; population and income per island, and availability of boat services 
between islands. We have used data for a heavy (but not a peak) month, September, for 
the last year they were available (2009).  
The demand target for each market was assumed to be the daily number of passengers 
in that market in September 2009. In that month, a total of 35,317 passengers traveled 
by air inside the Azores, distributed per market as described in Table 5.2 (data supplied 
by SATA). The number of passengers on markets connecting the Azores to external 
airports were assumed to be independent of the airfares charged in domestic flights.  
Table 5.2 - Number of passengers per market (September 2009) 
Market PDL TER HOR SMA SJZ PIX FLW GRW CVU
PDL - 3666 2107 1790 872 1248 870 385 68
TER 3596 - 1268 155 1147 497 390 860 34
HOR 2571 1156 - 65 18 0 517 90 75
SMA 2139 187 63 - 14 46 42 46 4
SJZ 1159 1165 25 33 - 4 7 63 0
PIX 1636 822 3 58 6 - 9 23 0
FLW 1339 361 536 34 19 10 - 30 16
GRW 362 1185 86 37 55 53 9 - 0
CVU 67 44 57 4 0 2 12 0 -  
The flight costs per leg and aircraft type were determined by multiplying the aircraft’s 
operating costs per block-hour (BH) with the leg’s flight time. The operating costs 
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essentially include fuel, crew, and maintenance, and were calculated through linear 
regression analysis using the information for aircraft with less than 100 seats available 
at EUROCONTROL (2009). The values obtained were 1,363 EUR per BH for the 
DHC-8-200 and 2,156 EUR per BH for the DHC-8-400. The stoppage costs per BH 
were considered to be nil for SATA base airports (PDL and TER) and to be the same as 
the crew costs, which were estimated to be 1/3 of the flight costs, for the remaining 
airports (SWAN and ADLER, 2006). The airline ground and system operating costs 
were assumed to be equal to the direct operating costs for the current network 
(BELOBABA et al., 2009, Chapter 5). 
The value of time, used to calculate passenger time costs (on-board and waiting), was 
assumed to be 5 EUR/hour. This small value of time reflects the low average income of 
the Azorean population. 
The maximum airfares per market and the minimum number of weekly flights and seats 
per leg are shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. Table 5.4 also provides 
information on the current number of flights, which is 234 per week, 17 percent more 
than the minimum required (200). The heaviest leg is PDL-TER with 50 flights per 
week, 6 more than required. The smallest airport is CVU with only 10 flights per week. 
The flight time per leg was taken to be the same as the current flight time and is shown 
in Table 5.4.  
The population and income per island were used to estimate the demand function (5.1). 
The estimation was carried out through multiple linear regression analysis. The best 
results were achieved when the 14 larger markets (334 monthly passengers or more) and 
Setting Public Service Obligations in Low-Demand Air Transportation Networks 
129 
the 19 smaller markets (176 monthly passengers or less) were dealt with separately. The 
regression equations obtained were as follows: 
 Larger markets: 
 210.00 7.71 50.47 38.10 677.68 0.89
m
P
m m m j k j k PDL adjq p c P P i i Y R       (5.11) 
Table 5.3 - Maximum round-trip airfares per market under PSO requirements (2009) 
Market PDL TER HOR SMA SJZ PIX FLW GRW CVU
PDL - 158 158 92 158 158 158 158 158
TER 158 - 153 158 92 153 158 92 158
HOR 158 153 - 158 121 121 92 121 92
SMA 92 158 158 - 158 158 158 158 158
SJZ 158 92 121 158 - 121 158 121 158
PIX 158 153 121 158 121 - 158 121 158
FLW 158 158 92 158 158 158 - 158 46
GRW 158 92 121 158 121 121 158 - 158
CVU 158 158 92 158 158 158 46 158 -  
Table 5.4 - Minimum number of flights and seats under PSO requirements and current number of 
flights (September 2009) 
22 2590 58,9 25 50
11 1270 57,7 14 50
10 1200 60,0 12 40
3 330 55,0 5 90
7 780 55,7 8 60
2 190 47,5 3 30
11 1320 60,0 12 60
8 820 51,3 9 40
7 780 55,7 7 30
2 190 47,5 2 30
7 700 50,0 10 40
5 380 38,0 5 50
3 60 10,0 3 50
2 40 10,0 2 10
Flight leg
PDL -  TER
PDL -  HOR
PSO requirements
Current 
number of 
flights
Flight time 
(min)Number 
of flights
Number 
of seats
Seats/    
flight
FLW -  CVU
PDL -  SMA
PDL -  SJZ
PDL -  PIX
PDL -  FLW
TER -  HOR
TER -  SJZ
TER -  PIX
TER -  FLW
TER -  GRW
HOR -  FLW
HOR -  CVU
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where: qm is the number of passengers in market m,  pm are the airfares in market 
m, c
P
m are the passenger time costs in market m, Pj and ij are the population 
(thousands) and the income per capita (EUR/inh.) in island of airport j, 
respectively; and YPDLm is dummy variable for the presence of PDL in market m.  
 Smaller markets: 
 20.33 0.38 3.28 41.97 79.03 0.86
m m
P
m m m j k CVU Boat adjq p c i i Y Y R        (5.12) 
where: YCVUm is a dummy variable for the presence of CVU (smallest airport)  in 
market m and YBoatm is a dummy variable for the existence of regular boat 
services competing with air services in market m. 
More information on the results of the regression analysis is provided in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 - Regression analysis of the demand function 
Coeffic ient t- stat p- value Coeffic ient t- stat p- value
50,47 9,67 0,00 -
38,10 7,19 0,01 3,28 4,10 0,11
- 10,00 - 3,79 0,43 - 0,33 - 3,11 0,77
- 7,71 - 2,39 4,06 - 0,38 - 1,88 8,05
677,68 3,64 0,54 - 0,00
- - - - 41,97 - 2,05 5,99
- - - - 79,03 - 3,28 0,55
Larger markets Smaller markets
Population
Income per capita
Airfares
Passenger time costs
Presence of PDL
Presence of CVU
Existence of Boat 
connection
Variables
  
5.4.2 Network-wide Results 
The comparison between the current network and the optimum networks (with no-limit 
and with a 3-hour limit on maximum waiting time) was made at the network level with 
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respect to the following indicators: total social costs, amount of public subsidies, airline 
costs, passenger time costs, airfares, aircraft fleet, number of flights, average load 
factor, number of connecting passengers, and average and maximum waiting time. The 
values obtained for these indicators are shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. 
Table 5.6 - Costs, subsidies, and airfares for the current and the optimum networks 
Value Var. % Value Var. % Value Var. % Value Var. % Value Var. %
163640 - 77116 - 9407 - 79792 - 74441 -
152048 - 7.1 65650 - 14.9 9282 - 1.3 74474 - 6.7 68292 - 8.3
155817 - 4.8 69865 - 9.4 8836 - 6.1 78170 - 2.0 68811 - 7.6
Airfares
Network
Total Social Cost
Airline Operating 
Costs
Passenger Time 
Costs
Public Subsidies
Current
Optimum
(No- limit)
Optimum
(3- hour limit)
 
Table 5.7 – Fleet, number of flights, load factor, number of connecting passengers, and waiting time 
for the current and the optimum networks 
Average Maximum
2 + 4 42 51,9% 114 47,7 495
2 + 3 40 62,1% 133 46,8 390
3 + 4 41 62,0% 130 33,8 210
Number 
of Flights
Load 
Factor
Connecting Passengers
Number
Waiting Time (min)Fleet     
(DH2+DH4)
Current
Optimum
(No- limit)
Optimum
(3- hour limit)
Network
 
For the current network, the total social costs are 163,640 EUR per day, corresponding 
to 42 flights with an average load factor of 51.9 percent. The amount of public subsidies 
needed to finance the network is 79,792 EUR (per day). The entire fleet operated by 
SATA (6 aircraft) is needed to run the network. Total airfares are equal to 74,441 EUR, 
airline operating costs sum to 77,116 EUR, and passenger time costs are 9,407 EUR. 
The percentage of connecting passengers is 7.8 percent (114 in 1,454 passengers), their 
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average waiting time is 47.7 minutes, and the maximum waiting time is 495.0 minutes 
(PIX-TER-HOR). With this network, 12 passengers cannot reach their destination on 
the same day of departure even with two stops (the corresponding waiting time costs are 
not reflected in the value of the indicators). 
If no limit is placed on the maximum waiting time, the total social costs of the optimum 
network are 152,048 EUR (a 7.1 percent decrease with respect to the current network). 
This is quite a significant decrease because approximately half of these costs – the 
airline ground and system operating costs – were assumed to be fixed. The number of 
flights drops to 40 and the average load factor increases to 62.1 percent. The amount of 
public subsidies decreases 6.7 percent to 74,747 EUR. The optimum network can be 
operated with 5 aircraft – 3 DH2 and 2 DH4 – instead of the current 6. Total airfares 
decrease by 8.3 percent to 68,292 EUR, airline operating costs decrease by 14.9 percent 
to 65,650 EUR, and passenger time costs decrease by 1.3 percent to 9,282 EUR. The 
percentage of connecting passengers is 9.1 percent, their average waiting time decreases 
to 46.8 minutes (-1.7 percent), and the maximum waiting time is 390 minutes (GRW-
TER-PDL-SMA). All passengers can reach their destination on the same day of 
departure.  
When the waiting time is limited to a maximum of 3 hours (for each stop), the total 
social costs of the optimum network are 155,187 EUR (-4.8 percent). As one should 
expect, these costs are higher than when no waiting time limit is considered, but still 
clearly lower than for the current network. The percentage of connecting passengers is 
8.9 percent, larger than when no limit is placed on waiting time, but the average waiting 
time is reduced to 33.8 minutes (-29.1 percent) and the maximum waiting time is 210 
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minutes (PIX-PDL-FLW-CVU). In relation to the current network, the amount of public 
subsidies decreases by 2.0 percent to 78,170 EUR, total airfares decrease by 7.6 percent 
to 68,811 EUR, airline operating costs decrease by 9.4 percent to 69,865 EUR, and 
passenger time costs decrease by 6.1 percent to 8,836 EUR. The number of flights drops 
to 41 and the load factor increases to 62.3 percent. The network needs 7 aircraft to be 
operated (3 DH2 and 4 DH4), that is, one DH2 in addition to the aircraft currently being 
used (the costs of these aircraft were taken into account in the computation of airline 
operating costs). 
5.4.3 Airport-specific Results 
Network results show that the air transportation network of the Azores can be improved. 
However, this analysis does not allow the detection of possible negative effects specific 
to some airports/islands. To overcome this, we now examine how the optimum 
networks would impact the various islands of the archipelago, focusing on the following 
items: total number of daily flights, airfares, and waiting time of connecting passengers. 
 
Figure 5.5 - Number of flights per airport for the current and optimum networks 
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With respect to the total number of daily flights serving each airport (thus, each island), 
changes are quite meager. As it can be seen in Figure 5.5, SMA, SJZ, PIX, FLW, and 
CVU do not lose any flights both when there is no limit on the waiting time faced by 
connecting passengers and when there is a limit of 3 hours. In contrast, TER and HOR 
stay at most with the same number of flights, and GRW loses flights in both cases. 
Finally, PDL loses two flights in the first case (no limit) and gains one in the second. 
The airfares decrease on average for the optimum networks, but increase in some 
markets. It can be seen in Figure 5.6 that, in general, the number of markets that become 
less expensive is larger than the number of markets that become more expensive. This is 
particularly true with respect to GRW, where airfares decrease for all markets but one. 
In contrast, airfare increases affect 5 of the 6 markets involving CVU, the airport of the 
smallest island. As shown in Table 5.8, airfare changes can be rather substantial, with 
decreases above 60 percent in 5 markets (HOR-GRW, SJZ-PIX, HOR-SMA, SJZ-FLW, 
PIX-GRW) and increases above 60 percent in 3 markets (FLW-CVU, TER-CVU and 
HOR-CVU). These large changes can essentially by explained by two main reasons: the 
current amount of public subsidies per passenger is considerably higher (or lower) in 
some islands than in others, meaning that the airfares are relatively very low (or high); 
the travel times increase (decrease) more for some islands than for others, making the 
passengers from/to these islands more (less) willing to pay for their flights.  
In relation to the waiting time of connecting passengers, the optimum networks show 
improvements from the current network, especially when the waiting time is limited to 
3 hours (Table 5.9). The first reason is because there is no underserved demand (i.e. 
passengers that cannot reach their destinations on the same day of departure). 
Setting Public Service Obligations in Low-Demand Air Transportation Networks 
135 
Table 5.8 - Round-trip airfares per market for the optimum network: value in EUR (upper 
triangle) and variation with respect to the current network (lower triangle) 
Markets PDL TER HOR SMA SJZ PIX FLW GRW CVU
PDL - 130,0 141,5 77,4 148,3 178,3 157,6 163,1 227,0
TER - 17,9 - 143,2 216,7 95,9 142,5 151,5 81,9 264,1
HOR - 10,6 - 6,7 - 49,2 111,7 144,2 83,5 20,7 148,4
SMA - 15,5 36,8 - 69,0 - 177,3 67,7 168,0 120,5 168,8
SJZ - 6,4 4,8 - 7,8 12,0 - 34,5 52,6 55,0 -
PIX 12,5 - 7,1 19,1 - 57,2 - 71,5 - 188,7 45,8 99,1
FLW - 0,5 - 4,4 - 8,8 6,0 - 66,8 19,1 - 130,7 89,4
GRW 2,9 - 10,5 - 82,9 - 24,0 - 54,6 - 62,2 - 17,5 - -
CVU 43,3 66,7 62,2 6,5 - - 37,4 96,3 - -  
 
 
Figure 5.6 - Number of markets with airfare increase and decrease per airport when there is no 
waiting time limit (top) and when waiting time is limited to 3 hours (bottom)  
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In addition to this, when no limit is placed on the waiting time, the maximum waiting 
time decreases in all airports, except PDL and CVU, with the largest reductions in HOR 
and TER. In this optimum network, average waiting time increases at five airports, but 
it increased by more than 20 percent only at SMA and CVU. In contrast, it decreased at 
HOR and GRW by more than 20 percent. When the waiting time is limited to 3 hours, 
the results are significantly better than in the current network. The maximum waiting 
time decreases at least 57 percent at seven airports and only at CVU is the maximum 
waiting time increased, and by less than 8 percent. The average waiting time increases 
at three airports (PDL, TER, and CVU), while the other six airports have reductions of 
at least 35 percent. 
Table 5.9 - Number of connecting and not-served passengers and average and maximum waiting 
time per island for the current and optimum networks 
PDL TER HOR SMA SJZ PIX FLW GRW CVU
Current 38 28 18 15 12 8 45 50 14
Optimum
(No- limit)
45 28 18 18 16 18 50 54 18
Optimum
(3- hour limit)
38 28 22 18 16 12 50 54 22
Current 25 29 68 68 70 85 42 58 41
Optimum
(No- limit)
26 28 51 104 58 101 47 25 68
Optimum
(3- hour limit)
33 38 33 43 26 30 27 35 44
Current 75 435 495 435 405 495 375 465 195
Optimum
(No- limit)
150 195 165 390 345 360 360 390 300
Optimum
(3- hour limit)
75 105 150 180 135 210 105 135 210
Current 0 0 0 2 4 5 4 3 6
Optimum
(No- limit)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Optimum
(3- hour limit)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of 
connecting 
passengers
Average 
waiting time
Maximum 
waiting time
Underserved 
passengers
Indicator Network
Airport
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5.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to assess the variability of results, a sensitivity analysis was performed with 
respect to four important parameters: demand targets, maximum load factor per leg, 
value of time, and stoppage costs. For the demand targets we tested values of -20, -10,    
-5, +5, +10, and +20 percent of the reference values (Table 5.2). For the maximum load 
factor per leg, two alternatives were analyzed: 80 and 100 percent (instead of 90 
percent). For the value of time we used three values: 2.5, 7.5, and 10.0 EUR per hour 
(instead of the reference value of 5.0 EUR per hour). Finally, the stoppage costs were 
set at 20 and 50 percent of the airline operating costs (instead of 33 percent). The 
analysis was carried out considering no limit on the maximum waiting time of 
connecting passengers and the following indicators: total social costs, amount of public 
subsidies, airline operating costs, passenger time costs, and aircraft fleet. The results 
obtained for the sensitivity analysis are displayed in Table 5.10.  
In response to the change in demand targets, as expected, the amount of public subsidies 
per day increases as the number of passengers increases (Figure 5.7). When the number 
of passengers decreases by 20 percent, the amount of public subsidies drops by 27.7 
percent with respect to the current network, and when it increases by 20 percent the 
subsidies grow by 23.8 percent. The total social costs also increase, but at a much 
smaller rate, and do not reach the costs for the current network even when the demand 
increases by 20%. Airline operating costs follow approximately the same pattern as total 
social costs. Passenger time costs grow quickly, faster than the demand. The fleet 
necessary to run the network varies between 4 and 6 aircraft. For levels of passengers 
between -10 and +10 percent of the reference values, the optimal fleet does not change. 
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In contrast, it reduces to 4 aircraft only with 20 percent fewer passengers (2 DH2 and 2 
DH4) and increases to 6 aircraft (3 DH2 and 3 DH4) with 20 percent more passengers. 
Table 5.10 - Fleet, costs, subsidies, and airfares for the optimum network using different values of 
demand targets, maximum load factor, values of time, and stoppage costs 
Value Var. % Value Var. % Value Var. % Value Var. %
- 163640 - 77116 - 9407 - 79792 - 2 + 4
-20 144146 -11.9 59168 -23.3 7861 -16.4 57660 -27.7 2 + 2
-10 146297 -10.6 61399 -20.4 8138 -13.5 62971 -21.1 2 + 3
-5 149056 -8.9 64060 -16.9 7880 -16.2 68620 -14.0 2 + 3
0 152048 -7.1 65650 -14.9 9282 -1.3 74474 -6.7 2 + 3
+5 156080 -4.6 69309 -10.1 9654 2.6 81870 2.6 2 + 3
+10 157072 -4.0 69102 -10.4 10853 15.4 86748 8.7 2 + 3
+20 158044 -3.4 67643 -12.3 12284 30.6 98817 23.8 3 + 3
100 149414 -8.7 62056 -19.5 10241 8.9 71316 -10.6 3 + 2
90 152048 -7.1 65650 -14.9 9282 -1.3 74474 -6.7 2 + 3
80 157892 -3.5 71585 -7.2 9190 -2.3 80191 0.5 2 + 3
10 160055 -2.2 142702 85.0 17353 84.5 79582 -0.3 2 + 3
7.5 155835 -4.8 141644 83.7 14192 50.9 76580 -4.0 2 + 3
5 152048 -7.1 65650 -14.9 9282 -1.3 74474 -6.7 2 + 3
2.5 147159 -10.1 142612 84.9 4547 -51.7 71124 -10.9 2 + 3
20 149610 -8.6 63853 -17.2 8641 -8.1 72055 -9.7 2 + 3
33 152048 -7.1 65650 -14.9 9282 -1.3 74474 -6.7 2 + 3
50 152493 -6.8 66373 -13.9 9004 -4.3 75711 -5.1 2 + 3
Optimum
Value of 
Time 
(EUR/h)
Optimum
Stoppage 
costs
(%)
Load 
Factor (%)
Demand 
Target
(%)
Optimum
Optimum
Current
Airline Operating 
Costs
Passenger Time 
Costs Fleet     
(DH2+DH4)
Public Subsidies
Network
Total Social Cost
 
Also as expected, the amount of public subsidies increases as the load factor decreases. 
When the maximum load factor per leg is 100 percent, the gain with respect to the 
current network is 10.6 percent, and when it is 80 percent, there is a loss of 0.5 percent. 
The same occurs, though in smaller scale, with the total social costs and the airline 
operating costs. In contrast, passenger time costs increase with the maximum load factor 
per leg because there are fewer flights (thus waiting times are longer). The optimum 
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fleet is 3 DH2 and 2 DH4 when the maximum load factor per leg is 100 percent instead 
of 2 DH2 and 3 DH4 when it is 90 or 80 percent. 
 
Figure 5.7 - Amount of public subsidies for different demand targets 
Changes in the value of time affect directly the passenger time costs. These costs vary 
almost proportionally with the value of time, at approximately the same rate (they 
almost double when the value of time doubles). In terms of total social costs and of the 
amount of public subsidies, the results point to reductions on the same scale of the ones 
obtained in the optimum networks when comparing to the current network, even when 
the value of time is 10 EUR per hour. The impact of value of time changes on airline 
operating costs is minor, and on the aircraft fleet is nil. 
Finally, changes in the stoppage costs do not have a strong impact on results. The total 
social costs, the airline operating costs, and the amount of public subsidies all increase 
with the increase of the stoppage costs, but at a slower rate. For all stoppage cost values, 
the total social costs and the airline operating costs are lower than those obtained with 
the current network. The same occurs with the amount of public subsidies, which, in 
50
60
70
80
90
100
-20% -10% -5% 0% +5% +10% +20%
P
u
b
lic
 S
u
b
si
d
ie
s 
(T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s 
o
f 
Eu
ro
s)
Expected O/D demand
Current network
Chapter 5 
140 
relation to the current network, decrease 5.1 and 9.7 percent when stoppage costs are 50 
and 20 percent of flight costs, respectively. The optimal fleet does not change for the 
range of stoppage costs considered (2 DH2 and 3 DH4). 
5.4.5 Computational Effort 
The optimization model was solved on a Quad Core processor with 4GB of RAM using 
the optimizer version 22.01.04 of the commercial software Xpress (FICO, 2011). The 
model involved more than 5,000 integer variables and 150,000 real variables. The 
computation time without limiting the passenger waiting time was 88.1 minutes – the 
LP relaxation took 0.6 seconds, the first feasible integer solution was obtained after 1.7 
minutes, and the 10-percent optimality gap was reached in 10.7 minutes. Considering all 
model runs, the computation time varied between 2.7 minutes (3-hour maximum 
waiting time and 80% maximum load factor) and 154.8 minutes (demand targets equal 
to -20% of the reference values and maximum load factor of 80%). The average 
computation time was 52.4 minutes.  The computation times required to solve this case 
study seem to be reasonable for an optimization model that is to be used in processes 
that are repeated only once every three years.   
5.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a decision approach have presented aimed to assist governments 
(aviation authorities) in the establishment of PSO requirements for the air transportation 
networks of low-demand regions. The approach is based on an integrated flight 
scheduling and fleet assignment model and determines the air transportation network 
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that minimizes the total social costs of satisfying a given origin/destination (O/D) 
demand, as well as the amount of public subsidies necessary to finance the network. 
The application of the decision approach to the network of Azores (Portugal), one of the 
largest networks fully operated under a PSO system, demonstrates its practical 
usefulness. Indeed, the results of the application clearly indicate that, overall, the 
network of the region could be better for all stakeholders – passengers, airline, and 
government (this, of course, assumes validity of our assumptions and correctness of our 
data). It is, however, worth noting that the impacts on the various islands would be quite 
different, and some could be worse off if the approach is implemented (e.g., the airfares 
paid for flights involving Corvo, the smallest island, would increase, in some cases 
substantially). 
The decision approach presented in this chapter is, I believe, a valuable addition to the 
air transportation literature. Indeed, the literature on low-demand networks is quite 
meager (though growing quickly), and up to now has not focused on the kind of 
operational issues we have addressed here. However, we must recognize that it has 
some limitations. For example, the approach does not distinguish between passengers 
(residents, students, retired people), and such distinction often occurs in these types of 
networks. Also, it does not take into account the cost of airports, which, in this type of 
network, are publicly owned (like in the Azores). The future work in this area will aim 
at overcoming these limitations.  
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Chapter 6  
Multiple Perspectives on Air 
Transportation Networks in Sparsely 
Populated Regions with an 
application to Norway 
6.1 Introduction 
After deregulation of the airline markets, the freedom to choose where and how 
frequently to fly led to an under supply on some of the thinner airline markets. If 
regional government policy encourages and supports communities in remote regions 
such as Alaska, Northern Canada, the Canary Islands, Northern Norway and the interior 
of Australia, it may be necessary to subsidize the air transport network. Designing a 
publicly supported network that provides a reasonable level of accessibility at a 
competitive price is not a simple task. A welfare based flight schedule and fleet 
assignment optimization model (WFSFA) is developed in this research in order to 
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determine a network configuration that minimizes the overall social costs of the air 
transportation network. A social welfare computation based on the network solution 
evaluates passenger, airline, airport and government welfare which permits a 
comparison across different levels of accessibility and their related subsidy 
requirements.  
Public support systems such as the European Union’s public service obligation (PSO), 
Australia’s regional aviation access program (RAAP) and North America’s essential air 
services (EAS) are one of the direct consequences of liberalization and deregulation of 
the airline industry (WILLIAMS, 2005).  Details and comparisons of the PSO and the 
EAS systems are discussed in REYNOLDS-FEIGHAN (1995b), SANTANA (2009), 
and, more recently, in BRAATHEN (2011).  The EAS was initiated after the 
Deregulation Act of 1978 (US DOT, 2009; MENDES-METRASS and DE 
NEUFVILLE, 2010) and the PSO system was launched in 1992 (CEC, 1992a; CEC, 
1992b; CEC, 1992c) as part of the air transportation liberalization process in Europe 
(REYNOLDS-FEIGHAN, 1995a; WILLIAMS, 2005). According to European Union 
policy, a government can impose a PSO between any airport in its territory and any 
airport in the European Union if that route is considered to be crucial for economic and 
social development of the region (CEC, 2008). Air transportation services are necessary 
to provide remote settlements with access to essential services such as healthcare and 
education, and the country or regional capital, as well as promotion of the local 
economy and for purposes of national cohesion (HALPERN and BRAATHEN, 2010). 
As a result, by 2010, more than 260 routes in ten different European countries were 
operated according to the PSO system (CEC, 2010). The awarding of PSO routes 
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involves a competitive tender process in which airlines bid to operate the routes while 
satisfying the requirements set by the government. The winning airline operates the 
route as a monopoly and receives a public subsidy to do so.  PSO requirements usually 
impose a specified level of service as a function of a minimum number of flights per 
leg, a minimum aircraft configuration (aircraft propulsion and minimum number of 
seats), maximum or average fare levels, and earliest/latest departure/arrival times.  
Despite the common legal framework in Europe, countries have adopted different 
strategies and policies in relation to PSO networks. The variety of policies and 
requirements between countries has helped to create barriers to entry which reduce the 
competitiveness of the tender process leading to an increase in costs over time 
(WILLIAMS, 2005). According to SANTANA (2009), airlines that operate networks 
under subsidized programs have higher operating costs than airlines operating in 
competitive networks. Barriers to entry are generally caused by three factors. First, the 
PSO routes are awarded for three years which does not give new entrants sufficient time 
to organize the initial investment. Second, airlines have a very short period (very often 
only one month) to prepare for the operations once they win the tender. Third, aircraft 
specifications are often highly restrictive, which reduces the number of airlines capable 
of meeting the PSO requirements. For example, Norway requires (for most of the PSO 
routes) a pressurized aircraft with a minimum of 30 seats capable of operating at 
airports with runways of less than 1,000 meters. To overcome some of these problems, 
WILLIAMS (2005) proposes that the PSO cycle should be extended to five years with 
additional time between the end of the tender process and the beginning of operations. 
Moreover, according to REYNOLDS-FEIGHAN (1995b), a centralized European 
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program may enhance efficiency and public accountability, namely by harmonizing the 
size of communities to be served, setting a minimum distance to the nearest central hub, 
and considering alternative means of transport. 
The literature to date discussing subsidized air transportation networks have focused on 
the economic and societal impact of these networks on populations, regions and airlines 
(GRAHAM, 1998; METRASS-MENDES et al., 2011; LIAN, 2010) and on the legal 
framework (REYNOLDS-FEIGHAN, 1995a; SANTANA, 2009; BRAATHEN, 2011). 
To the best of our knowledge, the first integrated flight schedule and fleet assignment 
(IFSFA) operational model developed for subsidized networks is presented in Pita et al. 
(2012). Schedule design and fleet assignment problems have been extensively discussed 
in the literature due to their importance for the airline planning process.  For the flight 
scheduling problem readers are referred to ERDMANN et al. (2001), BARNHART et 
al. (2002), and YAN and CHEN (2007) and for the fleet assignment problem ABARA 
(1989), HANE et al. (1995), and DUMAS et al. (2009). In the last decade, a number of 
papers have analyzed the two issues simultaneously through integrated models. See for 
example DESAULNIERS et al. (1997), REXING et al. (2000), LOHATEPANONT and 
BARNHART (2004), YAN et al. (2008), and SHERALI et al., (2010). 
This research extends the approach discussed in Chapter 5 in four main directions. First, 
airport costs and revenues are endogenized in the optimization model and analyzed in 
the social welfare analysis. Second, passenger travel time preferences, measured by 
schedule delay, are included in the optimization model and the subsequent passenger 
welfare analysis. Third, passenger demand and airfares are endogenized in the 
optimization model permitting an analysis of the impact of airfares on the service 
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provided. Fourth, a social welfare computation to analyze the trade-offs across multiple 
scenarios is developed, based on the optimization model outputs. It includes a 
passenger, airline, airport, and government welfare analysis in order to compare various 
scenarios from multiple perspectives.   
The chapter is organized as follows. The mathematical modeling of the WFSFA 
optimization model and social welfare analysis are presented in Section 6.2. A case 
study of the Norwegian regional air transportation network, mainly operated under PSO 
conditions, is described in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 analyzes the results of the WFSFA 
model and the social welfare analyses with respect to Norway, highlighting the 
improvements that could be attained by all stakeholders. Final remarks, conclusions, 
and guidelines for future research are addressed in Section 6.5.   
6.2 The welfare-based flight schedule and fleet 
assignment approach 
This research develops an approach design PSO networks which balances the trade-offs 
across the different actors being served by the network, based on the WFSFA 
optimization model. The assessment of the social welfare outcome of the model is 
important for government agencies whose goal is to make the best use of public 
resources and, simultaneously, maintain an acceptable level of service for passengers. 
The level of service is measured by flight frequency, itinerary types and maximum 
waiting time between flight legs. The main research question can be formulated as 
follows:  
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“How should an air transportation network operated as a public service be 
organized such that total network costs are minimized?” 
Four different, and sometimes conflicting, objectives need to be taken into account by 
the government, or the aviation authority on its behalf, when setting PSO requirements. 
First, the utility function of passengers minimizes total trip costs, which is a function of 
airfare, flight frequency, number of legs in the itinerary, and total travel time required to 
complete the journey. Second, the frequently publicly-owned airport management 
should be encouraged to operate efficiently as a function of operating costs and 
revenues. Third, the monopolistic airline carrier operates the PSO routes by maximizing 
their profits given the minimum level of service requirements set by the aviation 
authority. Through the tender process, the airlines are also encouraged to minimize the 
level of subsidies requested. Fourth, government agencies spending public funds should 
consider the social benefits, territorial cohesion, and economic development that such 
investments may achieve.  
In general, passengers prefer lower travel costs, or in other words, to have a convenient 
flight itinerary at an affordable price. Those two parameters depend mainly on the 
passenger type and trip purpose. Typically, two passenger types are considered as 
function of the purpose of the trip: business and leisure. Business passengers tend to be 
more time-sensitive than price-sensitive especially in short-haul markets such as PSO 
markets (ADLER and GELLMAN, 2012). Hence, business passengers place greater 
value on higher flight frequency and more direct routes in order to minimize schedule 
delay and the number of required connections. Leisure passengers tend to be more 
price-sensitive than time-sensitive and therefore are more willing to accept higher 
Multiple Perspectives on Air Transportation Networks in Sparsely Populated Regions  
149 
schedule delays and multi-leg itineraries (BORENSTEIN and NETZ, 1999; NOLAN et 
al., 2005). Consequently, business passengers tend to have higher values of time. The 
approach endogenizes the passenger travel cost in the optimization process and 
estimates the trip utility per passenger type and per market in the social welfare 
analysis.  Travel cost is a function of airfares and time costs, including the time spent on 
board, waiting between connections, and schedule delay.  
On PSO routes, the tender mechanism often sets maximum airfares, which takes into 
account a given origin-destination (O/D) demand level. The government body that 
regulates prices is aware that lower fares are likely to stimulate demand but equally 
likely to increase the level of subsidies requested by the airlines. A balance is therefore 
sought between passenger demand, airfares and subsidies considering the budget 
limitations of the PSO service necessary to support regional policy directions.  
Passenger time costs are directly related to the passenger value of time, thus with the 
trip purpose and passenger type (ADLER, 2005; JORGE-CALDERÓN, 1997). Three 
elements are considered within the passenger disutility function: on-board time costs, 
waiting time costs between flight legs on a connecting itinerary, and schedule delay 
costs. Waiting time cost covers the time spent at the hub airports between flight legs for 
passengers travelling on multi leg itineraries. Schedule delay is the difference between 
the passengers’ preferred travel time and the time when a flight is available (RYERSON 
and HANSEN, 2010). The passengers’ preferred travel time is difficult to ascertain 
because flight time choices are related to existing schedules. According to BREY and 
WALKER (2011a), the 9 am and 6 pm peaks are the most important of the day, 
followed by 10 pm, noon, and 7 am. For the outbound flights, BREY and WALKER 
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(2011b) stated that business passengers show a much stronger peak in the morning than 
leisure passengers. It is therefore, reasonable to assume that business passengers are 
more willing to travel outbound in the early morning and return in the late evening than 
non-business (leisure) passengers, reflecting the higher value of time for business 
passengers.    
Frequently, PSO routes connect a local airport to a central airport, which also serves 
numerous commercial flights, hence may not depend on PSO flights to achieve a break-
even point. The local airports, however, are served partly (or totally) by flights operated 
under PSO conditions and may generate deficits if the revenues are insufficient to cover 
their costs. When the entire airport system is organized under a single owner, usually 
the government, then the larger airports tend to cross-subsidize the smaller regional 
airports. Alternatively, a direct subsidy will be required from the government or local 
authorities.  
According to ADLER et al. (2012), the break-even point of small regional airports 
increased from 400,000 passengers on average in 2002 to 1.3 million by 2009, in part 
due to substantial security investments that have been imposed as a result of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. The results of an efficiency analysis of 83 European airports suggest 
that airport groups are 6 percent less efficient than stand-alone entities because they fail 
to encourage cost efficiency and entrepreneurship, probably in part due to soft budget 
constraints imposed on management. In this approach, we assume that airports are 
publicly owned and that the government is interested in minimizing the subsidies 
granted to local airports through either a reduction in airport operating times or an 
increase in revenues.  
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Regardless of whether they operate PSO routes or not, private airlines maximize profits 
in part by ensuring operational efficiency. On PSO routes, airlines have substantially 
less flexibility to change aircraft types, flight frequencies and market seat capacity 
because such parameters are usually defined by the PSO requirements. Therefore, a 
fleet planning and assignment model which will develop a reasonable schedule to be 
defined in the tender may aid in setting PSO requirements that reduce costs, hence 
minimize the subsidy level requested by the airlines.  
Finally, government agencies in charge of regulating the PSO routes need to balance the 
requirements of the various stakeholders including the airports, airlines and passengers. 
An efficient PSO system will balance airline and airport operating costs, level of service 
provided to passengers, and the subsidies granted to airlines and airports thus 
minimizing public expenditure.  
Our approach is to apply the WFSFA model and the social welfare analyses to highlight 
the trade-offs, based on multiple objectives, and consequently support government 
agencies in developing an efficient PSO mechanism. It should be underlined that this 
style of formulation is a partial transport equilibria outcome in which only direct 
operating costs and revenues are considered. Therefore, indirect or induced costs or 
revenues generated by air transportation to/from remote regions are not taken into 
account, including their impact on the local economy or the environment.  
6.2.1 Optimization Model 
Integrated flight schedule and fleet assignment models have been published in the 
literature mostly from the airline perspective, where the objective is to maximize profits 
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(LOHATEPANONT and BARNHART, 2004; YAN et al., 2008; SHERALI et al., 
2010). The main differences between that approach and the welfare based flight 
schedule and fleet assignment model (WFSFA) are the following: (1) the overall 
objective is to minimize social cost instead of maximizing airline profit; (2) passengers’ 
time costs and airport operating costs are endogenized because they represent important 
social costs; (3) the network is operated under a monopolistic rather than competitive 
regime; (4) maximum airfares are regulated by the PSO requirements rather than being 
a result of market characteristics; and (5) a minimum level of service (e.g., number of 
non-stop flights, maximum waiting time between flight legs) is guaranteed for each leg 
and/or market. 
The WFSFA model is applied to a day of operations divided into time-periods (e.g., 15 
or 30 minutes) and to itineraries of up to 2-stops (i.e., 1, 2 or 3 flight legs), which 
represent the vast majority of itineraries. We also assume that passengers only travel in 
a 2-stop itinerary if no feasible itinerary is available with a higher level of service (non-
stop or 1-stop), which reflects the influence of level of service on passenger choice 
(COLDREN et al., 2003).  
The notation required for the optimization model is presented in Table 6.1.  
The WFSFA objective (6.1) minimizes the social cost of the air transportation system 
which is the difference between operating costs and revenues. The first term represents 
the airline operating costs as the sum of flight costs and off-base costs. The flight costs 
are a function of the flight leg (first element) and the off-base costs (second element) 
which include apron charges whenever an aircraft is not parked at the base of the 
airline. The second term represents the airport variable operating costs, which includes 
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Table 6.1 – Optimization model notation 
Sets 
A = {1, …, A} - set of airports indexed by j and k 
F = {1, …, F} - set of aircraft types indexed by f 
I = {1, …, I} - set of itineraries indexed by i 
L = {1, …, L} - set of flight legs indexed by l 
LOjt = {1, …, L} - set of outbound flight legs from airport j in time period t indexed by l 
LIjt = {1, …, L} - set of flight legs arriving at airport j in time period t indexed by l 
LCt = {1, …, L} - set of flight legs that pass the count time t indexed by l 
Ljk = {1, …, L} - set of flight legs between airports j and k 
M = {1, …, A} - set of origin-destination markets indexed by m 
T = {1, …, T} - set of time windows indexed by t 
Parameters 
cVlf  - flight costs for an aircraft of type f to fly leg l ($per flight) 
cOjft  - off-base costs of having an aircraft of type f parked at airport j ($per aircraft and time window) 
cBi  - on-board time cost for a passenger in itinerary i  ($per passenger) 
cWi - waiting time cost for a passenger in itinerary i  ($per passenger) 
cAj- variable airport cost per hour of operation ($/hour) 
cSDm - schedule delay cost for a passenger on market m  ($/minute per passenger) 
ll - maximum load factor for flight leg l 
sf  - capacity of an aircraft of type f 
δli - parameter equal to 1 if flight leg l belongs to itinerary i, and 0 otherwise 
dm - number of passengers for OD market m 
δmi - parameter equal to 1 if itinerary i belongs to market m, and 0 otherwise 
rm   - average revenue on market m ($per passenger) 
rCj - average commercial revenue on international markets for airport j ($per passenger) 
edm - price elasticity of demand on market m 
dTmt - %age of the daily demand on market m with desirable travel time on time period t 
M - auxiliary big number (for formulation purposes only) 
Decision Variables 
xlf  – number of flights by aircraft type f on leg l, which is the flight leg between airports jk that take off on time 
window t (binary variable) 
yjft – number of aircraft of type f that are ready to take off from airport j on time window t 
qi – number of passengers assigned to itinerary i 
qTmtt’ – passengers on market m with desirable travel time on time period t and departure time on time period t’ 
nf  – number of aircraft of type f (integer variable) 
vjk – revenue variation per market (percentage) 
zjh – binary variable: 1 if airport j is open on hour h and 0 otherwise 
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employee, operating equipment, security, energy, and depreciation expenses as a 
function of the opening times of an airport. The third term corresponds to the passenger 
on-board time costs computed by multiplying the number of passengers per itinerary 
with the corresponding flight time cost (flight time multiplied by the value of time). The 
fourth term corresponds to the passenger waiting time costs between flight legs 
computed by the number of waiting passengers per itinerary multiplied by their value of 
time. The sixth term represents the schedule delay cost as a function of the difference 
between the most desirable travel time and the flight schedule multiplied by the number 
of passengers and schedule delay cost. Finally, the seventh term computes the airport 
non-aeronautical revenues including commercial, duty-free and parking revenues 
measured by the average commercial revenues per departing passenger multiplied by 
the number of passengers.  
In the objective function, we do not consider aeronautical revenues including landing 
fees, security fees and passenger departing fees because they are simultaneously a cost 
to the airlines and revenue for the airports. Security fees are levied by various methods, 
per example they may be paid by the airline directly or they may be added to the airfare 
in form of a surcharge to passengers. Therefore, these costs are computed in the social 
welfare analysis but not in the optimization model.  
Airfares are also omitted from the objective function as they represent a direct cost to 
the passengers and a source of revenue to the airlines and indirectly to the government 
via taxes. Airfare variation from the current average airfare per market is calculated in 
the demand function, hence impacts the number of passengers served.  
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Nine sets of constraints are included in the model. The balance, availability, and 
continuity constraints are standard constraints in the flight scheduling and/or fleet 
assignment model. In addition, new or modified constraints have been developed to 
consider specific aspects relevant to the subsidized networks. 
The balance constraints (6.2) guarantee that daily departures and arrivals per airport and 
aircraft type are equal.  
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Availability constraints (6.3) ensure that, for each aircraft type, the number of aircraft in 
use is equal to the available fleet.  
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The continuity constraints (6.4) ensure the aircraft flows per time period, aircraft type 
and airport. If necessary, constraints (6.5) ensure cyclical continuity.   
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The aircraft capacity constraints (6.6) ensure that the number of passengers does not 
exceed the available seats. The total passengers per flight account for all itineraries 
covering the relevant leg, including non-stop, 1-stop, and 2-stops journeys. To account 
for demand variability, the available number of seats may be limited using a maximum 
load factor below one (SWAN, 2002).  
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The demand equation (6.7) aggregates demand per market with the number of 
passengers assigned to the itineraries of that market. Demand per market, the left hand 
side of the equation, is equal to the expected demand given the current average air fare 
multiplied by the demand variation due to a change in the average airfare per market. 
We consider demand elasticity per market to be fixed and given.  
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Equation (6.8) sets the number of hours airport j is open and requires the airport to be 
open whenever an aircraft movement is being served. M is the maximum number of 
daily hours that an airport can be open. 
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Schedule delay per passenger and market is defined in equations (6.9) and (6.10). The 
right-hand side of equation (6.9) sets the number of passengers who prefer to travel in 
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time period t, according to the demand distribution d
T
mt. The left-hand side distributes 
the demand according to departing times t’. Equation (6.10) distribute passengers with 
desirable travel time t departing in time period t’ (left-hand side) to the corresponding 
itineraries (right-hand side).  
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Finally, xlf, which describes the flight legs to be flown and the fleet required, and zjh, 
which sets airport j’s opening hours, are binary variables while all other variables are 
continuous.  
6.2.2 Social Welfare Analysis 
The social welfare analysis calculates the airline profits (Π), passenger disutility (WC) 
and airport surplus (WG) (6.11) based on the results of the optimization model.  We 
assume that, the marginal cost (m
C
) of public funds is set exogenously and for the 
Norwegian case study equals 1.2 based on CALTHROP et al. (2010). 
GCC WmWW   (6.11) 
The passenger surplus is estimated by adapting the utility function presented in ADLER 
et al. (2010) (6.12) which combine total travel time, travel cost, and level of service.  
 M mFRTPTTTW mmmCm ,3210   (6.12) 
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where βv weights the relative importance of parameters v={0,1,2,3}. TTTm represents 
the total travel time in market m in hours obtained by aggregating the on-board time, the 
waiting time between flight legs and the schedule delay (6.13). TPm represents the total 
price in market m defined in equation (6.14). FRm represents the log of the minimum 
flight leg frequencies belonging to market m (6.15). 
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where, rm equals the average airfare in market m. 
The airline surplus is defined as the difference between total airline revenues and 
operating costs (6.16). Revenues are the sum of airfares and other ancillary revenues 
(beverages, food and duty-free), without taxes. On PSO routes, the latter type of 
revenue tends to be very small and is not included in this analysis. In terms of costs, we 
need to consider direct operating costs, landing fees, and indirect costs. Operating costs 
are obtained from the results of the optimization model through equation (6.1). Landing 
fees depend on the airport and aircraft landing and take-off cycle and we assume that 
those values are known and fixed. Finally, indirect costs are usually estimated as a 
percentage of the operational costs. According to SWAN and ADLER (2006) and 
BELOBABA et al. (2009), indirect costs approximately equal the level of operating 
costs, although differences between airlines may be significant.  
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where, VAT represents taxes levied by the government, cLFjf are the landing fees per 
airport and aircraft type, and α is a factor representing the non-operational airline costs 
as a percentage of operating costs.  
Finally, government surplus (6.17) is the difference between the aeronautical revenues 
and taxes and the variable costs of the airport. In this approach it is assumed that local 
airports are publicly owned. Consequently, the government collects the landing fees, 
departing passenger taxes, security taxes, and the value added tax (VAT) which is a 
function of the airfare. The fixed costs of the airport, which are independent of the 
network design, have not been included in this analysis but could easily be added as a 
constant to WG. 
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where cPTj represents the aeronautical taxes levied by government agencies on airfares 
at each airport.  
The additional public subsidies that are paid to the airlines as a result of the tender 
process have not been included in this analysis directly; however it is reasonable to 
assume that the losses of the airline represent a lower bound on the expected subsidy 
requested during the tender process.   
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6.3 Case study 
The regional Norwegian air transportation system consists of 61 Public Service 
Obligations (PSO) routes, located mainly in the North part of the country where air 
transport is the only viable means of public transport during the winter season 
(WILLIAMS and PAGLIARI, 2004). The Norwegian geography, climate and 
demography are decisive factors that explain the large number of routes operated in this 
manner. In 2010, Norway was populated by almost 5 million residents, corresponding to 
16 inhabitants per km
2
. A detailed analysis of the current Norwegian network 
configuration is discussed in LIAN (2010).  
Norway has 52 commercial airports receiving scheduled services in 2011, 46 of which 
are publicly owned by Avinor, the 100 percent government owned company created in 
2003. These airports served 93.47 percent of all passengers. The Norwegian air 
transportation network is noticeably centralized around Oslo. Oslo alone accounted for 
44.50 percent (21,093,349 passengers) of the domestic and international passengers and 
30.47 percent (223,565 air traffic movements) of the commercial flights processed in 
2011 in Norway. Of the 46 Avinor owned airports, 29 airports are classified as local 
airports that mostly, or solely, serve PSO routes. Most local airports consist of a single 
runway of around 800 meters, as described in Table 6.2, from which only short take-off 
and landing (STOL) aircraft operate. Examples of aircraft that operate on these runways 
are presented in LIAN (2010).   
61 routes are operated in Norway under PSO regulations with an average hop length 
slightly below 200 km. Three airlines operate these routes, including Wideroe, a 100 
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percent owned SAS subsidiary, followed by Danish Air Transportation (DAT) with 8 
routes and Lufttransport with 2 routes operated by helicopter. The airfares on the PSO 
routes are price capped on point-to-point services but not on an itinerary that includes 
non-PSO segments. According to the available airfare data from OAG for November 
2011, non-business passengers pay on average 50 percent of the maximum airfares set 
by the PSO requirements while business class pay 96 percent of the maximum, giving 
an overall average of 86 percent.  
Table 6.2 - Runway length (in meters) and operational costs per hour (US/hour) for the local 
airports in Norway 
IATA 
Code
Airport
Runway 
(m)
Operating 
Costs 
(USD/h)
IATA 
Code
Airport
Runway 
(m)
Operating 
Costs 
(USD/h)
ANX Andøya 2468 860 NVK Narvik 799 746
BJF Båtsfjord 810 431 OSY Namsos 812 717
BNN Brønnøysund 1199 1228 RET Røst 800 628
BVG Berlevåg 879 654 RRS Røros 1720 700
FDE Førde 930 595 RVK Rørvik 800 691
FRO Florø 1199 1003 SDN Sandane 800 650
HAA Hasvik 859 916 SKN Stokmarknes 889 947
HFT Hammerfest 890 1038 SOG Sogndal 930 955
HOV Ørsta- Volda 950 755 SOJ Sørkjosen 859 741
HVG Honningsvåg 860 705 SSJ Sandnessjøen 931 779
LKN Leknes 799 927 SVJ Svolvær 876 830
MEH Mehamn 800 602 VAW Vardø 1085 610
MJF Mosjøen 889 914 VDB Fagernes 1989 873
MQN Mo i Rana 799 851 VDS Vadsø 870 712  
Three major assumptions have been made in our case study in order to restrict the 
analysis to the regional air transportation system and to present an approach that designs 
a PSO network.  
(1) Only local airports are explicitly analyzed. 
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We consider the airports that are mainly or only served by PSO routes. Larger 
regional airports are served mostly by commercial carriers which are beyond the 
scope of this analysis. We include the regional airports for connecting itineraries 
but we do not consider the airport revenues and costs in the social welfare 
analysis.     
(2) The case study includes only O/D markets that connect through at least one local 
airport. 
Local airports are mostly served by PSO flights, therefore passengers on markets 
to/from those airports will be using the PSO system.  
(3) Flights connecting two non-local airports are fixed according to the 2010 
schedule. 
Connecting itineraries may use flights between two non-local airports. In this case 
we assume that the flights are fixed including both departure and arrival times. 
Passengers are assigned to these flights although the model does not consider the 
costs or revenues generated.  
Through the case study, three scenarios which consider the optimal fleet mix, airfare 
variation and the level of service offered to passengers were tested. Each scenario is 
compared to the 2010 PSO network and the potential solutions are discussed jointly. In 
the first scenario, given the existing fleet we optimize the PSO route network and search 
for the optimal fleet configuration. In this scenario, airfares remain at current levels. In 
the second scenario, airfare variation per market is endogenized, hence demand will 
fluctuate. Two alternatives are tested: first, airfare variation is unlimited; second, 
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airfares cannot vary by more than 5 percent.  In both cases the model also determines 
the optimal fleet configuration. In the third scenario, we limit the maximum passenger 
waiting time to the current values and, subsequently, to a maximum 3-hour waiting time 
between legs of an itinerary. 
In the remainder of this section, first is described the data used in the case study and 
then presented the results for each scenario beginning with an analysis of the current 
network. 
6.3.1 Input Data 
The input data was provided by the OAG, EUROCONTROL, official reports published 
by the Norwegian authorities and the academic literature. Data collected for the case 
study includes airport operating costs, demand levels per market, flight time per leg, 
flight costs per leg and aircraft type, off-base costs, airline indirect costs, value of time 
per passenger type, maximum airfares per market, and the daily demand distribution. 
Airport costs for each local airport were divided into fixed and operating costs. The 
fixed costs are not dependent on the number of hours that the airport is open, therefore 
are not included in the optimization. The operating costs are directly related to the daily 
operations of the airports and are derived from official reports. The operating costs per 
hour per local airport were computed by dividing the total operating costs by the 
number of hours that the airports were open in 2010 as presented in Table 6.2.  We 
assume that an airport must be open at least one hour before take-off and a half hour 
after an aircraft landing.  
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Demand data and flight time per leg were collected from OAG statistics for the 16
th
 
November, 2011.  The flight time per leg was assumed to be the minimum flight-time 
according to the OAG statistics (Table 6.3). 
Flight costs per block-hour (BH) are the airlines’ direct operating costs which include 
fuel, crew, and maintenance. The block-hour costs were computed using regression 
analysis for aircraft with less than 100 seats using data drawn from EUROCONTROL 
(2009).  Three aircraft were considered in this case study including 19, 39, and 78-seater 
aircraft and the cost per block-hour was valued at US 811.9, US 1,503.9 and US 
2,853.4, respectively. Currently, the minimum aircraft size permitted is a pressurized 
30-seat cabin aircraft, although on certain routes non-pressurized aircraft above 15 
seats, such as the 19-seater Dornier 228, have been allowed. The off-base costs were 
assumed to be 1/3 of the direct operating costs (SWAN and ADLER, 2006).  
The value of time per passenger type, an important element in the passenger time cost 
computation, was estimated by RAMJERDI et al. (1997) for the Institute of Transport 
Economics. The value of time for different modes of transport and travel purpose was 
determined as a percentage of the gross average wage in Norway in 1995 (108 
NOK/hour). Based on the gross average wage in Norway in 2010 (243 NOK/hour), we 
determined the value of time for this study: US 54.5 and US 73.2 per hour (equivalent 
to 300 and 403 NOK/hour) for leisure and business passengers, respectively. Flight time 
costs and waiting time costs were set equal to the value of time, while schedule delay 
costs were assumed to be approximately 20 percent and 29.5 percent of that value (US 
11.0 and US 43.6 per hour) for leisure and business passengers, respectively, as 
described in RAMJERDI et al. (1997).  
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Airfares per market were obtained separately for PSO and non-PSO routes. For PSO 
routes, the airfares were set at 86 percent of their maximum value, which is the 
weighted average of the airfares available in the OAG database, divided by business and 
non-business passengers (Table 6.3). For the non-PSO routes, we conducted a 
regression analysis, based on OAG data, in order to calculate the average values per 
market, taking into account the percentage of business and non-business demand. 
Table 6.3 - Flight-time (in minutes) and average airfares (USD) for the PSO routes 
Route
Flight 
time (min)
Airfares 
(USD)
Route
Flight 
time (min)
Airfares 
(USD)
Route
Flight 
time (min)
Airfares 
(USD)
OSL-FDE 57 255 ALF-HVG 33 151 TOS-ANX 30 107
OSL-FRO 69 255 ALF-KKN 46 170 TOS-HAA 33 164
OSL-HOV 61 255 ALF-MEH 41 175 TOS-LKL 48 182
OSL-RRS 52 278 ALF-VDS 48 170 TOS-SOJ 25 87
OSL-SDN 57 255 BOO-ANX 45 225 BJF-BVG 18 62
OSL-SOG 47 220 BOO-BNN 45 211 BJF-HFT 42 154
OSL-VDB 30 125 BOO-LKN 26 124 BJF-HVG 33 104
BGO-FDE 30 156 BOO-MJF 39 181 BJF-MEH 23 62
BGO-FRO 35 156 BOO-MQN 30 132 BJF-VDS 23 104
BGO-HOV 42 216 BOO-NVK 40 182 BVG-HFT 40 154
BGO-SDN 37 188 BOO-RET 25 124 BVG-HVG 29 122
BGO-SOG 33 156 BOO-SSJ 35 181 BVG-MEH 17 77
TRD-BNN 44 204 BOO-SVJ 27 124 BVG-VDS 26 96
TRD-MJF 51 225 KKN-BJF 27 122 HAA-HFT 20 77
TRD-MQN 64 249 KKN-BVG 32 104 HFT-HVG 25 104
TRD-OSY 30 140 KKN-HFT 47 170 HFT-MEH 35 135
TRD-RVK 34 178 KKN-HVG 41 170 HFT-VDS 44 170
TRD-SSJ 53 225 KKN-MEH 36 146 HVG-MEH 20 77
ALF-BJF 45 175 KKN-VAW 22 81 HVG-VDS 38 154
ALF-BVG 44 170 KKN-VDS 15 62 MEH-VDS 32 128
ALF-HFT 24 77  
Finally, the daily demand distribution was determined separately for domestic business 
and leisure passengers and international passengers. For leisure passengers we assume a 
uniform distribution of desirable travel times across the day. For business passengers, 
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we assume that the desirable travel times are equally divided between a 2 hour peak in 
the morning and evening. The morning peak is between 8 and 10am (arrival time) and 
the evening interval is 6 and 8pm (departure time).  The departure times corresponding 
to the earliest arrival times were calculated assuming a non-stop flight between the 
origin and destination. For international passengers, based on the current schedules, we 
assume the desirable arrival (departure) time to be one hour before (after) the scheduled 
international flight and exclude connections of less than 30 minutes. 
6.3.2 Model Results 
In order to analyze the results, we compare the current solution and the optimal 
solutions for the three scenarios with respect to the following indicators: total, flight, 
passenger, and airport costs, airfares, fleet requirements, number of flights, flight 
frequency, cost per available seat-kilometer (CASK), load factor, the total number of 
passengers, passenger waiting times, and social welfare (passenger, airline, and 
government). The results are presented in Figure 6.1 and Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6.   
 
Figure 6.1 - Flight frequency for the Norwegian PSO network 
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The current network has a daily expected total social cost of US 3.05 million of which 
US 0.215 million correspond to airline operating costs, US 1.43 million to airport costs, 
and US 1.19 million to passenger time costs. Airfare revenue on PSO flights amounts to 
US 0.122 million. The current fleet is composed of three 19-seater, twenty-one 39-
seater, and seven 78-seater aircraft. A total of 325 flights achieve an average load-factor 
of 60.2 percent and the CASK amounts to US 0.129. A total of 6,852 passengers are 
carried, of which 62 percent travel on non-stop itineraries, 35 percent on 1-stop 
itineraries, and 3 percent on 2-stop itineraries. Passengers traveling on connecting 
itineraries have an average waiting time between flights of 163 minutes. Finally, the 
social welfare analysis computed an average passenger utility of US 237.2 and a total 
passenger utility of US 1.63 million, a government deficit of US 1.29 million, and an 
airline deficit of US 0.382 million, which we assume represents a lower bound on 
subsidies. 
Table 6.4 - Optimization model total social costs and airfares for the current network and optimum 
networks 
Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var % Value Var %
3.048 - 0.427 - 1.433 - 1.188 - 0.122 -
Fixed fleet 2.080 - 31.8 0.337 - 21.2 0.568 - 60.4 1.176 - 1.0 0.122 -
Optimum 
fleet
1.883 - 38.2 0.311 - 27.1 0.564 - 60.6 1.008 - 15.1 0.122 -
Free 
variation
1.704 - 44.1 0.275 - 35.5 0.572 - 60.1 0.856 - 27.9 0.112 - 8.5
5% 
variation
1.859 - 39.0 0.291 - 31.7 0.565 - 60.6 1.003 - 15.5 0.121 - 0.7
Current 
waiting time
1.758 - 42.3 0.284 - 33.5 0.569 - 60.3 0.905 - 23.8 0.119 - 2.7
Maximum 3-
hour time
1.773 - 41.8 0.314 - 26.5 0.568 - 60.4 0.892 - 24.9 0.121 - 1.3
Passenger 
waiting time
Fleet 
Optimization
Airfare 
Variation
Current Network
Model Scenario
Total Cost Airline Costs Aiport Costs
Passenger Time 
Costs
Airfares
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Table 6.5 - Number of flights, average load factor, average waiting time, cost per available seat-
kilometer, and fleet for the current network and optimum networks 
Value Var (%) Value Var (%) Value Var (%) Value Var (%)
325 - 60.2% 163 0.129 3 / 21 / 7
Fixed fleet 327 0.6 64.8% 7.8 153 - 6.3 0.126 - 2.0 3 / 21 / 7
Optimum 
fleet
341 4.9 79.9% 32.7 121 - 25.7 0.105 - 18.3 15 / 12 / 5
Free 
variation
303 - 6.8 78.6% 30.7 141 - 13.4 0.094 - 27.2 14 / 8 / 4
5% 
variation
313 - 3.7 79.1% 31.4 133 - 18.3 0.100 - 22.5 16 / 7 / 4
Current 
waiting time
314 - 3.4 76.6% 27.3 114 - 30.0 0.103 - 19.9 16 / 8 / 4
Maximum 3-
hour time
328 0.9 74.6% 23.9 101 - 38.0 0.107 - 16.6 18 / 8 / 4
Passenger 
waiting time
Fleet 
Optimization
Airfare 
Variation
Current Network
Model Scenario
Number of Flights
Average Load 
Factor
Average Waiting 
Time (min)
Cost Available-
Seat KM Fleet
(19/39/78)
 
Table 6.6 - Social welfare results for the current network and optimum networks 
Value Var (%) Value Var (%) Value Var (%) Value Var (%)
- 1.29 - - 0.382 - 1.63 - 237.22 -
Fixed fleet - 0.44 66.1 - 0.281 26.5 1.76 8.1 256.43 8.1
Optimum 
fleet
- 0.44 65.8 - 0.249 34.9 2.05 25.9 298.76 25.9
Free 
variation
- 0.46 64.6 - 0.224 41.4 1.41 - 13.3 248.23 4.6
5% 
variation
- 0.43 66.4 - 0.240 37.3 1.93 18.7 288.45 21.6
Current 
waiting time
- 0.44 65.8 - 0.234 38.6 1.90 17.1 301.23 27.0
Maximum 3-
hour time
- 0.43 66.4 - 0.266 30.4 2.33 43.5 354.65 49.5
Fleet 
Optimization
Airfare 
Variation
Passenger 
waiting time
Current Network
Passenger Utility
AverageTotalModel Scenario
Government 
Surplus
Airline
Surplus
 
 6.3.2.1. Fleet optimization 
The WFSFA model computed the optimal network given the existing fleet constraint 
and then chose the optimal fleet. In both cases, airfares and demand were fixed and 
equal to the current values. The main results and comparisons with the current network 
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are displayed in Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6.  
For the fixed fleet (Figure 6.2), the expected social costs decrease to US 2.08 million 
which represents a 31.8 percent reduction in overall costs the largest savings draw from 
the airport operating costs which were reduced by 60.4 percent (US 0.568 million). 
Airline costs were reduced by 21 percent (US 0.337 million) due to a slight increase in 
load factor (to 64.8 percent) and a 2 percent decrease in CASK. Passenger time costs 
remain almost unchanged with a decrease of 1.0 percent (US 1.18 million) because 
much larger savings were available from the supply side. The passenger distribution 
remained almost identical to that of the current network, although the average waiting 
time decreased by 6.3 percent to 153 minutes due to a better schedule coordination 
between flight legs. 
 
Figure 6.2 - Flight frequency for the optimum fleet network 
Thus, the social welfare analysis shows an average and total passenger utility increase 
of 8.1 percent and the government and airline deficits were reduced by 66.1 and 26.6 
percent, respectively. In summation, passenger demand and airfares remain constant, 
hence the improvement in welfare draws mostly from streamlining the network, slightly 
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increasing the number of non-stop itineraries and reducing waiting times.   
When the fleet constraint is removed the total social cost is reduced by 38.2 percent 
compared to the current network, producing savings of US 1.17 million on a daily basis. 
The largest reduction draws from the airport operating costs with a 60.6 percent cut, 
while airline operating costs drop 27.2 percent. The main difference in comparison to 
the fixed fleet solution is the passenger time cost savings of 15.1 percent instead of 1.0 
percent. The fleet merely increases from 31 to 32 aircraft but the fleet composition is 
substantially different resulting in much lower seat capacity: from 3 to 15 19-seater 
aircraft, from 21 to 12 39-seater aircraft and from 6 to 5 78-seater aircraft. The optimal 
fleet mix positively impacts the load factor which rises to 79.9 percent and operating 
costs which drop by 18.3 percent to US 0.105 million. The increase in load factor, 
decrease in CASK and increase in flight frequency by 4.9 percent all provide benefits to 
the passengers. As a result of the higher flight frequency, the average passenger waiting 
time decreases by 25.7 percent to 121 minutes. The social welfare analysis reflects these 
improvements with a 26 percent increase in average and total passenger utility and a 
decrease in airline losses of US 0.249 million, substantially reducing the potential 
subsidy requests. However, the government surplus is slightly lower than that of the 
fixed fleet because of the reduction in landing fees, although still 65.8 percent better 
than the current network equilibria outcome. 
 6.3.2.2. Airfare Variation  
In the airfare variation scenario, we first set an upper bound of 5 percent on any 
potential changes compared to the current prices and then we remove all constraints. 
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The main results and comparison with the current network are presented in Tables 6.4, 
6.5 and 6.6.  
For a maximum airfare variation of 5 percent the total social costs decrease compared to 
the current network by 39 percent. The total passenger revenues collected on the PSO 
flights is US 0.112 million which represents an 8.5 percent decrease compared to the 
current network mainly due to a 2.4 percent reduction in the number of passengers 
carried and an average 1.8 percent increase in airfares. The airfares increase by 5 
percent (the limit) on 38 percent of the PSO routes, airfares increase between 0 and 5 
percent on 32 percent of the routes, while the remaining 30 percent of the routes 
decrease airfares between 0 and 5 percent. The average waiting time is 133 minutes, 
which is an 18.3 percent decrease compared to the current network. As a result, fewer 
aircraft are needed (4 less than the current fleet), the number of flights decreased by 3.7 
percent, CASK decreased to US 0.1, a 22.5 percent reduction, and the load factor rose 
to 79.1 percent. The social welfare analysis shows that all stakeholders are better off 
compared to the current network with increases of 18.7 percent in the total passenger 
utility, 66.4 percent with respect to government surplus and a 37.3 percent reduction in 
airline losses.    
After removing the 5 percent limitation on airfare variation, the total social costs drop 
further achieving a 44.1 percent reduction compared to the current network and an 8.4 
percent reduction over the 5 percent maximum airfare variation (Figure 6.3). Compared 
to the 5 percent maximum airfare variation, the greatest change is in passenger time 
costs whereas airport costs suffer a slight increase. The airfares increase by 10.8 percent 
which leads to a decrease in demand of 17.2 percent in the total number of passengers 
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whilst maintaining the same relative itinerary choice. Airfare variation was more 
asymmetric than the previous 5 percent maximum variation scenario, ranging from 
+41.7 percent (VDS – HFT) to -12.5 percent (OSL – HOV) compared to the current 
airfares, although 60 percent of the PSO markets show a variation of less than 5 percent 
(Figure 6.4).  
 
Figure 6.3 - Flight frequency for the optimum network with unlimited airfare variation 
  
Figure 6.4 - Airfare variation from the current network for the optimum network with unlimited 
airfare variation 
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improved because the airport revenues drop due to the decrease in the number of 
passengers. The average passenger utility increases only 4.6 percent compared to the 
current network, which is a 17 percent drop compared to the previous result because the 
number of flights decreases and the average waiting time increases. Moreover, the total 
passenger utility is lower than the current network by 13.3 percent. In other words, 
capping the airfares is necessary if the government wants to maintain passenger 
throughput and airport activity. 
 6.3.2.3. Passenger waiting time 
One of the more complicated issues connected to the design of a subsidized networks is 
the decision with respect to service levels. Simply defining service levels is a question 
in its own right as it may be expressed in terms of flight frequency, airfares, or 
maximum waiting times across all remote areas given budget constraints. In this 
scenario, we focus on the passenger waiting time by restricting waiting time per market 
to the current value and then by limiting the waiting time to three hours per stop. The 
main results and comparison with the current network are presented in Tables 6.4, 6.5 
and 6.6.  
After restricting waiting time to the current level per market the total social cost drops 
by 42.3 percent compared to the current network.  The largest gains draw from a 33.5 
percent reduction in passenger time costs (US 0.904 million). Consequently, social 
welfare significantly improves for passengers, with an average passenger utility increase 
of 27.0 percent and a total increase of 17.1 percent despite an average airfare increase of 
5.6 percent and a reduction in passengers of 7.8 percent. This result draws entirely from 
Chapter 6 
174 
the reduction in average waiting time to 114 minutes which represents a 30.0 percent 
improvement over the current network. The reduction in the average waiting time is 
mainly due to a reduction on the longest waiting times in the system. The maximum 
waiting time is in the market BJF – MOL – LKN with two passengers waiting for 4.5 
hours compared to 7.5 hours in the current network. Indeed, in the current network 14 
passengers wait for almost 8 hours and 12 percent wait above 4 hours while the 
maximum waiting time in this scenario is below 5 hours and only 2 percent wait more 
than 4 hours (Figure 6.5).  
Overall, the total revenue collected from airfares drops by 2.7 percent as a result of the 
decrease in the number of passengers. This decrease is also reflected in a decrease of the 
number of flights by 3.4 percent compared to the current network and a reduction of 3 
aircraft in the total fleet. The social welfare analysis shows that the government and 
airline are better off than in the current network with 65.8 percent and 38.6 percent gain. 
In other words, it is possible to increase the level of service to passengers without 
compromising airline and government surplus.    
By limiting the maximum waiting time to 3 hours, the objective is to further increase 
the level of service to passengers. Overall, the results show further gains for the 
passengers with the average and total passenger utility rising by 49.5 and 43.5 percent, 
respectively, as compared to the current network. This gain is derived from a 24.9 
percent decrease in passenger time costs and 4 percent decrease un the total number of 
passengers compared to the current network. Moreover, passenger waiting time drops 
by 11.4 percent beyond that of the previous case.  The average waiting time is 101 
minutes with 21 percent of the connecting passenger waiting less than one hour and 82 
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less than two hours. This is a significant improvement over the current network in 
which only 70 percent waited less than two hours (Figure 6.5). The cost of this solution 
is a decrease in government surplus of 13.3 percent compared to the previous case while 
airline surplus remains almost unchanged. These results reflect the focus on the level of 
service offered to passengers. In addition, government agencies and airline are still 
significantly better off as compared to the current network equilibria but not as much as 
other scenarios (Figure 6.6).  
 
Figure 6.5 - Passenger waiting time for the current and passenger waiting time optimum networks  
 
Figure 6.6 - Flight frequency for the optimum network with 3-hour maximum passenger waiting 
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6.3.3 Computational Effort 
The WFSFA optimization model was solved using the optimizer version 22.01.04 of the 
commercial software Xpress (FICO, 2011) on a Quad Core processor with 4GB of 
RAM. The total number of integer variables was approximately 110,000. Before 
applying the optimizer, a set of preprocessing methods were performed reducing the 
number of integer variables to around 48,000. The maximum passenger waiting time 
constraint has a substantial impact on the number of constraints and problem size. For 
the current network, the computation time required was 3.0 minutes including a LP 
relaxation of 2.1 seconds. For the optimal solutions, the average computation and LP 
relaxation times were, respectively, 20.1 hours and 20.6 seconds. The computation time 
required to reach optimality varied between 7.0 hours and 30.8 hours with the shorter 
time covering the first scenario and the longer time necessary for the 5 percent airfare 
variation scenario. The LP relaxation took between 9.2 and 37.3 seconds for the same 
scenarios.  
It is clear that the two sets of integer variables that cover flights and airport operating 
hours are one of the reasons for the computational complexity and the size of the 
branch-and-bound tree. Furthermore, the optimum solution balances different and 
conflicting costs, namely airport, airline and passenger time costs. We also recognize 
that the computer capacity was not ideal for this size of problem, in particular the RAM 
capacity. Despite those limitations, the computation time required seems to be 
reasonable for a strategic approach to be applied on a three to five year basis, In 
addition, the case study encompasses the largest PSO network currently operated 
globally. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
This research proposes a welfare based flight schedule and fleet assignment 
optimization model in order to design a publicly supported air transportation network 
that balances the social costs of the system across the relevant stakeholders.  
An application of the approach to the Norwegian regional network, the largest European 
public service obligation system, illustrates the trade-offs between potential solutions 
for a number of scenarios. Perhaps surprisingly, all the results improve the outcome 
over the current network solution for all stakeholders. In particular, airport operating 
costs are reduced by more than one half for all alternative scenarios, which clearly 
indicates the potential to reduce expenditure in the airport system without 
compromising the level of service offered to passengers. It is also clear that the current 
fleet composition ought to be altered with greater emphasis placed on the 19-seater 
aircraft as compared to the 39-seater aircraft, which reduces airline operating costs.  
Finally, the changes suggested have a relatively small impact on passenger utility unless 
specific service level targets are defined such as limiting the maximum waiting time. 
Overall, the network will require subsidies unless airport charges and passenger price 
caps are increased but on a much smaller scale than necessary today, irrespective of the 
scenario.  
With these findings some general remarks about setting PSO requirements can be made. 
First, the outcomes indicate that governments in charge of subsidized network should 
integrate airport and airline operating costs in their analyses. By doing so the public 
expenditure across the network may decrease. Second, a mathematical model as 
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described in this research could aid government agencies to publish more flexible PSO 
requirements. The results of the analysis have tightened the airline schedule leading to a 
network closer to the socially optimal solution. Third, it might be useful for 
governments to relax some of the aircraft specifications in the PSO requirements as 
aircraft pre-requisites tend to be too restrictive, increasing the CASK and lowering the 
load factors without significantly improving the level of service offered to passengers. 
This could also lead to a more competitive and cost efficient tender process with 
benefits for both passengers and society. 
The social welfare analysis would appear to be a valuable contribution to the air 
transportation literature analyzing low-demand, subsidized, air transportation networks. 
However, the current analysis has some limitations and possible improvements that 
should be point out. The main limitation is that we have considered only one passenger 
type. Considering business and non-business passengers separately should enhance the 
accuracy of the model as the behavior of these passengers is different. A second 
limitation has to do with the passengers’ desirable travel times. Our approach is quite 
simple and based on typical considerations and findings from existing literature. 
Specific analysis for this type of network may improve the daily demand distribution, 
hence the results of the modeling approach. Finally, in terms of computational effort, 
we believe we have reached the maximum network size that can be solved with exact 
methods. Specialized algorithms may be needed if we want to improve and/or add new 
elements to the model formulation. 
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Conclusion 
This doctoral thesis addresses a number of problems involved in the design of congested 
and low-demand, subsidized aviation networks through a set of optimization models. 
The network design optimization models determine optimal flight schedule and fleet 
assignment decisions for aviation networks using different objectives and perspectives. 
These decisions are relevant for: airlines in their planning process; for transport 
authorities in their strategic decision regarding a more reliable and sustainable air 
transportation system; and for governments in their regulatory role.     
The thesis pursued two global objectives, set in the Introduction, one for congested 
networks and the other for low-demand networks. Both global objectives were fully 
accomplished through the five network design optimization models developed: three 
focusing on congested networks and two on low-demand networks. Models relating to 
congested networks deal with different problems faced by airlines, aviation authorities, 
and governments. The specific objectives set for congested aviation networks are 
satisfied throughout Chapters 2, 3, and 4  
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Chapter 2 presents a network design model to determine the optimal slot allocation 
decisions for a publicly owned network. The main contribution of this chapter is the 
definition of optimal slot allocation decisions so that the total social costs of the 
network are minimized, while satisfying a given leg-based demand with a given fleet. 
This approach is suited for governments or aviation authorities in charge of air 
transportation networks. Another contribution of this chapter is the consideration of 
delay costs for aircrafts and passengers in the network’s total costs.  The results from an 
application to the main network of Portuguese airports show a decrease in the network 
costs, increasing the number of passengers and flights. Indeed, the network costs drop 
13.0 percent to 1.533 million EUR/day while the number of daily passengers increases 
from 7982 to 8524 (+ 6.8 percent).  
Chapter 3 introduces a network-wide approach to analyze whether the existing airport 
capacity and slot distribution are capable to accommodate the expected passenger 
demand with lower costs, including delay costs. To the best of my knowledge, this is 
the first model of this kind developed and applied to slot-constrained airport networks.  
The approach is based on an optimization model that minimizes the total costs of a 
liberalized, slot-constrained and congested aviation network. It takes into account 
airline market power, number of slots per airport, available fleet, and expected airport 
delay time. The model can be used by aviation authorities to test and propose different 
slot configurations (or demand management measures), enhancing the information 
available to authorities in charge of those decisions. The approach applied to the 10-
largest airports and 8 airlines in Europe led to a significant reduction in the total 
network cost mainly by cutting by more than half the expected delay costs. With respect 
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to the actual network, the total network costs decrease 10.4 percent to 39.12 million 
EUR/day, while the delay costs drop by 56.4 percent to 1.18 million EUR/day. All 
airlines in the application reduce their costs from the actual network between 6.9 and 
14.3 percent, while the costs also drop for all airports, in this case between 6.8 and 15.4 
percent.  
Chapter 4 describes an integrated flight schedule and fleet assignment model for airlines 
operating in congested, competitive and slot-constrained networks. In this model, 
demand is considered by O/D market which is an important improvement with respect 
to Chapters 2 and 3. The main contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is the 
consideration of delay costs in the airline scheduling process, using the expected airport 
delay time to obtain the expected delay costs for both aircraft and passengers. Other 
improvement to the existing literature is the consideration of airline competition effects, 
assuming that competitors’ frequency is known. Airline market share is then determined 
as function of the airline frequency through the model. The model was applied to the 
TAP Portugal main network, which involves 31 airports. The results indicate a possible 
increase of airline profits by 5.2 percent, corresponding to 25,092 USD/week. The gains 
in profit are achieved mostly by reducing delay costs to 8.4 percent of total costs, 
instead of 9.8 percent for the actual network. This reduction is attained decreasing by 
2.2 percent the number of flights and increasing by 8.0 percent (7 minutes) the 
passenger average connecting time.      
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on low-demand, subsidized aviation networks. To the best of my 
knowledge, network design models had never addressed specifically this type of 
networks. However, as accountability for the use of public funds increases, it becomes 
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more important to determine whether essential aviation services can be set in such a 
way that public expenditure is reduced and passenger level of service is enhanced.  
Chapter 5 presents an integrated flight schedule and fleet assignment model which is to 
the best of my knowledge the first model of this kind developed for subsidized air 
transportation networks. Another contribution to the existing literature is the decision 
approach set for determining the airfares per market and, consequently, the expected 
public subsidies using the outputs of the optimization model. This approach assumes a 
target number of O/D passengers to satisfy. The decision approach was applied to the 
Azorean network, which comprises 9 airports. The results show reductions of airline 
costs and passenger time costs of, respectively, 14.9 percent and 1.3 percent. With those 
cost savings, the average airfares and the expected public subsidies also decrease by 8.3 
and 6.7 percent, respectively. These results are obtained with two less flights than in the 
actual network (40 instead of 42) and using only five aircraft, instead of the six needed 
to run the actual network. 
Chapter 6 presents an optimization model with important additional features with 
respect to the model of Chapter 5, and a detailed social welfare analysis of the results. 
The new model includes airport costs and passenger schedule delay costs in the network 
costs, which did not happen in the previous model. Also, airfares are decided during the 
optimization phase and not after, like in Chapter 5. A significant contribution to the 
existing literature is the utilization of the outputs of the optimization model in the 
analysis of welfare implications for all the players in the system: passengers, airlines, 
airports, and governments. The model and subsequent welfare analysis were applied to 
the Norwegian regional network, which involves 29 airports. Comparing to the actual 
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network, the results obtained signify a reduction of total costs between 31.8 and 44.1 
percent. Most of the cost reduction is due to decreases in airport operating costs 
between 60.1 and 60.4 percent. The most significant welfare gains are for the 
government, whose welfare increases by more than 64 percent for all model scenarios. 
The results obtained in the applications show the usefulness of the various optimization 
models. Despite this, it is important to underline some overall findings due to their 
importance for congested and low-demand networks. First, the use of airport capacity in 
congested networks may be enhanced without compromising airline and passengers’ 
objectives by adapting airline schedules. Second, it seems that airlines operating in 
congested networks will benefit from incorporating delay considerations since the 
beginning of their schedule design process. Third, it appears that governments in charge 
of subsidized networks might reduce public expenditure with the aviation network 
(airlines and/or airports) and still increase the passenger level of service. Also it appears 
that this type of networks really needs to simultaneously consider airline, passenger, and 
airport costs to improve the overall network design and social welfare.    
Despite the effort made to build real-world case studies, it should be emphasize that the 
case studies are hypothetical.  Indeed, some assumptions were made due to lack of data 
or to restrain the analysis to the thesis objectives. Nevertheless, the usefulness of the 
optimization models and decision tools described in this thesis is demonstrated by the 
results and the models can be used in practice as they are or with minor adjustments. 
Improvements and future research work identified in Chapters 2 to 6 can enhance the 
accuracy of the models. Despite this, the author believes that the models introduced and 
applied in this thesis represent a valuable contribution for the existing knowledge about 
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aviation network design, especially for congested and low-demand networks. The case 
studies, largely based on real-world networks, clearly exemplify this contribution for 
airlines, aviation authorities, and governments in their network design decision process.  
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